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The Fires Awakened Us
The catastrophic wildfires devastated British Columbia 
in 2017. The Tsilhqot’in communities, their territory and 
wildlife will take years to recover. Planning for the future of 
impending emergencies needed to happen yesterday.
The wildfires swept through the Tsilhqot’in territory in the 
summer of 2017 and illuminated the issues that plague the 
inclusion of First Nation value systems in government-to-
government relationships.   
 
In many ways the fires awakened the Tsilhqot’in people.
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ThE FIRES AWAkENED uS
The way that us as First Nations people move through the world and experience the world is vastly different from non-First Nations. We have 
come from a history of being viewed as a burden - as something that needs 
to be changed and assimilated. The wildfires of 2017 demonstrated that this 
outdated historical perspective is still active in the way governments and 
organizations view and treat First Nations people.
 
Our traditional, ecological and territorial knowledge of the Tsilhqot’in territory 
weaves an unbreakable thread through our generations for century upon 
century. Protecting our lands, food sources and homes from wildfire is nothing 
new to us. We always knew the time would come for a massive wildfire event 
– it was never a matter of if, but always a matter of when. When the 2017 
wildfires hit, we knew we had a long battle ahead of us. We knew that this 
battle was not going to be on the land with wildfire – it was going to be in the 
administration office with the financial reports, in the homes with the families 
and in the boardrooms with outside organizations.
 
In 2010, my community of Tl’etinqox was evacuated to a centre in Williams 
Lake where our people slept on cots, were provided non-traditional foods 
and were at times viewed with major distrust by local staff. Traumas from 
residential school resurfaced as our elders felt the effects of being forced from 
their homes. Tsilhqot’in leadership did not want to put their people through 
this again, nor were we going to allow our houses to burn as wildfire resources 
went to other areas. We knew we had the strength and knowledge to stay and 
fight the wildfires – so we stayed.
 
Many of our members were trained and had years of experience working 
the front lines of wildfires for the provincial government. They protected our 
homes and our families from what would have been sure devastation.
 
The report that we have produced is a mechanism to allow for a true reflection 
of the experience that we as Tsilhqot’in people endured. We hope this 
report can be used to improve emergency management in other First Nation 
communities while also maintaining their rightful jurisdiction to their lands, 
people and practices. 
A Message From Tsilhqot’in National Government 
Tribal Chairman, Nitsil’in Joe Alphonse
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INTRODuCTION
The 2017 wildfires broke all records in British Columbia as they burnt over 1.2 million 
hectares of land, reached suppression costs of $568 million dollars and forced a remarkable 
65,000 people to evacuate. Todd Stone, Minister of Transportation and Infrastructure 
announced a Provincial State of Emergency that lasted 70 days. In just the first 48 hours, 176 
new wildfires started.1  However, the Chilcotin region is isolated and remote. As a result, it 
saw delayed and unequal wildfire protection, in part because of the Province’s prioritization 
of higher-value urban areas. 
In the Interior of British Columbia, the Tsilhqot’in communities were significantly impacted 
by two of the largest wildfires: the Hanceville Fire and the Plateau Fire. These two fires 
encompassed approximately 761,000 hectares of land, which was 63% of the total area 
impacted in British Columbia.
1 Wildfire Season Summary (2017 BC Wildfires)  
https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/safety/wildfire-status/about-bcws/wildfire-history/wildfire-season-summary
 
Regional Cariboo Chilcotin Wildfire Activity Map (August 29, 2017) 
Compiled by: Tsilhqot’in National Government GIS Department
Tsilhqot’in Communities Highlighted
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The Contention Over 
Inherent and Colonial Authority
The Tsilhqot’in leadership asserts jurisdiction over the territory, yet continues to face 
challenges reconciling its authority with the Governments of British Columbia and 
Canada. 
Jurisdiction in Tsilhqot’in territory is an intricate web of overlapping regional, provincial, 
federal, and Tsilhqot’in authorities. The Tsilhqot’in Nation exercises its inherent 
jurisdiction to care for its land and people. This jurisdiction has been exercised since time 
immemorial. However, with colonialism came the assertion of exclusive jurisdiction by 
the British Crown, and its subsequent division between federal and provincial powers in 
sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (and later the Constitution Act, 1982). 
These colonial laws mean that Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction was not only disregarded, it was 
further obscured by a confounding delineation of territorial authority between federal 
and provincial governments. The federal government’s legislative authority, under section 
91(24) includes “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” managed under the Indian 
Act. Subordinate and selective bylaw-making authority is then ‘delegated’ by the federal 
government to individual Indian Band governments. Meanwhile, provincial legislative 
authority under sections 92 and 92A includes powers over lands and natural resources 
(excluding federal Crown land). 
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized Aboriginal title in Tsilhqot’in territory. 
The decision, while recognizing Tsilhqot’in title over a portion of Tsilhqot’in lands, 
left questions of jurisdiction untouched, and to be determined through future litigation 
or negotiation. As a result of this decision, the resolution of issues of jurisdiction in 
Tsilhqot’in territory is now guided by the Nenqay Deni Accord (BC and Tsilhqot’in Nation) 
(NDA)2 and the Letter of Understanding (LOU)3  between the Tsilhqot’in Nation and 
Canada: January 27, 2017.
2 “Nenqay Deni Accord” February 2016,  http://www.tsilhqotin.ca/Portals/0/PDFs/Nenqay_Deni_Accord.pdf
3 “Letter of Understanding” January 27, 2017, http://www.tsilhqotin.ca/Portals/0/PDFs/Press%20Releases/2017_01_27_Tsilhqo-
tin_Canada_LOU.pdf
Tsilhqot’in National Government & Provincial Government 
Signing - Nenqay Deni Accord (February 12, 2016)
Source: Province of BC flickr.com
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Emergency management in Canada is also an inter-jurisdictional endeavour. Local, 
regional, provincial, and federal authorities must cooperate to address major emergencies. 
From a constitutional perspective, emergency management falls principally to provincial 
governments and their delegates, the municipalities. However, the federal government 
plays a vital coordinating and supportive role, exercising its powers under the Emergency 
Management Act, SC 2007, c 15. 
Since First Nation’s reserve lands fall within federal jurisdiction, they are not subject 
to provincial emergency response regimes. Here again, the federal government plays a 
supporting role, leaving authority over emergency management on reserves in the hands 
of First Nations’ leadership. At the same time, the federal government has entered into 
arrangements with the provinces and third-party organizations to provide resources 
when emergencies exceed the capacity of the local community. As a result, emergency 
management on reserves is known to be a complex arrangement between communities, 
the provincial and federal governments, and third-party organizations.4  This jurisdictional 
complexity creates unnecessary vulnerability and confusion in the face of disasters. 
The discord over authority made a lasting impression on the leadership for BC, Canada 
and the Tsilhqot’in Nation and exposed the expansive work still necessary to attain a 
4  Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2013 Fall Report of the Auditor General of Canada (Ottawa: Auditor General of 
Canada, 2013) ch 6, online: www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201311_06_e_38800.html
Tsilhqot’in National Government & Federal Government 
Signing - Letter of Understanding (Jan. 30, 2017)
Photograph By: Monica Lamb - Yorski, Williams Lake Tribune
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genuine government-to-government relationship as set out in the Accord and Letter of 
Understanding.
During the 2017 wildfires, a flashpoint for these jurisdictional issues was the decision 
of the Tl’etinqox Government, one of the six Tsilhqot’in communities, to not issue an 
evacuation order. Instead, Tl’etinqox followed its own emergency protocols, developed to 
reflect its traditional governance structures, and community members stayed to fight the 
impending wildfires. Among provincial and federal authorities, there was a widespread 
assumption that Tsilhqot’in leadership should simply follow their lead. The Tl’etinqox 
leadership’s decision not to issue an evacuation order caused a negative reaction from 
government. Attempts were made to impose an evacuation of citizens by intimidation 
and persuasion by governmental authorities, and threats of child apprehension. No one 
seemed to contemplate the fact that Tsilhqot’in leadership was in the best position to make 
decisions in the best interests of its communities. 
The emergency operations strategies that the Tsilhqot’in communities employed were 
on par with, and exceeded in many ways, the work of the Emergency Operation Centres 
(EOC) subsidized by the government. 
Having faced multiple evacuations in previous years, the communities began prioritizing 
wildfire response training across the various levels of wildfire suppression. The Tl’etinqox 
were ready with a comprehensive and effective emergency plan reflective of their 
traditional governance structures, modelled on Provincial operations. Tl’etinqox’s wildfire 
response was directed by knowledgeable and strong leadership.  
Hazard Protection Measures in the Tsilhqot’in
Still, due to the fact that the Tsilhqot’in Nation was not sufficiently funded for emergency 
preparedness, they were disadvantaged by the lack of dedicated resources for continual 
planning, training and testing.  The magnitude of the situation forced the communities to 
respond to the emergency even without adequate resources. The conflict over jurisdiction 
caused numerous stumbles, which left communities, land and resources vulnerable to the 
impending wildfires within the territories of the Tsilhqot’in. 
Wildfires in the Tsilhqot’in are inevitable and may be intensifying as climate change 
boosts the probability of wildfire.5  The BC Government predicted that climate change will 
increase droughts, leaving forests more susceptible to wildfire.6 
A ground-based survey of forest fuel conditions surrounding the Tsilhqot’in communities 
was conducted in September 2018 to determine that forest fuel conditions are likely 
to deteriorate in the future due to continued forest health issues. This means the forests 
surrounding Tsilhqot’in communities are becoming  increasingly more combustible and 
dangerous. The diverse forested areas in the territory face increased mortality and are 
highly vulnerable to attack from the epidemic population levels of spruce budworm, 
mountain pine beetle and Douglas-fir beetle.7  The poor health of the forest, in addition to 
deficiencies in forest fuel management and modern forestry practices, are among many of 
the cumulative effects that increase the wildfire risk in the Tsilhqot’in.
5 Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5° Celsius Approved by Governments. (2018). 
[online] Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/2018/10/08/summary-for-policymakers-of-ipcc-special-report-on-global-warming-
of-1-5c-approved-by-governments.
6 Abbott, George and Chapman, Maureen. “A Report for Government and British Columbians. Addressing the New Normal: 21st 
Century Disaster Management in British Columbia.” April 30 2018.
7 Gray, Robert. “Wildfire Fuel Assessment for Tsilhqot’in Communities in the Cariboo Forest Region.” September 2018.
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On February 19, 2018, the Tsilhqot’in Nation, the Federal Government and the Province 
of British Columbia entered into the first-of-its-kind Collaborative Emergency Management 
Agreement8 to build upon a ground breaking platform for effective partnerships in 
emergency management in a cross jurisdictional landscape. 
Following this, the Tsilhqot’in Nation compiled a team of experts and collected advice 
from the knowledge keepers in the territory to develop strategic recommendations that 
support Indigenous peoples as true partners, experts and government authorities in 
emergency management. This report reflects the culmination of that work.
8 Collaborative Management Agreement” February 19 2018, https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/environment/natural-resource-
stewardship/consulting-with-first-nations/agreements/tng_collaborative_emergency_management_agreement_signed.pdf
Throughout this report, you will see the Tsilhqot’in flag. This flag indicates that the 
report is addressing an issue of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction answers the question: who 
has the authority to govern or decide? Jurisdiction is thus fundamental to Tsilhqot’in 
authority over Tsilhqot’in people and territory. The report documents numerous 
significant moments during or after the 2017 wildfires in which the answer to the 
question of jurisdiction was unclear or contested. Because of the fundamental nature 
of these jurisdictional issues and the significance of addressing these issues moving 
forward, additional discussion of jurisdiction can be found in Recognizing Tsilhqot’in 
Jurisdiction in Emergency Management (Appendix B).
Tsilhqot’in National Government, Federal & Provincial Governments
Signing - Collaborative Emergency Management Agreement 
Jan. 30, 2017
Photograph By: Monica Lamb - Yorski, Williams Lake Tribune
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CALLS TO ACTION
1. Develop a centralized Indigenous-led 
Emergency Centre in Tsilhqot’in territory 
with satellite sites to connect isolated 
or remote communities with advanced 
safety and emergency equipment 
2. Construct or update fire halls in each 
reserve equipped with:
• Fire trucks 
• Training space 
• Storage for supplies (i.e. hoses, 
pumps, firefighting equipment) 
3.  Build gathering halls/safe muster areas 
with:
• Commercial kitchen  
• Training area 
• Sleeping quarters 
• Storage space for emergency & 
evacuation supplies (i.e. cots, non-
perishable foods)
4.  Create an immediate on-reserve housing 
and infrastructure strategy fund to:
• Assemble a team to assess the 
wildfire impacts to all homes in 
Tsilhqot’in territory 
• Build houses that are more 
structurally sound and energy 
efficient with air purification systems 
• Upgrade all essential infrastructure 
in the community with stand-by 
generators 
• Expand and improve water treatment 
facilities and reserves for future 
emergencies with back-up systems
5.  Develop lodging in and around each 
community to accommodate seasonal  
workers that assist communities with the 
four phases of emergency management:  
mitigation, preparedness, response and 
recovery
6.  Invest in public services along Highway 
20 and Taseko Lake Road corridor 
including:
• Installing cell phone towers 
• Connecting Fiber Optics in some 
areas 
• Commencing a major powerline 
upgrade on Highway 20
7.  Establish highway signage to clearly 
identify community locations to ensure 
rapid emergency response where 
necessary
8.  Widen and maintain roads to 
communities and egress routes
substandard building and water infrastructure is a common problem on First nation 
reserves. The inadequacy of the infrastructure does not meet the current basic 
needs of the citizens. even worse, the infrastructure does not adequately support 
emergency situations. 
During the 2017 wildfires, the residents west of Williams Lake, BC were compelled 
to fight the fires for many days without external assistance since all wildfire 
personnel were already deployed to other major wildfires. The aggressive wildfires 
in the isolated rural Tsilhqot’in exposed the vulnerability of the communities: 
community water systems lacked the volume to adequately suspend the fires 
that encroached upon the community; the facilities used by the community for 
services or to gather together lacked commercial-grade air filtration systems leaving 
emergency personnel susceptible to prolonged smoke exposure; the volunteers did 
not possess caches of wildfire equipment to efficiently support fire operations; and 
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9.  Establish an advanced protocol 
agreement that establishes an active 
and collaborative leadership role for the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation with:
• Recognition of Tsilhqot’in adaptable 
emergency measures, orders and 
culturally-appropriate relocation 
protocols that differ in form and 
substance from regional, provincial 
and federal actions
• Re-entry protocols for a staged 
approach to returning to the 
community providing continual 
service throughout
• Protocols for child protection during 
emergencies
• Tsilhqot’in access pass lists 
authorized by leadership and 
recognized by the Cariboo Fire 
Centre
• Procedures on geographic 
coordination of wildfire response 
that reflect Tsilhqot’in fire crew 
knowledge of the land
• Revision of protocols to ensure 
that land, resource and wildlife 
recovery and mitigation decisions 
are based on Tsilhqot’in cumulative 
impact assessments and value-based 
approaches are incorporated into a 
territorial management plan
10.  Ratify Nation-to-Nation evacuation 
location agreements with First Nation 
partners to ensure that there is adequate 
capacity, resources and protocols in 
place prior to relocating citizens to 
these venues
11.  Enter into a Service Agency/Tsilhqot’in 
agreement built upon respect and 
recognition of Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction 
that:
• Fosters consistent, ongoing 
relationship and communication 
networks with government service 
bodies beyond the fire season
• Outlines community protocols for 
entering into the community or 
working within the community
• Mandates cultural awareness and 
sensitivity training for all Emergency 
Agencies providing services to the 
community
12.  Develop inter-agency Tsilhqot’in 
Nation service provider agreements 
in the event of an emergency with 
Denisiqi Services Society, Nenqayni 
Wellness Centre Society, Cariboo 
Friendship Society and Punky Lake 
Wilderness Camp Society to provide 
services to citizens during and after an 
emergency event
The Tsilhqot’in faced a multitude of set-backs while trying to govern their 
communities and work with the governmental wildfire protocols. Respect for the 
decisions that Chief and Council make for the benefit of their citizens is paramount. 
The Tsilhqot’in people who are knowledgeable about the land should be recognized 
for their skillsets and the nation should be supported as government. 
The Collaborative Emergency Management Agreement (2018) is a crucial first step 
in recognizing Tsilhqot’in leadership in emergency management. however, further 
detailed agreements are necessary to ensure all parties understand the roles and 
responsibilities of all orders of legitimate government in a way that allows for a fully-
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13. Develop a contract with British 
Columbia establishing a progressive 
framework for on-the-ground 
emergency response within Tsilhqot’in 
territory that ensures:
• Tsilhqot’in crews are properly 
trained and resourced to become 
level 1 contract crews
• Tsilhqot’in and First Nation crews 
are prioritized in deployment before 
other jurisdictions
• Local Tsilhqot’in citizens receive 
priority  for work within the territory 
in the event of an emergency 
including formal Community 
Liaison positions in each Tsilhqot’in 
community
• A requirement for yearly Tsilhqot’in 
wildfire service agreements 
committing to economic 
opportunities for citizens, 
community and privately held 
businesses to ensure they are placed 
as stand-by primary contractors
• Investment in training and 
employment of First Nation first 
responders and wildfire emergency 
management positions to ensure 
local First Nation knowledge is 
retained.    
• A process for experienced 
community crew members 
embedded within the broader fire 
centre structure, i.e. as incident 
commanders
• A provision for sufficient staff, 
supplies, and transportation to feed 
and support crews on the reserve
14. Establish government-subsidized, 
direct, ongoing, and dependable 
funding for training and certification 
that promotes Tsilhqot’in expertise 
(train-the-trainer) including:
• Emergency responder training 
in various roles adapted to the 
Tsilhqot’in mandated role in 
emergency response (i.e. first aid, 
critical incident trauma training) 
• Essentials of operating and 
maintaining emergency equipment 
(i.e. fire truck, structural 
infrastructure unit)
• Development of Tsilhqot’in Wildfire 
Teams with year round conditioning 
and fire suppression training at all 
levels (i.e. S100, S185)
• Evacuation centre personnel 
processes
• Forest fuel mitigation management 
15. Establish government-subsidized, 
direct, continual funding for planning, 
including:
• The development of and 
improvements to comprehensive 
community and Nation emergency 
management operational plans 
that are suitable to the unique 
requirements of each community 
while at the same time, sync with 
the entire Nation. The plans may 
include:
• Adding mechanisms for periodic 
review, practice scenarios, and 
clear protocols for community 
members
• Immediate emergency operation 
action plans 
• Citizen information packages (i.e. 
personal emergency kit checklist, 
relocation “go-bag” essentials, 
contact information for service 
agencies, muster/relocation areas, 
long-term hazard mitigation measures reduce and eliminate risk, and are proven 
to protect communities and create cost-efficiencies for government. Enhancing 
the nation’s capability to respond to and recover from disasters, coupled with 
the abundance of knowledge that the Tsilhqot’in have about the lands in which 
they reside, will improve emergency management. First nation citizens merit a 
prominent role in training, employment and contracting opportunities locally.  
First nation mental and physical health were disproportionately impacted in the 
2017 wildfires. Due to the rurality and uniqueness of the Tsilhqot’in, health needs 
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relocation steps, emergency 
preparedness information)
• A 72-hour plan
• Emergency contacts  
• Crisis communication speaking 
notes
• Relocation procedures,  
• Community roles and 
responsibilities 
• Community-based risk 
assessments, and
• Evacuation routes
16. Establish government-subsidized direct 
funding for personnel, including:
• Full-time Community & Nation 
Emergency Managers (yearly)
• Full-time Recovery Managers 
and Implementation Managers 
to complete recovery funding 
applications & manage the recovery 
projects (until complete)
• A part/full-time Fire Chief for each 
community fire station with a budget 
to recruit and train stand-by Fire 
Fighters
17. Establish a subsidized Tsilhqot’in 
Association of Emergency Responders 
with the responsibility to: 
• Coordinate and inventory individual 
community resources for improved 
Nation-level response and develop a 
labor force survey
• Deliver fire safety programs and 
workshops to communities
• Advance the mapping and 
identification of dwellings and 
streets 
• Develop policies that support Fire-
Smart community principles (i.e. 
debris management)
• Establish an advanced 
communication structure and 
process that:
• Performs a mass call service for 
Tsilhqot’in members
• Connects via alternate modes 
of communication (i.e. cellular, 
WIFI, radio, satellite networks)
• Provides GPS coordinates and 
check-in options for on-the-
ground emergency personnel
• Standardizes mandatory contact 
record keeping
• Establishes an alert siren and 
speaker system to connect with 
citizens without access to phones
• Establishes regular 
communication protocols for 
the entire community and 
Nation during emergencies with 
Tsilhqot’in language speakers for 
general information and updates
• Create door-to-door policies and 
procedures for on reserve check-ins
• Generate Tsilhqot’in culturally 
focused plans and procedures for 
relocation, launching and managing 
evacuation centre camps
• Develop a transportation system for 
each community including securing 
the appropriate means to transport 
citizens
• Launch alcohol and drug support 
program with integrated policies 
in all aspects of Emergency 
Management 
18. Provide direct funding for Tsilhqot’in-
led targeted skills and employment 
training and reduction of barriers to 
employment initiatives (i.e. driving 
lessons, programs to get driver’s license 
back, upgrading)    
19. Establish a holistic health support 
system that includes:
Short to Mid-term
• Integrating mental health supports 
in daycares, schools, band offices 
and health departments for staff and 
citizens 
• Hosting traditional healing 
ceremonies
• Conducting addictions counselling 
and programs 
• Offering Tsilhqot’in focused 
individualized men, women and 
youth empowerment groups 
Long-term
• Emergency Medical Service Team 
contracts for each community 
that include, but are not limited 
to remote nurses, mental health 
counselors and/or psychologists, 
addictions counselors, etc.
• Medical supply lists & emergency 
medicine supplies 
• Ongoing year round expanded 
mental health supports at the 
community level
• The compilation of an emergency 
management planning group, which 
hosts quarterly planning meetings & 
reports on discussions to community 
staff and citizens
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20. Perform test area forest fuel reduction 
practices with training through 
Indigenous-led fuel mitigation measures 
(i.e. prescribed burns) 
21. Conduct a Tsilhqot’in-managed 
comprehensive study on the Cariboo 
Chilcotin forest ecosystem affected by 
the wildfires including conservation 
recommendations
22. Separate the Tsilhqot’in territory from 
the Williams Lake Timber Supply Area 
and apply joint management methods  
23. Engage in rehabilitation planning at 
the territorial level with Tsilhqot’in 
communities playing an active 
leadership role  
24. Create a mechanism for tracking and 
compensating ongoing cultural and 
cumulative impacts 
25. Perform geotechnical work to stabilize 
banks and roads, as well as install 
culverts where wildfires threatened 
the vegetation of the steep slopes 
that surround and are within the 
communities
26. Conduct a damage assessment 
to archeological sites and create/
implement mitigation and protection 
measure for sensitive sites
27. Develop a Tsilhqot’in Economic 
Diversification report in anticipation 
of the decrease of forestry-related 
economics
28. Strengthen and expand collaborative 
enforcement efforts on Tsilhqot’in 
territory to promote cultural, economic 
and ecological values as the land 
recovers from wildfire
long-term mitigation measures and rehabilitation efforts will occur over several 
years and will require specialists in the various facets of forest ecology and planning. 
Tsilhqot’in involvement with resolving the balance to the delicate ecosystems in which 
they rely upon and live within is imperative. 
The Tsilhqot’in have been disproportionately impacted by the wildfires and the impacts 
to their traditional way of life is intensifying. Compensation measures should be jointly 
developed to satisfactorily address the actual impact. The wildfires burnt hectares of 
Tsilhqot’in forest resources therefore investments focused on diversification strategies 












 Land-Based and Economic Stabilization Measures
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29. Start a pilot project that implements a 
one-stop reimbursement process for First 
Nations governments 
30. Reimburse communities in accordance 
with the principle of building back 
better to mitigate future disaster risk 
31. Advance Tsilhqot’in recovery requests 
for financial assistance towards 
community rebuilding as soon as 
possible 
32. Establish clear financial arrangements 
and compensation measures developed 
together between Tsilhqot’in, regional, 
provincial, and federal authorities in 
advance of an emergency through: 
• A reserve fund for Tsilhqot’in 
emergency response and a 
commitment to the timely advance 
of Federal reserve funds for 
emergency situations
• Proportionate compensation and 
restitution processes’ that accurately 
reflects the community’s reliance on 
land-based sustenance 
33. Apply Jordan’s Principle to emergency 
management on reserve to require a 
single government partner to provide 
immediate payment responsibility for 
response and recovery costs 
After the Fires
Photograph By: Monica Lamb-Yorski
Williams Lake Tribune
 
Core funding for emergency management and preparedness has been dedicated to 
government operated emergency operation centres. First nation communities lack 
access to financial reserves and face barriers to obtaining credit extensions when 
they require them for emergency situations. The lack of funding is an impediment to 
preparedness and in the event that the community has suffered an emergency, the 
financial recovery processes are significantly demanding on operations rather than 
building up First nations’ capacity.    
The Tsilhqot’in nation provides autonomous governance for their citizens and 
communities. The most vital duty of the nation is to protect the Tsilhqot’in citizens, 
property, and territory. With dedicated financial resources Tsilhqot’in emergency 
management could be enhanced with community-level planning, coordination and 













Dedicated Financial Resources  
Throughout All Stages of Emergency Management 
18Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires
COMMUNITY SPECIFIC NEEDS
Fast Track expenses incurred During 2017 
Wildfires
• Replace freezers ruined in 2017 power 
outages
• Replace fencing and cattle guards damaged 
by installing fuel breaks
• Hay for livestock & to replace losses
• Repair Anaham Creek to its natural state
• Remove debris from other creeks, roads and 
trails caused by wildfires




• Emergency Operations Centre
• Traditional Community Long-House Gathering 
Centre with kitchen and lodging
• Training facility with storage
• Traditional Arbor & Camping Area for 
evacuees
• Expansion to Health Centre & Services 
health & Wellbeing
• Conduct an immediate community mental 
health wellness assessment to determine 
appropriate service needs
• Facilitated healing circle for staff 
• Holistic health team with comprehensive 
health services
• Land-based equine recovery, healing and 
leadership program
• Safe House 
• End of Life, Palliative Care/Hospice Society – 
to support amplified stress from 2017 wildfires 
on Elders 
emergency equipment needs
• Heavy-duty equipment emergency needs 
assessment and procurement
Tl’etinqox Government Office Specific Needs 
Fast Track expenses incurred During 2017 
Wildfires
• Replace fencing and cattle guards damaged 
by fires and fuel breaks
• Hay for livestock & to replace losses
• Remove debris from other creeks, roads and 
trails caused by wildfires
• Repair damages to homes and public 
buildings
emergency infrastructure
• Satellite Operations Centre (preferably an 
updated fire hall) with  response equipment, 
medical equipment, a training room, and 
kitchen
• Structural protection installed on essential 
infrastructure
• Gas Station
• Upgrade water reservoir, treatment plant and 
hydrants 
• Back-up systems including generators for 
community essential infrastructure
• Community Hall (for safe gathering site)
• Radio Tower or Mobile Satellite
• Helicopter Pad
•    Renovate and replace derelict housing
• Access to water for the dual process of fire 
suppression and irrigation
health & Wellbeing
• Immediate community mental health wellness 
assessment to determine appropriate and 
ongoing service needs
• Ongoing cultural programming on the land as 
part of community healing
emergency equipment needs
•    Needs assessment and procurement of heavy-
duty equipment emergency 
• Two Skidders (Damaged in wildfires)
• Fleet truck 
• Fire truck
Community Capacity needs
• Assess emergency staffing needs and existing 
capacity
• Ongoing training for fire crews
• Simplified emergency management plan for 
community members, including Elders
• Access to reserve funds or expanded credit 
limit
• Indigenous Fire Management methods, such 
as prescribed burning
research
• Needs assessment of medical equipment and 
supplies
• Assess impacts on rights, wildlife, hunting, 
fishing, plant and medicine areas
• Map remaining hunting, fishing, and 
culturally-significant locations for future 
protection
• Develop holistic, territorial, and long-term 
rehabilitation and land-use plan
Yunesit’in Government Office Specific Needs 
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Fast Track expenses incurred During 2017 
Wildfires
•    Remove debris from other creeks, roads and 
trails caused by wildfires
•    Repair damages to homes and public 
buildings
emergency infrastructure
• Toosey Old School Expansion
• Upgraded water reservoir to handle additional 
capacity
• Back-up systems for community essential 
infrastructure
• Structural protection installed on essential 
infrastructure
• Create pump hose caches with adequate line 
to reach homes
• Rebuild hose cleaning station (burnt in 2017)
• Community gathering/muster centre with 
kitchen, lodging and storage
• Camping area for evacuees
• Food & Provision storage
health & Wellbeing
• Conduct an immediate community mental 
health wellness assessment to determine 
appropriate service needs
• Host cultural events to ensure appropriate 
transfer of knowledge to youth (i.e. sweat 
lodge, Tsilhqot’in language and traditions, 
equine healing)
emergency equipment needs
• Heavy-duty equipment emergency needs 
assessment and procurement
• Water vehicles 
• First Aid vehicles
self-reliance Community Projects
•    Establish gardens & greenhouses
•    Raise livestock
•    Host community canning and drying 




• Commercial licenses & transportation 
certificates
internal Policies
• Relocation Order travel policies – to prevent 
people from attempting re-entry after a signed 
evacuation order
• Emergency Response communication 
measures
Tl’esqox First Nation Specific Needs
Fast Track expenses incurred During 2017 
Wildfires
•    Refund expenses towards food, general and 
emergency supplies
•    Wildfire crew expenses (i.e. wages, fuel)
emergency infrastructure
• Band office (new)
• Health Clinic (new)
• Satellite Operations Centre with response 
equipment, medical equipment, a training 
room, and kitchen
• Structural protection installed on essential 
infrastructure
• Back-up systems for community essential 
infrastructure
• Community hall and lodging capacity for 
evacuees with kitchen, showers and storage
• Camping area for evacuees
health & Wellbeing
• Immediate health supports for community 
(i.e. traditional healing ceremonies, men’s 
and women’s support groups, addictions 
counselling programs, individual and group 
counselling) 
• Conduct a community mental health wellness 
assessment to determine appropriate service 
needs
emergency equipment needs





• Ambulance & medical transfer vehicle
• Mapping plotter
Community Capacity needs
•    Medical training (i.e. nurse, first aid 
responders, search & rescue)
research
• Needs assessment on medical equipment 
demands
• Conduct a damage assessment to 
archeological sites
• Develop mitigation & protection measures to 
protect the sites
internal Policies
• Access through road blocks designated by 
Chief & Council 
emergency Preparation
• Develop fire guards around community & 
Punky Lake Wilderness Camp Society
Tsi Deldel First Nation Specific Needs
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Fast Track expenses incurred During 2017 
Wildfires
•    Refund expenses towards food, general and 
emergency supplies
• Emergency response staff expenses (i.e. 
wages, fuel)
• Community living-out expenses (i.e. lodging, 
essential needs)
emergency infrastructure
• Band office (new)
• Satellite Operations Centre with response 
equipment, medical equipment, a training 
room, and kitchen
• Structural protection installed on essential 
infrastructure
• Back-up systems for community essential 
infrastructure
• Multi-use community centre with gymnasium, 
additional separated rooms, kitchen, storage
• Camping area for evacuees
• Gas station
• Upgraded water reservoir to handle additional 
capacity with potable water
• Accessibility:
• Create an Egress route – safety bridge to 
connect to Highway 20
• Upgrade the West Fraser Road washout 
• Signage to mark ?Esdilagh territory
health & Wellbeing
• Immediate health supports for community 
(i.e. traditional healing ceremonies, men’s 
and women’s support groups, addictions 
counselling and programs, individual and 
group counselling) 
• Conduct a community mental health wellness 
assessment to determine appropriate service 
needs
• Host cultural healing events and provide 
Tsilhqot’in courses
• Emphasis on youth programs & events (i.e. 
additional resources for mountain bike trial & 
riding gear, movies in the community, support 
for recreational activities)
emergency equipment needs
• Heavy-duty equipment emergency needs 
assessment and procurement
• Trailers 
• Emergency response vehicles 
• Hoses to reach each home
• Install fire hydrants throughout the community
?Esdilagh First Nation Government Specific Needs
Fast Track expenses incurred During 2017 
Wildfires
•    Refund expenses towards food, general and 
emergency supplies
• Emergency response staff expenses (i.e. 
wages, fuel)
• Community living out expenses (i.e. lodging, 
essential needs)
emergency infrastructure
• Satellite Operations Centre with response 
equipment, medical equipment, a training 
room, and kitchen
• Structural protection installed on essential 
infrastructure
• Upgraded water reservoir, treatment plant & 
hydrants 
• Back-up systems for community essential 
infrastructure
• Band office with community gathering space




• Create an Egress route – Secondary 
passage to leave Nemiah Valley
• Complete air strip
• Upgrade Nemiah Valley Road
health & Wellbeing
•   Conduct an immediate community mental 
health wellness assessment to determine 
appropriate service needs
•    Support for additional essential health staff
emergency equipment needs
• Heavy-duty equipment emergency needs 
assessment and procurement
• Water transportation vehicles
• Water vehicles
Community Capacity needs
•    Remote and isolated community emergency 
response capacity 
internal Policies
• Development of roles, duties and hours of 
emergency staff 
emergency Preparation
• Expansive forest fuel management plan and 
mitigation measures
• Forest prescription project
• Debris clearing along the road and powerline 
corridors
• Identify and develop safety zones
Xeni Gwet’in First Nation Government Specific Needs
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key points 
•  Previous experience with wildfires enabled the Tsilhqot’in to provide recommendations to 
government grounded in expertise, however they were unheeded.
•  The 2017 wildfires revealed inadequate recognition and support of Tsilhqot’in leadership in 
wildfire management.
•  Sufficient financial support towards emergency preparation was not available to First Nation 
communities.
ThE NATION EXPERIENCE
As a consequence of the 2003 wildfires in the Cariboo Chilcotin, later that winter the 
Tsilhqot’in leadership were invited to meet the Firestorm 2003 Provincial Review Team9 
to discuss their overall experience. The largest issue was and still is that the wealth of 
Tsilhqot’in skills and expertise is dismissed by government. The Tsilhqot’in recommended 
true involvement of their people who possess extensive knowledge of the territories and 
that they should be included in the fuel mitigation, fire suppression, and recovery efforts. 
In both 2009 and 2010, some of the Tsilhqot’in communities were evacuated due 
to wildfires and the knowledge of how to better prepare the Nation grew stronger. 
Nevertheless, emergency planning financial resources were scarce. Each community 
created an Emergency Preparedness Plan, but many of these plans were shelved for years 
because the communities could not afford to employ an emergency manager position to 
maintain and manage emergency practices. 
The Nation consistently sought financial resources for the day that a wildfire would 
undoubtedly threaten the communities again, but they were unable to secure sufficient 
funds to prepare adequately. The expansive and distinct composition of the Tsilhqot’in 
territory requires planning at a Nation level, while still recognizing and addressing the 
strengths and challenges of each community. 
The 2017 wildfires finally publicly exposed the inadequacy of provincial emergency 
readiness within the Tsilhqot’in territory. In the heat of the emergency response, the failure 
to properly integrate Tsilhqot’in knowledge and expertise into emergency preparedness 
was on full display. Sometimes inadequate knowledge was as simple as basic local 
geography, as in the mistaken attempt by the RCMP to evacuate the Tsilhqot’in community 
of Tsi Deldel (also known as Redstone or the Alexis Creek First Nation) because of 
confusion with the nearby municipalities of Redstone and Alexis Creek. This lack of 
geographic knowledge is clearly problematic from a logistical emergency management 
perspective. 
More fundamentally, provincial and federal roles in emergency preparedness did not 
adequately support the Tsilhqot’in Nation in playing a leadership role in emergency 
management within their territory. Planning and preparation to support the Tsilhqot’in 
and nearby residents’ safety and security are paramount. The Tsilhqot’in are inherently 
responsible for the livelihood of their citizens, and are responsible to protect their land, 
resources, and traditional wellbeing, which is combined into an intricate value-based 
9 Firestorm 2003 Provincial Review . Province of British Columbia, 15 Feb. 2004, https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/
farming-natural-resources-and-industry/forestry/wildfire-management/governance/bcws_firestormreport_2003.pdf.
Preparedness
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decision-making process. The provincial and federal 
government have not reconciled their governance 
orders with the inherent responsibilities and value 
systems that drive First Nations governance, leading 
inevitably to conflict.
When the wildfires of 2017 swept through Tsilhqot’in 
territory, the communities were left to their own 
devices for many days since wildfires were burning 
out of control across the Province of British 
Columbia. Resources were allocated to the numerous 
interface fires. The highways to the communities were 
desolate because of the roadblocks, and residents 
throughout the territory felt they were abandoned 
and had no choice but to stay and fight the fires 
themselves. 
Tl’etinqox leadership made the 
choice to not sign and authorize an 
evacuation order for their citizens, 
which aggravated interactions with 
RCMP. There was a general perception 
that the Tsilhqot’in were disobeying 
the evacuation order, when in fact the provincial 
evacuation order was not applicable to the Reserve 
lands. In the days to follow, hordes of RCMP and 
Canadian Armed Forces personnel flooded the 
territory. The Nation remained determined to operate 
independently and make the best decisions for its 
citizens and local neighbours. Where possible, they 
sought external supports to ease the burdens while 
combating wildfires.
The lack of understanding of Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction 
was on display most prominently in the conflict at 
Tl’etinqox, when the RCMP attempted to enforce a 
provincial evacuation order. Chief Alphonse informed 
the RCMP that the order was not enforceable unless 
the Chief and Council consented to it, which they 
had not. The fact that a Band Council Resolution or 
bylaw is legally required for an evacuation on reserve 
is easily accessible information contained in the 
province’s Evacuation Operational Guidelines (2009). 
A similar lack of understanding was experienced 
in Yunesit’in, which was subject to a community 
evacuation order. Chief Myers Ross and Council 
members issued a Band Council Resolution 
declaring a local state of emergency and ordering 
that Yunesit’in Government and employees “work 
in collaboration with the primary response agency 
to perform all acts and implement all procedures 
that are considered necessary…”. However, RCMP 
Response
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Tsilhqot’in Caretaker Area Map
Source: Tsilhqot’in National Government Stewardship Department
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sUMMArY of leGAl AUthoritY to deClAre 
stAtes of eMerGenCY And to issUe 
eVACUAtion orders
Emergency response measures on reserves are governed by Band Council Resolutions or 
bylaws. Provincial and regional authorities cannot impose emergency measures on reserve 
lands.
 
In British Columbia, emergencies are governed by the Emergency Program Act, RSBC 
1996, c 111. This legislation empowers the Lieutenant Governor in Council (LGIC) to 
declare a provincial state of emergency (s 9) and it empowers the Minister to implement 
emergency measures (e.g. evacuation orders, roadblocks) (s 10). During a state of 
emergency, the LGIC or Attorney General can assume jurisdiction over the police 
forces and firefighting services (Emergency Program Management Regulation, s 9). 
The Emergency Program Act also empowers local authorities to declare local states of 
emergency (s 12) and to take emergency measures (s 13). However, if a provincial state of 
emergency is declared, local emergency powers cease to have any effect (s 14(3)). 
The Emergency Program Act does not apply to reserve lands. Reserve lands are federal 
jurisdiction under s 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Federal Parliament has not legislated 
specifically on emergency management on reserve lands. Emergency management is 
therefore governed by the Indian Act.
Emergency measures on reserve lands are governed by s 81(1)(a) of the Indian Act, which 
authorizes the council of a band to make by-laws “to provide for the health of residents 
on the reserve…”. Validly enacted by-laws have the force of law; they are binding on 
individuals. During the 2017 wildfires, Tsilhqot’in leadership exercised their inherent 
jurisdiction to protect their communities. They also implemented emergency responses in 
their communities through Band Council Resolutions, issued under the authority of s 81(1)
(a) of the Indian Act. 
did not follow this requirement for collaboration to ensure a “soft” evacuation in the 
community. 
Nation-wide, Tsilhqot’in communities also experienced financial uncertainty resulting 
from a lack of coordination between provincial and local authorities. With the wildfire 
bearing down on Tl’etinqox, and no assurance that provincial wildfire response 
authorization was forthcoming for many days, Chief and Council in Tl’etinqox directed 
crews to begin fighting fire. This decision meant that the community had to assume 
liability and the financial risk of deploying these crews. 
Throughout the territory fire-fighting efforts began without authorization since buildings, 
homes and full communities were at risk. In each community there were many 
recollections of immediate wildfire response activities. Notably, these early firefighting 
efforts are credited with protecting the communities from fire.
Leadership requires adequate consultation and dialogue with both the provincial and 
federal governments well in advance of declaring an evacuation. Merging the local First 
Nations knowledge, local resident knowledge and government processes together would 
create an enhanced emergency response process that would better attend to the particular 
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Fires Burning Across Roads in the Chilcotin
Photograph By: Riske Creek Resident
challenges and needs of First Nations communities. Access to basic resources that are 
common for many Canadians, such as vehicles and relatives who live in evacuation 
cities to lodge with, is often lacking for Tsilhqot’in citizens. Due to financial constraints, 
Tsilhqot’in citizens may not own vehicles, and even if they do, they may not have 
insurance or even fuel. Vehicles may not be road worthy or reliable, thus elevating their 
risk. Emergency management must account for these additional and significant barriers to 
safe emergency response within First Nations communities. 
Each community has varying risk thresholds for agreeing to evacuations, but at the very 
least, all had a safety plan, a support team for the citizens to rely on, and a trained fire 
fighting presence. The media heavily publicized the wildfires and portrayed the Nation as 
acting recklessly for exercising its own emergency response systems instead of heeding the 
evacuations. Tl’etinqox Chief Joe Alphonse was interviewed in the subsequent days and 
described the extensive preparation and planning by his community for wildfire response 
and the importance of First Nations’ autonomy in the case of evacuation procedures.
key points 
•  Emergency response authorities lacked a basic understanding of Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction and 
governance, which caused unnecessary confusion and conflict.
• Proper coordination between the governments of BC, Canada and Tsilhqot’in Nation that 
integrates the knowledge and expertise of all three governments will create enhanced 
emergency management that makes communities safer.
• The Tsilhqot’in communities established emergency management systems to instinctively 
protect their lands and resources.  
• Early firefighting efforts decreased the wildfire footprint.
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Dignitaries from across British Columbia began to seek travel to the Chilcotin to personally 
assess the damage and to provide support. Chuck Puchmayr, a New Westminster City 
Council Member, had maintained a long-standing relationship with the Tsilhqot’in starting 
in his previous role as MLA for New Westminster, and was one of the first to connect with 
Tl’etinqox during the wildfires. Hearing about the refusal by Tl’etinqox to evacuate, and 
in his role as Chair of the Emergency Advisory Committee in New Westminster, Puchmayr 
worked with his riding’s fire department to gift a fire truck to the community of Tl’etinqox, 
which was delivered on July 13, 2017, after his visit to the community. 
Puchmayr observed that Tl’etinqox activated a well-functioning Emergency Operations 
Centre. They were supported by knowledgeable and trained First Nation firefighters, local 
heavy-duty equipment and operators, and the leadership’s assessment of the fires and 
safety plan was accurate and sound. 
City of New Westminster Donation of Fire Truck to Tl’etinqox
Chief Joe Alphonse and New Westminster City Councillor Chuck Puchmayr
Photograph By: Monica Lamb - Yorski - Williams Lake Tribune
Support Through First-Hand Observations
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Grand Chief Ed John, Political Executive of the First Nation Summit (FNS) worked with 
the Ministry of Forests Deputy Minister to arrange a helicopter to fly to the remote 
and difficult-to-access areas of the Tsilhqot’in. Once it was safe and the skies were 
clear enough to fly, Grand Chief Ed John travelled with Chief Bob Chamberlain, Vice-
President of the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs (UBCIC), and Catherine Lappe, 
the Regional Director General for Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) to 
Tsilhqot’in territory. On the day of the visit, the fire was blazing across the river from 
Tl’etinqox, in Yunesit’in’s caretaker area and they were present to witness the local fire 
crews managing the fire. 
Grand Chief Ed John highlighted in their meeting with government officials that in order 
to make appropriate decisions, First Nation leadership require real time information that 
can be provided by the Regional Districts who are equipped with emergency operation 
centres. In addition, the expansive geographic area of a Regional District requires local 
resident representation to advise them on the state of the land. 
In a letter dated July 28, 2017, Grand Chief Ed John wrote to Canadian Prime Minister 
Justin Trudeau and attached “A Proposal for a BC First Nations Emergency Management 
Visit to Tl’etinqox
(Left to Right) Chief Robert Chamberlain, Chief Joe Alphonse and Grand Chief Ed John
Photograph Provided By: Grand Chief Ed John
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Fund to prepare for, prevent, respond to and recover from emergencies.”  The proposal 
called for a $200 million First Nation emergency preparedness and response fund. The 
seven recommendations include:
1.   Review and revise First Nation’s emergency response plans.
2.   Support to develop an integrated multi-agency government and First Nation’s 
emergency response action plans.
3.   Support for emergency response asset acquisitions for First Nations.
4.   Support for capacity development in the form of training and accreditation for First 
Nations.
5.   Dedicated support to the health and wellbeing of evacuees and their recovery, 
financial support for restoration of the community and additional recovery of 
resources expended to First Nation communities that provided safe relocation 
centres. 
6.   Establish an Emergency Operation Centre centrally located along Highway 20 
within the Tl’etinqox village. 
7.   Assistance for the restoration of traditional food security, relief for the impacts to 
First Nation farmers’ and ranchers’ livelihoods and support for First Nation people 
to develop mitigation measures to avoid further cultural and traditional loss. 
During the wildfires of 2018, the BC Assembly of First Nations, First Nation Summit and 
Union of BC Indian Chiefs resubmitted the seven recommendations to Prime Minister 
Trudeau and Premier John Horgan.10
10 “BC First Nations Being Devastated by Wildfire Season of 2018, Immediate Resources Needed.” UBCIC Website, 22 Aug. 2018,  
https://www.ubcic.bc.ca/bc_first_nations_being_devastated_by_wildfire_2018.
Fire Across Chilcotin River near Yunesit’in Community
Image Facing South From Tl’etinqox Community
Photograph By: Grand Chief Ed John
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key points 
•  At the outset of the wildfires, there was widespread apprehension regarding the competence 
of the Tsilhqot’in.
• The Tsilhqot’in accommodate BC and Canada’s jurisdiction in safety and emergency 
management, but expect a similar recognition.
• In principle, support for Tsilhqot’in leadership in wildfire emergency management is existing 
and widespread. building on this foundation of support will allow the Tsilhqot’in nation to be 
true leaders in First nation led emergency response.
Lappe had received many calls of concern 
from other governmental organizations, and 
traveled to the Tsilhqot’in communities with 
FNS and UBCIC to meet with Tsilhqot’in 
leadership. Lappe affirmed that the role 
of Federal Government is to work with 
communities to understand from their 
leadership what types of supports they 
require, rather than to assume what is 
best for the community. In Tl’etinqox, 
she affirmed that Chief and Council were 
clearly within their own authority to issue 
evacuations and alerts on their Federal 
Indian Reserves.  
Becky Row, Canadian Red Cross Senior 
Manager for Northern and Indigenous 
Engagement BC & Yukon, saw many 
lightning strikes from her Prince George, 
BC office on July 7, 2017, and knew that 
assistance from the Society would be 
required shortly because a substantial 
fast-moving incident was underway. Row 
connected with the First Nation Health 
Authority to provide her contact information 
and described that the role of the Red Cross 
was to provide financial assistance to those 
working towards recovery. 
 
The Canadian Red Cross faced the barrier of 
not having up-to-date contact information 
for each First Nation community, which 
prevented immediate service delivery. Once 
contact was made, the Canadian Red Cross 
proceeded with meeting the leadership 
to seek culturally-respectful guidance on 
working within the community. Quickly 
learning that the First Nations communities 
have unique needs, the Red Cross team 
communicated daily with their internal 
team to discuss the various experiences and 
themes, and to seek methods to address 
them quickly. 
fAst trACKinG reCoVerY eXpenses
In the weeks following the wildfires’ abatement, Lappe organized community tours with 
additional service agencies to learn about the communities’ experiences and needs. Lappe 
discovered that integrating the work of varied agencies in emergency situations requires 
much more effective coordination. As such, a different approach was employed to commit 
to fast track recovery funding from the Federal government to help First Nations build back 
quicker after impacts from natural disasters. 
In the case of the 2018 Alkali Lake wildfire that destroyed many structures in the 
Telegraph Creek area of the Tahltan Nation and displaced several community members, 
the Federal government was able to accelerate funding so the First Nation could cover 
initial expenditures. The process still requires further refinements to reducing the extensive 
paperwork requirements.
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The six Tsilhqot’in Nation communities shared similar experiences and challenges. At 
the forefront was the difficulty in communicating and coordinating with governmental 
organizations. In general, an inordinate amount of time was spent educating external 
organizations about the jurisdiction of the Tsilhqot’in. Both Tsilhqot’in citizens and non-
First Nation residents expressed the concern that if they made the decision to stay and 
protect their homes, infrastructure and livestock, they would be punished by having 
services cut off to them.
Concerns about child apprehension loomed large in Tsilhqot’in 
communities. RCMP had threatened to remove children from the Tl’etinqox 
community in a meeting with Chief Alphonse to try to force them into 
evacuation. A verbal battle between Chief Alphonse and the RCMP ensued 
with each threatening duelling roadblocks. The Chief then informed them 
that they needed to seek legal advice about evacuations on First Nation 
Common Wildfire Experiences
sUMMArY of proVinCiAl AUthoritY 
to Apprehend Children on reserVe
Under provincial law, police officers and MCFD officials have the authority to remove a 
child if they reasonably believe the child’s health or safety is in immediate danger, or if an 
official reasonably believes that the child needs protection and no less disruptive measures 
are available (Child, Family and Community Service Act, RSBC 1996, c 46 ss 27, 30). 
Section 88 of the Indian Act makes these powers applicable on reserve lands.
When making a decision about removing a Tsilhqot’in child, officials are to be guided by 
the best interests of the child, which is elaborated in the Child, Family and Community 
Services Act to include consideration of: “the child’s cultural, racial, linguistic and 
religious heritage” and “[i]f the child is an aboriginal child, the importance of preserving 
the child’s cultural identity must be considered in determining the child’s best interests” (s 
4). In the Nenqay Deni Accord, the province committed to working with the Tsilhqot’in 
Nation to provide: “adequate support for Tsilhqot’in children and families, delivered and 
managed by Tsilhqot’in Communities, in accordance with Tsilhqot’in laws and values…” 
(s 8).
Denisiqi Services Society (DSS) is a Delegated Aboriginal Agency affiliated with the 
Tsilhqot’in National Government that works with MCFD when there is a child protection 
concern. DSS does not have decision-making authority over child removal. This leaves 
the decision to remove a Tsilhqot’in child in the hands of police and MCFD officials who 
exercise provincial authority.
The exercise of provincial jurisdiction over child removal is part of a long colonial legacy 
that includes Indian Residential Schools and the 60s scoop. Against this backdrop and 
the recent class action proceedings on behalf of 60s scoop survivors, threats of child 
apprehension are always grave and traumatic for Indigenous communities. The threats of 
child apprehension during the 2017 wildfires perpetuate this colonial legacy. These actions 
failed to reflect the spirit and intention of the guiding principles in the Nenqay Deni 
Accord. They fail to reflect the goal of family preservation – achieved through prevention 
services and adequate family support – that ultimately breaks the intergenerational cycles 
of trauma.
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reserve since the Chief was acting within 
his authority and that he felt strongly that 
the children were safest where they were.
These threats were, in part, acted upon in 
Tl’esqox where RCMP misled a Councillor 
in order to “mark” houses with children 
in case child apprehension was deemed 
necessary. For families that did evacuate to 
evacuation centres in the cities, they faced 
increased surveillance by the Ministry of 
Child and Family Development (MCFD). 
Displaced from their communities and 
ordinary support systems and in a high-
stress setting, parents were scrutinized — 
not supported — by the province.
In various accounts from community 
citizens, revolving enforcement personnel 
at roadblock crossings were uncooperative 
and inconsistent in enabling access 
to designated staff — even those with 
sanctioned passes — to deliver essential 
food and supplies. Delivering goods to and 
from the communities was a dangerous job 
because the fire had crossed the highway 
several times and continued to burn close 
to the road. However, safety protocols were 
in place to ensure that those drivers had 
knowledge of the territory and some had 
wildfire interface experience, which helped 
to assess and mediate the risk. 
The issues with roadblocks started from a 
lack of communication and clarity around 
permits. Even some of the Tsilhqot’in 
leadership were not provided with permits 
at the start. Dealing with RCMP who had 
come in from elsewhere was entirely 
inconsistent. For this reason, it was later 
suggested that it would have been helpful 
to have a community member or liaison 
stationed at each roadblock.  
The enforcement of roadblocks during 
the provincial state of emergency was 
arbitrary and often confrontational. At 
times, enforcement officials — largely 
RCMP— recognized the need for Tsilhqot’in 
government employees to pass through 
roadblocks to provide essential supplies. 
Other times, roadblocks were strictly 
and aggressively enforced. There was no 
consultation with the Tsilhqot’in Nation 
about the placement and enforcement of 
roadblocks in Tsilhqot’in territory during the 
wildfire.
Enforcement of roadblocks depended 
on the particular officials on duty. On 
some days, officials would let Tsilhqot’in 
citizens and employees pass through. 
Other days officials would strictly enforce 
the same roadblock in an aggressive, 
confrontational and disrespectful manner. 
The result of this arbitrariness was that 
Tsilhqot’in government employees were 
constantly uncertain about whether they 
would be permitted to carry out their jobs 
in supporting Tsilhqot’in communities. 
Tsilhqot’in authorized representatives were 
not uniformed. While they held positions 
of authority delegated by their respective 
leadership or Emergency Operations 
Centres, they were not equally recognized 
for their role within the Nation. Many of 
these positions were essential services for 
the welfare of the community emergency 
response teams. Enforcement officials either 
lacked a basic understanding of Tsilhqot’in 
authority or understood, but refused 
to respect the vital role they played in 
emergency response in their communities.
Information about the location of 
roadblocks was poorly communicated 
to Tsilhqot’in communities. Moreover, 
decisions about the placement of 
roadblocks were made without input from 
Tsilhqot’in communities and resulted 
in alternate routes left accessible and 
unpatrolled. This was a missed opportunity 
to incorporate Tsilhqot’in knowledge of 
the territory to ensure the safety of those 
travelling through the fire zone.  
Access passes issued by the Fire Centre 
were a partial solution to the challenge 
of managing roadblocks. Passes allowed 
authorized individuals (such as Tsilhqot’in 
National Government employees) to pass 
through roadblocks. These passes were 
a welcome, if belated, development. 
However, for Tsilhqot’in community 
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key points 
• Provincial authorities attempted to undermine Tsilhqot’in leadership during the response 
through threats of child apprehension and increased surveillance.
• Roadblocks were sites of confrontation, discrimination and active impediments to effective 
Tsilhqot’in wildfire response.
• Communication was strained, particularly in the rural setting of the Tsilhqot’in, and Tsilhqot’in 
knowledge and expertise was not incorporated into provincial wildfire response strategy.
members, leadership and employees, the permitting process was time consuming and 
difficult to access. 
Local territorial knowledge was disregarded and as a result, government-to-government 
relationships were further strained. The governmental by-the-book procedures were 
frustrating to experienced and senior Tsilhqot’in wildfire staff who possessed practical 
experience and land-based knowledge, which could have been greatly beneficial to 
wildfire suppression efforts. Without adequate consultation and dialogue, a significant 
amount of the territory was decimated. Wildfire response activities, such as back burns, 
resulted in excessive damage to cattle guards and fences, timber, wildlife, medicinal 
plants, culturally significant sites, and even led to unearthing human remains from 
important spiritual burial grounds.  
A central theme that emerged in documenting the Tsilhqot’in experience 
for this report is the significant knowledge that Tsilhqot’in people have of 
their territory and how little of this knowledge was accessed or respected 
by emergency responders and fire crews. Daily briefings occurred in the 
communities, but only conveyed information on what had already been 
decided by the provincial response authorities. Crucial decisions about 
firefighting strategy, such as the location and extent of back burns were made without 
meaningful consultation with the communities who have knowledge of the territory and 
who are most impacted by the consequences. 
Chiefs noted that it would take 10 days or more to develop a working relationship with an 
Incident Commander, and then the 14-day shift would come to an end. There was a very 
strong impression that every Incident Commander who came through approached their 
work with the First Nations differently. In a few notable and laudable instances in some 
communities, leadership recall that they were asked about sites to be mindful of that held 
cultural significance. But after the 14-day shift, the Incident Commander was not seen 
by the community again and there was no indication that this important information had 
been transferred to the next Incident Commander. 
Burnt power lines created communication challenges for those actively working in 
communities. Within five minutes of leaving the Williams Lake city centre, travelling west 
on Highway 20, cell phones do not have network coverage. The lack of communication 
posed many safety concerns.
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For the communities that were evacuated, 
their citizens were scattered into evacuation 
centres in different cities. The setting added 
to citizen stress and in many cases triggered 
residential school trauma: memories of 
being forcibly removed by authorities, 
staying in unfamiliar group lodging and 
many separated from family and friends. It 
was the first time for many of the Tsilhqot’in 
to travel to a larger urban centre. The 
effects on the health of the Tsilhqot’in from 
evacuations is still being understood today. 
Many found being separated from family 
to be extremely stressful, without the 
emotional, social, and economic supports 
they might be used to.  Normally, within 
the confines of the community, leadership 
and their employees provide basic services 
to their people. Band offices, daycares, 
and health clinics offer a range of support 
services from providing access to health 
care professionals to administering 
income assistance. Counselling for mental 
health instabilities and addictions are 
essential community services. The health 
departments even provide basic toiletries to 
those in need. The staff recognise if families 
may require a food hamper or assistance in 
some form. 
Displacement eliminated access to these 
types of services, and at the greatest cost to 
the Nation, led to the loss of a Tsilhqot’in 
Elder’s life. During the evacuations a 
Tsilhqot’in Elder, identified as a vulnerable 
person, was reported missing when he did 
not return back to Tsi Deldel after being 
evacuated to Kamloops, BC RCMP, family 
and friends searched extensively, but sadly 
in the spring the Elder was found and had 
passed. The Canadian Red Cross assisted 
the community and family to transport the 
Elder back home to have a peaceful burial. 
Within the Nation there are Elders who 
speak only the Tsilhqot’in language. Intake 
at evacuation centres was a discouraging 
process for those with language barriers 
and literacy challenges, which resulted 
with many not receiving financial support. 
In addition, the evacuation generated new 
Fires Burning in the Tsilhqot’in
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Evacuations and the Tsilhqot’in
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key points 
•  Evacuation procedures were not culturally appropriate and left Tsilhqot’in without adequate 
support.
• Tsilhqot’in leadership and staff effectively managed a complex emergency response effort, 
providing support to all six communities and evacuated citizens as needed.
• Basic services refined in communities were not available to Tsilhqot’in citizens when they 
were evacuated.  
• Due to a lack of culturally appropriate programming some citizens did not receive support 
during evacuation. 
• The six communities maintained a central emergency operations centre. 
• The six communities continued to maintain their duties and obligations to citizens and were 
available to support them. 
• The Tsilhqot’in National Government provided centralized services (i.e. training, mapping and 
logistical support) to each community in a regionalized manner. 
expenses, adding financial difficulty to 
impoverished citizens. Many people rely 
solely on preserving fish and wildlife in the 
summer to provide sustenance throughout 
the year. At the same time, evacuees were 
forced to spend funds on costs that they 
would not have encountered at home – 
i.e. laundry mat expenses, commercial 
transportation, groceries, shelter for 
themselves and their livestock/pets, and fuel 
and insurance for vehicles. 
Within communities, where possible, 
facilities remained open as a central point 
of contact providing services to citizens 
and workers that stayed behind. Often 
times, leadership and staff were required 
to advocate on behalf of those in need and 
were stationed at these locations. These 
were gathering sites for citizens and staff.  
An emergency operation site for the Nation 
and a separate one for Yunesit’in were 
hosted in Williams Lake in the Tsilhqot’in 
National Government (TNG) offices. When 
the City of Williams Lake was evacuated, 
staff that remained in Williams Lake were 
scattered to different cities and had to assist 
to the best of their ability remotely.
The TNG staff and volunteers assisted 
citizens and communities with various 
needs to ensure that the operations went 
as smoothly as possible; however, the 
logistics were undeniably complex. 
Staff worked from revolving task and 
responsibility lists that were created newly 
each day.  The many duties they assigned 
included assisting citizens with registration 
at the evacuation centres, and shopping 
for and delivery of large orders of food 
and prescriptions. Community delegates 
were helped with shopping for inventory. 
Deliveries of supplies to the community 
were frequent, often several times a day. 
Limited supplies in BC forced staff to 
procure supplies from other provinces. 
TNG Geographical Information Systems 
Technicians developed daily maps specific 
to the territories.  These maps were widely 
praised for their usefulness. Neighbours 
would check the TNG social media pages 
for up-to-date information they could not 
easily receive elsewhere. 
The Nation hired a community contractor 
to host Basic Fire Suppression and Safety 
(S-100) training courses on the fly. When 
communities required assistance, the staff 
were there to help. Daily conference calls 
helped communities to be connected, 
receive updates, and determine outstanding 
needs. 
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The Cumbersome Road to Recovery
Recovery
Beginning as early as August 2017, communities performed damage assessments and 
began recovery planning. By the beginning of September, each community needed to 
focus on daily operational programs and provide regular services to citizens. However, 
recovery has been plagued by an intensive recovery-reimbursement process. Over a year 
since costs were expended, some reimbursements are still being reviewed.
The current funding approach to emergency response in Canada is 
structured through a reimbursement process. Communities are expected 
to cover up-front response costs and then use a reimbursement process 
facilitated through Emergency Management BC. First Nations in British 
Columbia must also follow this provincial process, even though emergency 
funding is ultimately sourced from the federal government. 
Unlike municipalities, Tsilhqot’in communities do not have the capacity to maintain 
emergency reserve funds to cover emergency expenditures. Multiple Tsilhqot’in 
communities had to establish a line of credit with private financial institutions to cover 
emergency response expenditures. Tsilhqot’in communities were required to make a 
financial leap of faith to respond to the wildfires, hoping that costs would eventually be 
recouped, placing significant financial strain and uncertainty on the communities in the 
interim. In the absence of loans from financial institutions, Tsilhqot’in leadership would 
have been in the untenable position of having to lay-off essential front-line staff in their 
communities. 
This leap of faith has not fully borne out. Communities are still waiting, well over one year 
after the 2017 wildfires, for full reimbursement for their emergency expenses. Tsilhqot’in 
communities already face a significant financial strain in the day-to-day operations of their 
organizations. This forces the communities to provide services to their citizens without the 
appropriate financial support until they can recover from the financial impact. 
Each community varies in size, but most needs are common amongst them all. 
Documenting losses is an extensive process resulting in databases of information, but to 
actually perform the recovery requires financial resources and human capacity. 
Although funding has been available through various sources, the 
communities have had difficulty handling the extra administrative burden 
of applying for, and reporting on funding. Funding should flow directly to 
each community to ease financial risks. Navigating a disjointed and non-
transparent web of financial and reporting requirements spread across 
multiple agencies including FNESS, EMBC, Red Cross, and DISC has put 
significant strain on staff.
The Tsilhqot’in National Government held a meeting for community finance managers 
to provide information on the reimbursement process and to learn from one another’s 
experiences. Finance managers learnt then that there are many different bodies that 
provide reimbursement however it would be scrutinized by one group at a time. This 
process was unsatisfactory. As a start, through the Tripartite Collaborative Emergency 
Agreement senior staff representing the many bodies established a table to field the 
recovery requests together.  The table has not addressed all questions and reimbursements 
are still outstanding.
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key points 
•  Emergency financing is premised on assumptions of financial capacity that do not match 
reality.
• Reimbursement for emergency expenditures is slow, involves multiple departments and places 
an excessive administrative burden on Tsilhqot’in communities.
• Recovery needs in Tsilhqot’in communities are significant and urgent. Tsilhqot’in communities 
remain vulnerable to the next wildfire.
International standards for emergency management point to the 
recovery stage as a crucial moment for rebuilding in a way that prepares 
communities for the next emergency (known as ‘build back better’).11 
Building back better means repairs that go beyond simply restoring 
infrastructure to its previous state and improving that infrastructure so that 
it is sufficiently resistant to future threats. Despite the standard emergency 
management practice of building back better, Tsilhqot’in communities need significant 
additional support from provincial and federal authorities for recovery that reduces 
vulnerability to future wildfire. 
11 United Nations Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030), Priority 4.
Fires Burning in the Chilcotin
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Impacts to the Tsilhqot’in Peoples
Helicopter with Water Bucket near ?Esdilagh, BC 
Photograph By: Richard Lam/PNG - Vancouver Sun
Individually, people are deeply and emotionally impacted by the scarcity of their 
traditional sustenance and medicinal plants and berries. Compensation for the loss of 
them has also been elusive. The citizens put high significance on their traditional practice, 
considering them invaluable. In addition to determining the impact to the community, 
there is always confusion about whether to approach the federal or provincial government 
for support. In the short term, these impacts have been supported financially through the 
Red Cross “cultural livelihood” funding, a catch-all form through which individuals can 
claim lost opportunities in hunting, fishing, and the like, and income lost from traditional 
arts industries and cultural work. While these applications are pouring in, there is concern 
that this may not be the appropriate restitution for longer-term losses in game, fish, 
medicine, and berries. Further, this process is inadequate to capture the collective impacts, 
beyond economic impacts, on Tsilhqot’in peoples’ ability to practice their rights. With so 
much burned up, people are having to go further and further out into the territory to find 
game and berries, beyond the areas that have been traditionally and continuously used. 
This has deep social, cultural, and political implications for the exercise of Tsilhqot’in title 
and rights.
Sadness and mental health concerns has plagued many families after the experience of 
working on such a tumultuous fire without proper provisions. Witnessing large tracks of 
traditional land, wildlife, and livestock die in the fire added an even greater emotional 
burden to many. 
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As part of the effort to suppress fire mobility, firefighters destroyed fences, cattle guards, 
and even historical and current trails or roads. In some areas, the machinery-built fire 
guards had diverted water courses, which led to flooding. In other areas, wildfires left 
hillsides barren of vegetation causing mudslides during heavy precipitation. 
The wildfires not only devastated traditional sustenance, but also continue to impact the 
daily life for the animals that did survive. The Tsilhqot’in Nation is a steward of the land 
and prioritizes conservation for future generations, yet the Nation is consistently at odds 
with political decisions that conflict with these values. 
The jurisdictional division between provincial and federal crown lands 
divides the territory and the rehabilitation work being done on it. While 
rehabilitation work has begun on Crown land in Tsilhqot’in territory, 
the lack of a comprehensive land use plan at the territorial level means 
that rehabilitation work is somewhat piecemeal and lacks overarching 
Tsilhqot’in authority or vision on how the work will unfold. On the one 
hand, there has been a positive move towards direct awarding rehabilitation contracts 
to community entities. A group of five communities including Yunesit’in, Tl’esqox, Tsi 
Deldel, Tl’etinqox, and Esk’etemc have established zones in the Hanceville fire complex 
and have been contracted to each of these zones. So, while it is a positive development 
that the government is receptive to First Nations managing the rehabilitation program, 
major decision-making has still come from the Province, undermining the community 
leadership’s inherent right to plan, set priorities and make decisions on their lands. Further, 
the process has been too slow, as prescriptions have been made, but much of the work 
hasn’t started. 
Homes and infrastructure within the Tsilhqot’in communities are subpar to those in 
non-First Nation communities. Housing on reserves is in need of major repairs, often is 
infested with bats or mold and is severely overcrowded. The shortage of housing has been 
a longstanding issue and forces multiple families to live within one house. Infrastructure 
Impacts to the Tsilhqot’in Land
At the onset of the 2018 fire season and throughout the summer, anxiety increased, and 
panic was triggered by helicopters, sirens, and smoke. Many of the people who worked 
on or throughout the fires have had little time off as the burdens of the community are 
unending.
Citizens who are personally recovering from the exhausting experience identified many 
health and wellbeing issues, in addition to the effects to their livelihoods as ranchers, 
trappers, farmers, and woodlot owners.  The emotional, mental, and physical health of the 
citizens has been negatively compounded. Asthma and depression are among the many 
common physical and emotional symptoms. 
Unfortunately, there is concern that the residual mental health impacts, as well as 
increased disposable income, particularly among the young men on the fire crews, had 
increased alcoholism and impacted family and community safety. Heavy drug and alcohol 
use started or increased during people’s evacuation to urban areas, and drugs are now 
coming back to the community from those cities. Incidents of drunk driving, violence, 
domestic violence and familial conflict have increased from previous rates. The evidence 
is plain: there is an urgent need for counselling as well as community healing, including 
debriefs, community gatherings, cultural and land-based activities and traditional 
ceremony. 
Impacts to the Homes, Properties and Livelihoods
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key points 
•  The 2017 wildfire has had a deep and far-reaching impact on Tsilhqot’in citizens, affecting 
land-based practices, mental health and livelihood.
• Significant rehabilitation activities are ongoing in Tsilhqot’in territory.
• Economic opportunities have flowed to Tsilhqot’in-based companies in a modest and 
piecemeal way, but planning and major decision-making in the region has been led by the 
province in the absence of Tsilhqot’in collaboration. 
• Infrastructure on reserve is inadequate to suitably support the basic needs of the citizens and 
even less suitable to support their needs in an emergency situation.
• The Tsilhqot’in communities lack sophisticated emergency operations equipment and a facility, 
although they are well situated to manage these operations themselves. 
• Tsilhqot’in communities face greater struggles to recover from disasters than non-Indigenous 
communities and face disproportionate impacts.  
“I remember going to the Cariboo 
Regional District (CRD) Office, probably 
around seven at night and then realizing 
they have a pretty big room, and they 
have all their communications, have a huge 
tv-screen projecting all of the events taking 
place, people sitting around a big table with 
all their computers, laptops and phones, 
everyone dialed into communicating on 
different things and already, by that time, 
there had been about 36 different fires that 
started up, all within an hour’s time. Going 
in there I realized that we weren’t going to be 
a priority. That is the biggest thing I got out 
of that night.”       
Chief russell Myers-ross
needs are significant. Many of the 
communities have remained on boil water 
advisories for years without any indication 
of when or how their community water 
systems will be improved. The common 
buildings, often not properly constructed, 
are insufficient to 
handle the needs of 
the communities.  




acute. Lack of 
emergency structures 





facilities, and storage 
left the communities 
vulnerable. Further, 
each community was 
faced with issues of 
disrepair and limited 
capacity of their water reservoirs and 
treatment plants.
After the wildfires, these inequalities 
worsened. Rodents had moved into 
hundreds of evacuated homes, seeking 
refuge from the fires. Resulting from group 
lodging and clothing donations, bedbugs 
infiltrated homes. What is a small issue 
to some becomes a large issue in First 
Nation communities. For instance, seeking 
housing inspectors to assess the state of 
each household has become a significant 
challenge. Cleaning homes and clothing 
to prevent the spread of bedbugs is an 
arduous activity without individual washing 
and drying machines. Existing dilapidated 
houses became 
further impacted. The 
Tsilhqot’in is in an 
even greater state of 
crisis facing housing 
shortages. 
Patterns of animal 
behaviour has 
changed due to 
the landscape 
disturbances at 
times causing a 
safety concern for 
the people. The 
displaced animals 
pose a threat to daily 
activities like walking 
to and from school.   
Ranching is a 
source of income for many citizens in the 
Tsilhqot’in. The wildfires either injured 
livestock or burned them to the point of 
non-recovery. Communities have noted 
negative impacts on the production of hay, 
and the procurement of hay for livestock 
because hay fields were either burnt or left 
unmanaged. The fires decimated integral 
outbuildings and further continue to impact 
the economical bottom line of these small 
businesses. 
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key points 
•  Cultural competency training for service agencies that support First Nations in 
emergencies is a first step.
• First Nation communities require continual and government-subsidized training. 
It is clear that government representatives across a number of ministries need training in 
the jurisdictional authority of First Nation governments, as well as cultural competency 
training in working with Indigenous communities. Given the high turnover of personnel, 
this training must be frequent and ongoing. In particular, the RCMP should be prepared 
to take direction from Chief and Council. Beyond simply hiring liaisons, community 
members should be embedded within the larger emergency response and management 
system, taking up leadership roles such as division supervisors and managers.  
Training for the Tsilhqot’in communities needs to continue to ensure that more people 
within the territory have tickets and certifications for wildfire suppression. In the summer 
of 2018, the Province of BC contributed a mobile Community Structural Protection Unit 
(SPU) to the Tsilhqot’in National Government. The SPU contains approximately 350 
sprinklers and can protect between 30-35 homes. Tsilhqot’in citizens were trained to 
operate this highly-valuable unit. Although this was a significant contribution the nation 
requires an ongoing and comprehensive training regime along with a cache of equipment 
and inventory.
In May 2018, the Tsilhqot’in Nation issued permits for mushroom harvest 
and declared “No Harvest Zones” within the territory.12  This exercise of 
jurisdiction led to a coordinated approach with other governments and 
agencies and allowed the harvest of lucrative, post-fire mushroom crops, 
while also protecting culturally-sensitive areas destroyed by the 2017 
wildfires. 
Many non-Tsilhqot’in people—including visitors and those who live in the territory—
were exposed to, interacted with, and abided by Tsilhqot’in law and jurisdiction. In the 
beginning, there was resistance from some mushroom buyers and mushroom pickers, 
however this had subsided quickly once the Tsilhqot’in had explained that the measure 
was taken for conservation purposes and to keep the area clean. A small fee was charged 
for the pickers and buyers. The fee allowed Tsilhqot’in land rangers to monitor areas for 
safety purposes, maintain outdoor bathroom facilities and empty Tsilhqot’in-provided 
garbage bins. 
This form of governance should be expanded to other areas of land management. This 
includes seeking ways to put assessment, monitoring, and prevention roles directly into the 
hands of the community, including leading in prescribed burning.  
12 Tsilhqot’in National Government. “Tsilhqot’in Issue Permits for Mushroom Harvest in Territory.” 2018. http://www.tsilhqotin.
ca/Portals/0/PDFs/Press%20Releases/2018_05_18_MurshroomPermitPR.pdf
Advancing and Strengthening 
Relationships - A First Step
Taking Back Inherent Jurisdiction
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The Tsilhqot’in mushroom harvesting permitting regime is a tremendous success story of 
collaborative, inter-jurisdictional stewardship in Tsilhqot’in territory. In anticipation of a 
significant influx of people onto Tsilhqot’in territory to harvest and purchase mushrooms, 
the Tsilhqot’in Nation exercised its inherent jurisdiction to establish a permitting system 
on Tsilhqot’in territory. Early and ongoing conversations led to an effective enforcement 
collaboration between the Tsilhqot’in Nation and the Ministry of Forests, Lands, Natural 
Resource Operations and Rural Development, Conservation Officers, Natural Resource 
Officers and the RCMP. 
British Columbia has not established a regulatory regime for mushroom harvest on Crown 
lands. As a result, there is, at present, no possibility for a jurisdictional conflict between 
provincial law and the exercise of Tsilhqot’in law over mushroom harvesting on Tsilhqot’in 
territory. Rather, the Tsilhqot’in Nation has effectively filled an existing jurisdictional gap. 
The objectives of the 2018 Tsilhqot’in mushroom harvesting regulation were to manage 
the influx of mushroom harvesters and purchasers, ensure their safety, protect culturally-
and-biologically sensitive areas within Tsilhqot’in territory and generate economic benefits 
for Tsilhqot’in communities. The regulation required mushroom pickers and buyers 
to purchase permits from the Tsilhqot’in National Government. The harvesting permit 
allowed harvesting only in designated areas, which excluded the Title lands and sensitive 
areas within Tsilhqot’in territory.
The Tsilhqot’in permitting regime was supported by the Government of British Columbia 
through a Land Act closure applicable to sensitive cultural and biological areas within 
the fire perimeter. Tsilhqot’in Land Rangers led the implementation and enforcement of 
the permitting system, with ongoing support from provincial and federal enforcement 
agencies. In August 2018, Tsilhqot’in leadership heralded the management of the 
mushroom season as success defined by a “spirit of collaboration” (Media Release Aug 8, 
2018).  
Riske Creek Fire
Photograph By: Riske Creek Resident
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The Tsilhqot’in Nation has also exercised inherent jurisdiction over the 
harvest of moose in its territory, in response to a severely-declining moose 
population and the unknown effects of the 2017 wildfires. Prior to the 
hunting season in September 2018, the Tsilhqot’in and Southern Dãkelh 
Nation Alliance, comprised of 10 First Nation communities, declared a 
joint prohibition on Limited Entry Hunt (LEH) for moose in response to 
the Province’s plan to allow a LEH with a few limited restrictions.  The fire guards built 
in 2017 dramatically increased hunting access routes into the territory and increased 
access to wetlands considered to be high value due the abundance of moose found in the 
area. The burnt natural moose canopy cover had opened up sight lines for hunters and 
predators, making wildlife especially vulnerable.
Management of the moose population in Tsilhqot’in territory is an example of both 
jurisdictional cooperation and conflict. In 2017, both the Tsilhqot’in Nation and 
British Columbia imposed moratoriums on the moose hunt, post-fire in portions of the 
territory. Yet moose management is an ongoing source of conflict, with the Tsilhqot’in 
Nation and Province unable to reach a consensus. The Tsilhqot’in Nation opposes the 
current provincial approach to still issuing LEH authorizations and feels this approach is 
incautious in light of the cumulative threats faced by the moose population, the lack of 
study post-wildfire, and the failure to close all the access roads built in 2017. 
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Conflict in the 2018 hunting season culminated in a Moose Co-Management 
Agreement between the Tsilhqot’in Nation and the Province, directed at developing and 
implementing a framework before the 2019 season. Stewardship decisions about the 
moose population in Tsilhqot’in Territory are guided by both the Nenqay Deni Accord and 
Moose Co-Management Plan. This plan will work towards moose recovery by dealing with 
habitat loss, and human and predator caused mortality.
Moose are an important traditional food source for the Tsilhqot’in and are thus, of 
significant cultural value. The Tsilhqot’in Nation exercises its inherent jurisdiction over the 
land, guided by its stewardship obligations with respect to the land and wildlife. The right 
of Tsilhqot’in citizens to hunt moose in their territory is protected in Canadian law under 
s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
Provincial decisions impacting the moose in Tsilhqot’in territory are subject to the Crown’s 
constitutional obligation to consult and accommodate the Tsilhqot’in communities. In 
addition, the Nenqay Deni Accord constitutes a bilateral Fish and Wildlife Panel, which 
provides “the framework for collaborative management of Fish and Wildlife in Tsilhqot’in 
Territory” (12.26). A key role of the Panel is to provide recommendations to provincial 
decision-makers regarding stewardship decisions within Tsilhqot’in territory (12.28 and 
Riske Creek Fire
Photograph By: Riske Creek Resident
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key points 
•  The Tsilhqot’in receive wide-spread support by local non-First Nation residents in their efforts 
towards applying conservation measures to circumvent wildfire effects within their territory. 
• Decisions affecting wildlife, lands and resources within Tsilhqot’in territory need to be 
reconciled with Tsilhqot’in rights, culture, values and goals to achieve jurisdictional 
cooperation.   
• Wildfire fuel breaks created heightened access to vulnerable wildlife.
• Provincial authorizations affecting Tsilhqot’in within the Cariboo Chilcotin continue regardless 
of the recommendations towards wildlife management made by the Tsilhqot’in.
the Tsilhqot’in Stewardship Agreement). Over the course of several months, the Fish and 
Wildlife Panel deliberated on a joint recommendation on the 2018 moose hunt, however, 
it was unable to reach a consensus and no joint recommendation was made. 
As a result of BC’s decision to move ahead with the LEH for 2018 and the Tsilhqot’in 
interim moose protection law which prohibits moose hunting in Tsilhqot’in Territory, there 
remains an unresolved jurisdictional conflict. It remains to be seen whether or to what 
extent the work envisioned by the Moose Co-Management Agreement will address this 
ongoing jurisdictional conflict. 
Moose management has proven to be highly political involving numerous parties. 
Nonetheless, as the stewards of their lands, the Tsilhqot’in need to be at the forefront of 
making decisions, and planning for the conservation of the moose and moose habitat. 
The communities have not allowed the 2017 jurisdictional battle to affect how they 
continue to manage their lands. Still, they are faced with daily opposition to overcome the 
barriers to self-determination.
The Tsilhqot’in, in March of 2018, also enforced conservation measures when they 
announced the closure to fishing Steelhead trout on the Chilcotin River.13 The Tsilhqot’in 
forwent their Aboriginal right to fish the newly acclaimed endangered species under the 
Species at Risk Act. In a press release, the community called upon the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans to also eliminate the bycatch from the commercial Pacific salmon 
fisheries. 
The many conservation measures that the Tsilhqot’in have executed were examined 
closely. The wildfire impacts have played a role in both, the reduction of fish and wildlife, 
and the creation of an in activity on the land. Many of the Tsilhqot’in communities have 
made the decision to not hunt or fish due to these concerns. However, at the same time, 
putting restrictions on hunting and gathering impacts the food sources that the community 
citizens heavily rely upon. While these decisions can be difficult for the communities to 
make, Tsilhqot’in leadership upholds the traditional teachings to care for the lands on 
which the people rely.
Ongoing issues with unilateral decision-making by government, even in reporting, 
rehabilitation, and strategic planning, demonstrate that the jurisdictional and operational 
conflicts have yet to be addressed. While some communication and relationships have 
improved between Tsilhqot’in leadership and certain government partners, for others, it’s 
back to the status quo. 
13 Tsilhqot’in National Government. “Tsilhqot’in Nation Announces Full Closure of Steelhead Fisheries.” 2018. http://
www.tsilhqotin.ca/Portals/0/PDFs/2018_03_20_SteelheadClosure.pdf
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TL’ETINqOX  GOVERNMENT 
Anaham First Nation
The Tl’etinqox (Anaham) Government is located just over 100 kilometres west of Williams Lake, BC on Highway 20 on the Chilcotin Plateau. The main reserve is located northeast of the 
Chilcotin River and the community of Alexis Creek. Tl’etinqox have over 1600 citizens registered 
and are the largest of the Tsilhqot’in communities with less than half of their population residing 
on the reserve. 
Tl’etinqox infrastructure on the reserve includes a band office, health centre, elders centre, 
elementary school, church, and gas station. The health building and the elementary school were 
the latest to be constructed. The newer buildings provide a safe, clean and healthy environment 
for health care services and schooling. Tl’etinqox seeks opportunities to upgrade and replace the 
facilities for the benefit of their people.  
Tl’etinqox Government operates numerous subsidiaries, which include Dech’en Ventures Ltd., a 
successful forestry company, and Tl’etinqox Trading, a convenience store and gas station. 
Cultural camps are held in summers to nurture the transmission of traditional teachings on the 
lands within the territory. Additionally, an annual ride on horse or bike embarks from Tl’etinqox 
and journeys to the Williams Lake Stampede. The journey is five days, and the participants stop to 
camp along the way. The event is multigenerational and is another way to foster the teachings. 
Often Tl’etinqox is in the media because the leadership places an emphasis on publicizing the 
disparities of treatment toward their people and First Nations in general. They have assumed the 
responsibility to advocate for better services. Knowledge of such disparity is otherwise hidden 
from public.
This type of publicity is exactly what Tl’etinqox leadership welcomed during the 2017 wildfire 
experience.
Tl’etinqox Aerial View 
Photograph By: Grand Chief Ed John
46Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires
wildfire fuel Assessment 
The Tl’etinqox main reserve is located on both sides of highway 20 located northeast of the 
Chilcotin River. Between the river and the highway lies mostly hayfields that have been irrigated 
in the past but have not been active for several years. These fields could have high surface fuel 
loads once the grasses have cured in late summer however the highway lies between the fields 
and most structures which would act as a fire guard. 
surrounding the community the terrain slopes steeply and has scattered Douglas Fir with 
moderate-to-low surface fuel loads. These steep slopes have discontinuous forest cover and 
intermittent cliff bands that act as partial fuel breaks. 
 robert gray, Fire ecologist 
r.W. gray Consulting ltd.
Tsilhqot’in Wildfire Fuels Assessment
“Why is it that at just the 
slightest provocation, they will 
take our kids away? I would have 
been willing to go to jail for that. 
We’re making a stand. We want to 
look after ourselves and we don’t 
want to depend on anybody.”
Chief Alphonse
The Wildfire Warriors of 
Tl’etinqox - The National Observer
The Tl’etinqox Experience
July 7, 2017 marked the first day that wildfire threatened Tl’etinqox. Tl’etinqox Chief and 
Council immediately recognized that the only way to save their residences and buildings 
from the intense rampant wildfire was to launch an Emergency Operations Centre, 
mobilize their wildfire interface personnel, and prepare to fend off the fires themselves. 
Building on previous wildfire experiences, the Chief and Council knew that an evacuation 
order could not be issued without a signed resolution by the community leadership. 
Chief Joe Alphonse assessed the risk for the community, knowing that if the community 
evacuated, they would have no authority to defend their homes and territory. Throughout 
the years, hundreds of their citizens were trained in various levels of wildfire response, 
from managing an Emergency Operations Centre to front-line wildfire response, and they 
were confident in handling the situation. 
Leadership’s choice to not evacuate, knowing the 
decision was within their full jurisdiction, was not 
understood or accepted by the RCMP. The RCMP 
had continued to try to force an evacuation of the 
community and alerted citizens that if they did not 
leave they would be forcibly moved or arrested. 
Further, the RCMP threatened the apprehension 
of children. At odds with enforcement personnel, 
Tl’etinqox had many abrasive encounters, which 
forced the leadership to act independently to 
safeguard the community. 
These threats and preparations were excessive and 
disrespectful. Moreover, if acted upon, they would 
have undermined with the exercise of Tsilhqot’in 
law. Tl’etinqox had in place a relocation order for vulnerable citizens; emergency 
preparedness actions had been taken in the community to protect children during the 
wildfire.
The Tl’etinqox Government 2017 Wildfire Report – A Compilation of Tl’etinqox 
Residents’ Encounters with the Wildfire,14 released in September 2017, documented the 
comprehensive accounts of the community’s experiences. The fire originating south of 
14 Verhaeghe, Crystal.“ Tl’etinqox Government 2017 Wildfire Report – A Compilation of Tl’etinqox Residents’ Encounters with the 
Wildfire.” Tsilhqot’in Territory. 2017.
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“A few weeks after I left Tsilhqot’in territory, 
I witnessed the fire at the Joe Rich community 
in Kelowna, BC I refer to this as the Joe Rich 
fire versus the Joe Alphonse fire. Firefighting 
response was abundant with water bombers 
flown every 20 minutes. When I was in 
Tl’etinqox I did not see any. 
In Kelowna, they protected the high-
valued land but it was not the same in the 
Tsilhqot’in. The land & territory was not 
perceived as a high-value area however in 
wealthy communities, infrastructure could 
be replaced quicker whereas in a First Nation 
community it may take several years.” 
Chuck puchmayr
New Westminster City Council
Tl’etinqox, across the Tsilhqox (Chilcotin 
River) travelled north east to Tsibas (a 
mountain east of the community). The 
historic Lee’s Corner, a restaurant and gas 
station, had burnt down and the fire was 
travelling closer to the community. At the 
same time a fire flanked southwest of the 
community. 
The highway was closed soon after and 
citizens of Tl’etinqox prepared to safeguard 
their homes and relocate, if necessary 
to the neighbouring communities of Tsi 
DelDel (Alexis Creek First Nation) or the 




band office, gas 
station and nearby 
fields became 
the gathering 
site for hundreds 









gathered to await 
instruction to fight 
the fires. Citizens 
were travelling 
along the highway 
to extinguish spot fires that could reignite 
and saturate burning hydro poles. The fires 
had compromised the hydro and telephone 
lines, leaving the communities without 
communication and electricity. The health 
building was the only building that had 
a backup generator, but within hours a 
secondary power supply was installed for 
the gas station. 
Working from the Tl’etinqox health 
building, the community assigned staff 
and volunteers to cook for the mass of 
people. Days into the wildfires, there was 
no sign of wildfire support. The community 
established firefighting crews and instructed 
un-dispatched equipment operators to 
begin working on the fires. Chief Alphonse 
assumed the liability and financial burden 
to start protecting their community. 
An emergency operation centre was 
established, governed by the Tl’etinqox 
Emergency Operations Plan (TEOP). People 
were assigned to managerial positions 
of Operations, Planning, Logistics and 
Finance and the Incident Commander and 
Emergency Operation Centre Director 
were established. They assumed their 
roles and duties at set out in the TEOP. 
The plan was modelled after provincial 
processes; however it included information 













body and the 
Indian Act Chief 
and Council 
system dissolved 
to ensure the 
emergency 
management 
process would be 
the sole authority. 
Early into the wildfires, several dignitaries 
traveled to the community to get a first-
hand impression on the state of the situation 
and to understand the community needs. 
Representatives from the Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs Canada, Union of British 
Columbia Indian Chiefs, First Nations 
Summit and Ministry of Indigenous 
Relations travelled to meet with Tl’etinqox 
leadership, volunteers and youth. 
Commitments were made to expedite funds 
in the event of losses. The dignitaries left 
with firsthand knowledge of the state of the 
community and territory and furthered their 
advocacy for the Nation from a far.
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City of New Westminster representative Chuck Puchmayr, City Councillor travelled to 
Tl’etinqox when the roads were clear, to meet with Chief Alphonse and learn about 
emergency protection mechanisms that were in place. After the initial meeting, it was 
deemed safe to transport a fire truck donated from the City of New Westminster to 
Tl’etinqox. Puchmayr traveled back and forth to the community delivering supplies often. 
The wildfires of 2017 strained the relationship between the First Nation 
Health Authority (FNHA) and the Tl’etinqox Government office. FNHA 
personnel were instructed by their superiors to stop work out of concern 
for their personal safety, even though there was no local evacuation order 
in force in Tl’etinqox. While FNHA staff did what they could to arrange 
for prescription medicine orders, supplies and deliveries, Tl’etinqox was 
stripped of essential health care services without notice.  Tl’etinqox sought emergency staff 
to fill the gaps in health services immediately and found health care staff with specialized 
training in remote medicine willing to travel to them. The exit of FNHA staff left the 
Tl’etinqox Health Clinic in an impossible position, as it had been operating as the main 
assembly point of the community.
Several fires in the Tsilhqot’in territory and surrounding Tl’etinqox merged to become the 
Hanceville Complex Fire and the Plateau Fire. These fires were not contained until mid-
September 2017. Tl’etinqox, united as a team, stood their ground to fight the wildfires that 
continuously threatened to decimate their residences, coming within feet of the village 
buildings. 
Recovery, Over A Year Later
Early on the community recorded damages, and worked diligently to refine their records 
to accommodate the reporting method requested by government. Tl’etinqox was the first 
Tsilhqot’in community to seek recovery reimbursement and submitted their first draft of a 
recovery plan in September 2017. They became an experimental subject in this difficult 
and time-consuming process. This funding, over a year later, has still not been fully 
reimbursed adding additional pressures to the community. 
Many issues resulting from wildfires affect the basic human needs of Tl’etinqox citizens. 
Many of these issues could not wait for the recovery process, and the community relied on 
own-source funding to address them. Additional impacts from the fire, similar amongst all 
of the communities, include smoke and water damage, melted siding and roofing, rodent, 
bat and bed bug infestation, demolished fence systems, and broken cattle guards.     
Tl’etinqox submitted damage reports to the government for the hay fields, houses, 
public buildings, and land-based impacts from heavy duty equipment (i.e. fire guards, 
creek impacts), supported by specialized maps, photos to reflect the damage, and GPS 
coordinates to identify the exact location. These documents later required further details. 
Tl’etinqox submitted documentation to support response costs and any identified recovery 
needs. Specific to community healing, many proposals were submitted to restore the 
community in a holistic manner. Activities such as equestrian healing were proposed as 
the Tsilhqot’in people have a strong relationship with horses. This may be unconventional 
and challenging to fund under existing government silos, but it is important to the people 
and their culture. 
In addition, therapists for the community developed a mental health impact assessment 
that documented an increase of negative coping strategies, interpersonal violence, and 
negative physical body symptoms compounded from stress (Appendix C). Heightened 
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“First Nation leadership reach out to me when wildfires jeopardize their communities 
and territories. We give them support and advice, but we all are impaired by 
government processes and narrow-minded approaches when it comes to including us 
in emergency management. 
My hope is that the Tripartite Collaborative Emergency Management Agreement will 
foster practical incorporations of First Nation jurisdiction in emergency management 
based on the recommendations that we provided living it first hand.
 
When we are faced with an emergency, we need the resources and infrastructure in 
place to protect people, wildlife, homes and buildings within the territory.”
Chief Joe Alphonse
Darell Petal and Robert Elkins fighting fires 
threatening the Riparian Ranch and IR #18. 
Left to fight the fires themselves, they worked 
for 24 hours and saved the Riparian Ranch.
Photograph By: Rebecca Rosette
anxiety was expressed in 
anticipation of the next wildfire 
season or with the presence of 
smoke.15 The demand for both 
conventional and cultural healing 
supports far outweighs the current 
capacity.
Over a year after the wildfires had 
ended, a team provided immediate 
and emergency health services to 
the community. Getting through 
a year without wildfires in the 
community forced the workers to 
settle in and reflect on their current 
state of wellbeing. Many of them 
had worked straight through, and 
without breaks because of not 
only an overwhelming backlog 
of regular work, but also the vast 
needs of the recovery efforts. It 
is clear that emergency health 
support is not a one-month 
endeavor, there is a need for 
continual support. 
In the spring of 2018, as a result 
of the wildfires, Tl’etinqox had 
numerous floods. The community 
pursued Disaster Financial 
Assistance (DFA) for the secondary 
losses of hay field production and 
water source debris management 
due to flooding. These issues have 
been flagged in the community 
recovery plans for rehabilitation.
15 Hartwick, Lisa. “Tl’etinqox Community Holistic 
Health Review of Effects Summer Wildfires, 
2017.” Tl’etinqox Government Caretaker Lands. 
2017
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Reconciliation and Preparation
In April 2018, Tl’etinqox and the RCMP participated in a relationship-building healing 
circle to begin reconciliation from the 2017 wildfires. The RCMP also attended Indigenous 
Awareness Training specific to the Tsilhqot’in. 
In August of 2018, the New Westminster City Council and the Tl’etinqox Government 
began the processes to connect the municipality of New Westminster with the First Nation 
community as a sister city. This relationship is the first of its kind in Canada. 
The relationship between New Westminster and Tl’etinqox has been a strong one. The 
Tsilhqot’in Nation received a donation of two police department vehicles in the summer 
of 2018. One was used for the Tsilhqot’in Ranger program and the other for Tl’etinqox 
security program.
The community was immersed in every aspect from response to recovery, and therefore 
are confident that they are equipped to handle a similar emergency. The Tl’etinqox is 
prepared to deploy equipment, personnel, and set up a fire camp. 
Over the year, staff have undertaken professional development training in all aspects of 
operating an emergency operations centre and attended wildfire and structural interface 
training. Furthermore, the knowledge they gained from seeking out the appropriate 
paperwork in a haste, is now documented for ease of process in the future. 
• Focused training in firefighting and the functions of an Emergency Operation Centre since 
2003. 
• Asserted decision to not evacuate the community even when threatened by enforcement 
personnel because of the understanding of the jurisdictional authority regarding evacuation 
protocols on First nation reserves. 
• Assessed the community’s ability to respond to wildfires and initiated culturally-appropriate 
emergency processes and safety procedures.
• Adopted community direction about how to handle the emergency situation.
• Accompanied elders to annual elders gathering and situated them in a safe location 
throughout the wildfire.
• Documented a chronological report on the Wildfire experience.
• Established a process to ensure that spot fires were attended to, hydro poles were 
consistently saturated along the highway and an overnight crew monitored the wildfires’ 
proximity to the community. 
• Assumed governance and financial implications of responding to wildfires immediately when 
there was no other support available.
• Developed a single decision-making body in emergency operations and dissolving indian Act 
Chief and Council system to prevent duelling internal authorities. 
• Applied knowledge of the traditional territory in decision making.
• Fostered a sister-city support system with a city that had expertise in emergency operations 
and a long-standing relationship with leadership.
• employed remote medical support staff to assist with health care needs of the community. 
• Commenced recovery plan and damage assessment during the end of the wildfires. 
• Commissioned a mental health and wellbeing report written by the community therapist.  
• initiated a healing circle jointly with the rCMP to reconcile the damage to the relationship 
during the wildfires of 2017.
Tl’etinqox Best Practices
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YUNESIT’IN  GOVERNMENT 
Stone First Nation
Yunesit’in (Stone) is located approximately 105 kilometres west of Williams Lake, BC, and 8 km south of Hanceville, off of Highway 20 in the Chilcotin Plateau. Its original place-name, ‘Gex 
Nats’inilht’ih,’ refers to where rabbits were hunted. The main reserve overlooks the Chilcotin River 
on the south side. Yunesit’in has 450 registered citizens, 250 of whom reside on the reserve. 
Infrastructure on the reserve includes a band office and health centre, elementary school and 
gym, church, saw mill, youth centre, water reservoir and treatment plant, and three greenhouses. 
While the band office, school, and greenhouses are new, some of the other infrastructure need 
upgrades, including the water reservoir, and an old firehall that is no longer properly equipped. 
Yunesit’in Government operates a subsidiary forestry company, Yunesit’in Development 
Enterprises (YDE). 
A majority of Yunesit’in’s population speaks the original language, Nenqayni Chi. Yunesit’in 
embraces Tsilhqot’in values and identity in the land, expressed through central activities 
including cultural camps, horseback riding, and fishing. 
Together with Xeni Gwet’in, and with support from TNG, the Yunesit’in Government launched the 
Dasiqox Tribal Park Initiative in 2017. In an area known as Nexwagwezʔan—“it is there for us”—
the tribal park is a proposed land, water and wildlife management area in traditional Tsilhqot’in 
territory. The communities exercise Indigenous governance over about 300,000 hectares of 
wilderness and wildlife habitat, bordering a number of existing parks and protected areas.
Yunesit’in Community View 
Photograph By: James Smith
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wildfire fuel Assessment 
The Hanceville Complex fire burnt within a few hundred metres of Yunesit’in. The fuel loads have 
been reduced on the south side of the community due to the fire and subsequent salvage logging.
between the burnt area and the southern side of the community is a band of deciduous trees. 
Several large hayfields are to the north and west of the community. Lightly burnt Douglas 
fir stands are located east of the community with an estimated mortality of these stands are 
less than 30%. The forests lie outside of the immediate Yunesit’in dwelling and community 
infrastructure. 
 robert gray, Fire ecologist 
r.W. gray Consulting ltd.
Tsilhqot’in Wildfire Fuels Assessment
In the late afternoon of Friday July 7th, 
citizens of the Yunesit’in community 
remember seeing a big plume of smoke 
directly adjacent to the reserve. Those who 
were travelling between the reserve and 
Williams Lake at this time, report seeing 
at least ten or eleven lightning strikes. As 
one citizen remembers, “we were at home 
and first I… heard the thunder coming and 
the lightning and I was excited because 
in our tradition when there’s lightning it 
means the salmon is coming up the river.” 
However, within a matter of 30 minutes, 
the magnitude of what was about to unfold 
started to become clear. 
When the fires began, Yunesit’in staff and 
leadership were scattered throughout the 
province—a challenge in coordination, 
governance, and communication that 
would persist throughout the wildfires. 
Most staff were travelling from north of 
Prince George, BC, where they had been 
on a work retreat. The Band Manager, 
with the few staff and summer students 
who remained at the band office, took 
immediate action. Very quickly, the band 
office became its own “little ops centre,” 
which oversaw the provision of essential 
resources and services that were neglected 
by the Cariboo Regional District Emergency 
Operations Centre (EOC) in Williams Lake.
Meanwhile, two of four band councillors 
were in Vancouver, where they had just 
completed a training with the First Nations 
Education Steering Committee. The Chief 
and another councillor were in Williams 
Lake. Nevertheless, by about 5:30 p.m., 
Chief and Council came to a consensus 
to issue a Band Council Resolution (BCR) 
to evacuate the reserve. However, it was 
intentionally decided that it should be 
implemented in a moderate and culturally-
appropriate way, rather than forcing people 
to leave—an approach that both the 
Province and the RCMP would fail to grasp. 
Almost right away, existing gaps in 
community infrastructure became acute. 
The fire truck, which had fallen into 
disrepair, had been sold the previous year. 
Since then, the fire hall had been used 
primarily for storage. The first night, Lee’s 
Corner, an historic store and gas station 
burnt down. As the power went down, in 
an area already without cell phone service, 
communication was cut off. A dearth of 
backup generators and no community 
freezer meant that each household’s deep-
freeze—containing the yearly supply of 
hunted game, fish, and other essential 
foods—began to thaw. Further, the limited 
capacity of the reserve’s water reservoir 
and treatment plant, already in need of 
upgrades, became an urgent source of 
stress. However, when the Chief walked in 
to the EOC that night, it was clear that his 
community and their infrastructure needs 
were not going to rise the top of their list. It 
Friday July 7th, an 
Indication of What Was to Come
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was clear that the majority of response operations would have to be taken on by the band 
itself. 
At the same time, community fire crews were quickly assembled. Under the Yunesit’in 
Development Enterprise, forestry crews became wildfire crews. However, YDE’s Forestry 
Manager was out of town and the community’s most experienced fire fighter was stuck 
in Williams Lake. With approximately 20 personnel on standby, they were guided by the 
Forest Manager from a distance. By the time they were sent to their first post that night, 
the fire was already of out control, and they were told by the Fire Centre to stand down. 
Meanwhile, others from the community were ready to join crews, but they required fire 
training and certification first. 
If the chaos of that first few hours revealed anything, it was that inconsistent coordination 
and inter-jurisdictional ambiguity with provincial and federal authorities would continue 
to pose operational and governance challenges which needed constant troubleshooting, 
generated instances of undermining the community leadership, created financial 
uncertainty, and delayed wildfire response and access to necessary resources on the 
reserve. Nevertheless, community strengths were also revealed: unity among band 
council, staff, and membership; a willingness to share responsibilities; and a strong 
commitment to advancing and acting on community authority. Despite many complex 
challenges, showing great resilience, Yunesit’in was able to respond to and recover from 
the 2017 wildfires in a way that prioritized community wellbeing. 
Yunesit’in Wildfire Crews and Canadian Armed Forces
Photograph By: Rebecca Rosette
Although the community started with inadequate infrastructure, patchy certification, and 
dispersed leadership, by the time the last of the community fire crews were taken off the 
line in the first week of November, much had been accomplished. 
Starting with about 20 crew members from Yunesit’in, by the end of fires, the Response 
Coordinator (normally the YDE Forestry Manager) was managing about 50 personnel, 
Wildfire Response
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including Yunesit’in crews, those sent from 
Tl’etinqox, and Emergency Fire Fighter 
(EFF) crews employed by the Province. 
While EFF are meant to be a separate 
entity—provincial employees outside of 
the Ministry—the Response Coordinator 
would meet them every morning at 6 
a.m. to determine who was going where. 
While coordination was more efficient this 
way, it was difficult to manage these extra 
crews and their food and transportation 
needs when band resources were already 
stretched to their limit.
The need to put experienced and 
inexperienced crew on the line together 
put a strain on the only two veteran crew 
leads. Without knowing where the funding 
was going to come from, one of the 
band councillors set up certification for 
emergency crew members within the first 
couple of weeks.
Many reported that Yunesit’in’s 
infrastructure, food, and equipment needs 
were not taken seriously at the EOC or 
the Fire Centre in Alexis Creek. The band 
office stepped in. As one staff reported, 
“we were kind of like an EOC here.” Due 
to an issue with the generators, they did 
this without power for the first few days. 
Band staff and Council members—and 
sometimes their family members—were 
enlisted to buy essential equipment on their 
own credit cards, or float expenses through 
YDE. This included two trucks, thousands 
of feet of hose, cat loops, radios, sprinklers, 
shovels, etc. When Williams Lake ran out 
of supplies, equipment was “coming from 
all over the place,” including Kamloops, 
Quesnel, Prince George, and Alberta. 
Sometimes, when they had no pumps, they 
had to rely on the existing reservoir and 
hydrants, running the water supply low, 
and at one point letting out a dam in place 
for irrigation. As the Response Coordinator, 
Ryan Grady, recalled, “The community 
received no support from the provincial 
government probably for the first month. 
The big struggle was getting fuel for work 
trucks, fuel for the skidders, fuel for the 
community and food.” 
Indeed, food would become a major source 
of tension. “The fire station in Alexis Creek 
was being very prejudice against our 
firefighters from this reserve here,” refusing 
to provide them food or other supports, 
despite their being contractually entitled 
to those things after the first 24 hours of 
an emergency. In any case, it didn’t make 
sense for Yunesit’in crews to drive to Alexis 
Creek for each meal at the end of a long 
work day, and risk getting stopped at a 
roadblock. Ultimately, the band had to 
purchase, transport, prepare, and supply 
food to crews and other community 
members, all out of the Yunesit’in band 
office. Food was either donated from Red 
Cross, donated from individuals’ deep 
freezes, taken from storage at the school, 
or bought by leadership, staff, and family 
members from other cities. Before the 
generator was up and running, 10 cooks 
utilized just six two-burner Coleman stoves 
to prepare food for 100 people. 
Despite these impediments, in the end it 
was important for people to come together 
to eat at the band office. It gave them the 
opportunity share knowledge of the land 
and wildfire. 
“You know in First Nations 
communities, food is a way of 
gathering, food is a way of getting 
knowledge from each other and 
helping each other and just sharing 




There were challenging—though sometimes 
positive—dynamics with the wildfire per-
sonnel brought in from outside the com-
munity. A blatant disregard of Yunesit’in 
stewardship and knowledge of the land 
became a theme with Ministry personnel. 
Sadly, this meant that the location of cabins 
used as hunting, fishing, and berry-picking 
outposts were not protected and many were 
lost in the fires. Meanwhile, the Yunesit’in 
crews often had to advocate for themselves 
so that they were not first to be relieved of 
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work. One of the Ministry’s machine man-
agers recognized this, going so far as to 
acknowledge they’re “the sovereign people” 
and should be in charge, not pushed out of 
the way. Unfortunately, this manager was an 
exception to the rule. 
There grew to be a deep mistrust and sus-
picion of outsider crews’ seeming disregard 
for the territory, fuelled by their delayed or 
insufficient tree falling, and especially their 
excessive prescribed burning. It seemed 
they had no respect for the land.
“They are going to go home 
somewhere else and they won’t 
have to look at what’s left 
over... the feeling of the land, the 
appreciation for what was 
here… they don’t have any 
feeling what so ever.”
dUAne hinK
There was one crew member from a 
ministry unit who bragged openly about 
burning a thousand hectares, since there 
weren’t enough resources to patrol that 
area. As incidents like this continued, 
Yunesit’in crews suspected they weren’t 
abiding the proper burn-off protocol, 
which the Yunesit’in community knew from 
long-standing experience with prescribed 
burning. Worse, some people became 
suspicious that they were stoking the fires 
around the reserve intentionally, or letting 
them burn while they prioritized elsewhere. 
Proper forest management practices should 
include burning pine beetle trees in the 
winter to not let forest fuels build up. As 
one community member said, “our people 
have always told Forestry and Ministry 
people that.” 
Nevertheless, outsider crews came to rely 
on Yunesit’in’s strong coordination and 
land-based knowledge. In addition to 
coordinating with EFF and CRD crews, the 
Response Coordinator would meet regularly 
with the Incident Commander, who would 
change every 14 days. The crews were 
invited to Alexis Creek for daily briefings 
if necessary, and were invited to CRD 
Incident Command before it was evacuated. 
One area where there seemed to be a 
universal lack of clarity was the role of 
the military. Both crews, staff, and citizens 
perceived that the reinforcements were a 
waste of resources, capacity and specialized 
equipment. While they were purportedly 
trained, they tended to leave hot spots 
behind, requiring community crews to 
follow after them. Communication was a 
challenge because only the main officers 
seemed to have any authority to speak, 
while the others, those on the ground, 
“wouldn’t listen.” In fact, some citizens 
reported feeling as though they were 
under additional scrutiny by the military, 
particularly in the midst of the conflict over 
the Taseko Mines Ltd. proposal, to which 
the community is vehemently opposed. 
Yunesit’in’s experience of the 2017 wildfires 
cannot be understood without mention 
of July 17th, the night that the Yunesit’in 
crews saved the community. They had some 
warning the day before, as all indications 
showed that the fire would make a push 
towards their main reserve. Predicting that 
the winds would shift around noon, the 
crew lead advocated that the crews stay 
on the line all day. As the fire neared the 
reserve, all of the crews were brought to 
a field down below the community burial 
grounds, and told to stand down and 
get ready to evacuate. At this point, the 
community crews broke rank and resolved 
to defend the community. Starting with 25 
crew members from Yunesit’in, they were 
joined by an additional 10 from Tl’etinqox, 
as well as some local ranchers who came 
to help. By the time they set up safety 
guards, wet down houses, and made sure 
everyone had left, the fire pushed towards 
a subdivision on the other reserve, having 
to turn their attention there. They cut a 
path to lay hose towards the creek above 
the reserve, set up a pump, and laid hoses 
wherever needed. By the end of the night 
no houses were lost. 
The worst injury of the wildfire season 
occurred the next evening. The firefighting 
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crew members had faced overwhelming 
physical and mental demands. Some of 
the citizens were unequipped to manage 
their stress in a healthy and supported 
manner. An impaired driving accident 
left one member paralysed. Without truck 
insurance, and off work hours, this has been 
an emotionally harrowing experience for 
family and community, and it has also been 
financially stressful and onerous to sort out. 
This proved true for the two, much more 
minor, incidents that also occurred, both 
of which were made more complicated 
by the bureaucratic and communication 
challenges plaguing the wildfire season.  In 
the first, a crew member got his arm caught 
in a skidder fan and had to be transported 
to Kamloops, BC to get treatment, and 
was off work for 10 months. In another, 
the crew lead flipped a truck while driving 
along roads that were soft from the fires 
and broken up by the heavy machinery 
constantly driving over them. While his 
injuries were minor, the decision to fly him 
to Prince George left him stranded there 
until extended family could pick him up.
While the crews were kept mostly on 
the reserve for the first couple of weeks, 
without sufficient equipment they couldn’t 
accomplish much. After that, they were 
often deployed elsewhere, even if another 
crew—often the EFF—was sent to Yunesit’in, 
or close by on the Hanceville fire. Being 
deployed to lower-priority areas gave the 
impression that their knowledge and skills 
were undervalued, causing frustration and 
low morale. Holdups at the provincial level 
only exacerbated this. For example, quite 
a few of the crew have tree falling skills, 
so the YDE submitted a standing offer for 
danger tree falling. However, when the 
one person in the Province who could 
approve contracts went away for 10 days, 
contracting came to a standstill. 
A relationship that may have strengthened 
as a result of the wildfires is that of 
Yunesit’in and its surrounding, non-
Indigenous neighbours. Yunesit’in crews 
and citizens helped to protect neighbouring 
ranches and have helped to rebuild those 
that were lost. In turn, the crews borrowed 
or repaired machinery at those ranches, 
some of whom never had a relationship 
with the community before. When the 
community organized a clean-up of all 
the debris in order to get the irrigation 
flowing—which is shared among Tsilhqot’in 
and non-Tsilhqot’in neighbours—quite a 
few ranchers showed up. 
hanceville Fire view From Yunesit’in residence
Photograph By:  James Smith
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“That’s the first time I’ve seen 
everyone coming together… I 
think that’s the start of building 





Evacuation became a messy affair for 
Yunesit’in. The ethic and objective behind 
the BCR to evacuate was deliberate: it 
should be implemented in a moderate way, 
by preparing most people to evacuate, 
while allowing flexibility so that citizens 
had agency in deciding if and when to 
leave. This seemed like a solution that 
was sensitive to different cultural and 
community needs. However, as would 
be revealed, neither the Province nor the 
RCMP would come to grasp the modest 
evacuation procedure the band had laid 
out, nor the authority of the band to issue 
it in the first place. Without the proper 
resources, understanding, or support from 
government, its implementation proved 
complicated.
Leadership evacuated the community to 
set an example but also to look after the 
needs of citizens scattered elsewhere. There 
was some animosity towards this decision; 
however the leadership made this choice 
in hopes of putting themselves in the best 
position to support the many different needs 
of the community. Much of the work they 
were doing to advocate for the community 
and get supplies was not visible to those 
who stayed. Some felt that evacuations 
should have been more strongly enforced, 
while others disagreed. 
However, the RCMP interpreted the BCR 
like a standard evacuation order, taking a 
hard line and attempting to force people 
to leave the reserve. There were multiple 
accounts of RCMP officers showing extreme 
disrespect for Elders, swearing at them and 
yelling at them from outside their homes. It 
was also reported that the RCMP stated that 
the Chief had ordered everyone to evacuate 
thus invoking the Chief’s authority without 
his consultation. As one Elder reported, 
RCMP officers didn’t seem to care if people 
had no way of leaving. After these reports, 
one Councillor ended up taking this up 
with a Constable. The Councillor suggested 
that, at the very least, RCMP officers should 
have a community member who speaks 
Tsilhqot’in accompany them door-to-door. 
Incentives for people not to evacuate 
included: employment opportunities on 
reserve such as cooking; apprehension 
about evacuating to large, non-Tsilhqot’in 
urban centres, where their usual support 
networks fell away; the desire to protect 
livestock and other animals; and the desire 
to protect their homes, belongings, and 
land. One staff noted that many of these 
are already derelict homes that are long 
overdue for renovation or replacement by 
INAC. In fact, the band put in a renovation 
request two years ago for $2 million, of 
which they were only provided $250,000. 
Given this lack of support for housing on 
reserve, it can hardly be a surprise that 
people were skeptical that their homes 
would be protected. 
Starting from the first day, a large group of 
Yunesit’in citizens camped away from the 
community fires at nearby Fletcher Lake—a 
traditional site for healing, sweats, and trout 
fishing. This posed a challenge for Yunesit’in 
as it was difficult to connect with the group 
to ensure their safety. They were sent food, 
supplies, a satellite phone, and a fire crew 
member would regularly report to them 
warning them as to when they should leave. 
Since there was movement to and from the 
camp, mostly via backroads, eventually, a 
helicopter from the CRD Fire Centre and 
a group of RCMP evacuated them. While 
the camp did evacuate for a time, some 
returned, and others joined those staying on 
the reserve. 
Initially, about 60 people stayed on the 
reserve, including Elders, families, and 
other members, many of whom were 
not properly prepared for the emergency 
situation, aware of tracking protocols or 
informed of the risk and responsibilities. 
Evacuation
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Without sufficient support from provincial 
and federal service agencies, there were 
not enough community resources and 
services to support them, and this caused 
a strain on staff and essential resources 
needed for the crews. Staff faced significant 
difficulty transporting food, prescriptions, 
diapers, medical and other supplies to 
the community. While there were two 
people administering first aid at the band 
office, there was no regular health staff. 
Gas was restricted and staff, fire crews, 
and citizens were sometimes stuck on the 
reserve, or had to transport gas, sometimes 
dangerously, from elsewhere. 
Many who remained in the community 
evacuated on the day the fire encompassed 
the reserve, and the total number dropped 
to 35. By this time, much of the resources 
and services in the evacuation centres had 
been exhausted. As the Band Manager 
reflected, “the system was there to provide 
supports but it was only there for people 
who followed the program.” This meant 
that people who arrived late had a more 
difficult time accessing those supports, 
with the band “basically running our 
own emergency social services” and 
providing food vouchers. For those who had 
evacuated on the first day of the fires, the 
band arranged for them to spend the night 
at Elks Hall in Williams Lake, and after that 
the high school. But after Williams Lake 
evacuated, people were strewn between 
Kamloops and Prince George. 
People relayed both positive and negative 
experiences at the evacuation centres. On 
the negative side, some felt displaced and 
uncomfortable in such public and crowded 
spaces, particularly those with health 
issues. Some felt that the centres were 
not culturally sensitive, and recall feeling 
scrutinized by volunteers and government 
authorities. This proved true when the 
band office received three or four phone 
calls from the Ministry of Children and 
Family Development, who had flagged a 
couple of Yunesit’in families in evacuation 
centres. In each case, the family had never 
had an issue in the community; as the 
Band Manager explained, they were under 
exceptional strain, and without their regular 
child care and support systems. One family 
who needed special needs support for their 
autistic child found the centre was not 
appropriate, and could not provide them 
with the proper care. 
On the positive side, people felt safe and 
taken care of, particularly in Prince George, 
where most of the evacuated citizens 
stayed together and were accompanied 
by one of the band councillors. As Elder 
Charleen Brigham-Hink reflected, “it was 
okay because we stuck together, we found 
other people to have our beds beside, other 
people from Stone, [when] we were kind 
of scattered at first.” Some remember being 
handed supplies as soon as they walked 
in: towels, shampoo, snacks, gas vouchers, 
etc. Further, there were representatives from 
banks, the Red Cross, and Employment 
Insurance (EI) there to help people get set 
up on EI, or apply for other types of funding 
and compensation. 
Ultimately, what seemed to be the key 
difference was the ability to stick together as 
a community, and get consistent advocacy 
from the band. In the end, the Chief hired a 
coordinator to phone every individual and 
offer to get them help, fill out paperwork, 
arrange lodgings, etc. Another success 
came when some Elders encountered a 
volunteer in Williams Lake who spoke 
Tsilhqot’in. However, it was not part of the 
regular program; rather, it was lucky that the 
individual was there at the right time.
Yunesit’in leadership felt the Williams Lake 
evacuation order was lifted prematurely, 
while it was still dangerously smoky, and 
before key services were re-established. 
The community took a different approach 
and sought to lift its own evacuation order 
incrementally until it was safe for more 
vulnerable citizens to return. To varying 
success, they worked with evacuation 
centres to accommodate certain people 
longer, including Elders and pregnant 
women. However, the shift from evacuation 
to alert meant that certain services and 
resources, including Red Cross funds, were 
suddenly cut off.
Yunesit’in met numerous challenges with 
roadblocks, due to a rotating cast of RCMP 
Roadblocks
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personnel who had different attitudes towards 
the crews, staff, and other citizens trying to 
get through. Whenever the fire crews were 
held up at roadblocks, multiple people had 
to be called upon to intervene. Often, the 
crew members’ families would call band staff 
to let them know of the situation, who would 
then have to track down the right authority to 
have it dealt with. The Chief, Band Manager, 
the Response Coordinator had to provide 
constant “double-verification” to vouch for 
people to get through. At one point, the fire 
crews were even turned away, preventing 
them from getting to the fire line. Once, a 
nearby rancher arrived and reprimanded 
the RCMP for delaying the crews. And for 
a time, the RCMP brought in their former 
community liaison, which made things go 
more smoothly. However, incidents like these 
encouraged the use of back roads, the safety 
of which were often unknown.
With so much upheaval, coordination, 
communication, and decision-making within 
the community itself, among Tsilhqot’in 
communities, and with many different 
governmental authorities—including EMBC, 
CRD, INAC, FNESS, Red Cross, RCMP, 
FNHA, and the Military—posed significant 
challenges, exacerbating operational gaps 
and jurisdictional conflicts, and delaying 
information. 
While the governments were making 
decisions according to a certain hierarchical 
order of operations, Yunesit’in uses a 
participatory, consensus-based decision-
making process. This meant that Yunesit’in 
would be left out of critical decisions, or 
left in the dark on decisions of which it 
needed to be involved in. On the one hand, 
the non-Indigenous Response Coordinator 
reported mainly positive interactions with 
the Ministry, whether it was the contract fire 
crews, EFF, fire centres, or the permitting 
process. However, the Chief reported having 
to constantly educate new personnel who 
arrived, and repeatedly remind PREOC 
where Yunesit’in is situated. Playing go-
between between the community and 
government, there were countless examples 
of coordination breakdown.
Many of these challenges seemed to arise as 
a result of the fact that government agencies 
overlooking Chilcotin river
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weren’t receptive to talking to staff or 
citizens directly; rather, the Chief was the 
sole authority who had any clout. In some 
cases, some Yunesit’in staff preferred to 
rely on the Chief or the Band Manager for 
this, as they feel uncomfortable talking to 
government. Clearly, consistent and long-
term trust and lines of communication need 
to be cultivated, so that in an emergency 
situation, those relationships are already 
established. One first step was a meeting 
held in September 2017, following the fire, 
which included nine support agencies and 
during which a lot of issues were put on the 
table. Quite a few fire crew and citizens 
recommended that many more of these 
meetings should take place. 
Due to evacuations, the band had to 
disassemble and re-establish ‘satellite’ 
offices out of which to run emergency 
operations on three different occasions. 
They first established themselves at the TNG 
negotiations office in Williams Lake, where 
they developed an organizational chart 
and order of operations. When Williams 
Lake was evacuated on July 15th, they 
were given a space at Thompson Rivers 
University (TRU) in Kamloops. However, 
after a battle with TRU’s Wi-Fi, they pulled 
out and brought the equipment back to 
the reserve. Each move was stressful for 
staff, who were already stretched too thin. 
Nevertheless, they successfully ran local 
emergency operations for the community.
The Chief took on responsibility 
for communication, including with 
government, community members, media, 
and the public. On the reserve, only one 
household with access to a generator 
had Wi-Fi, and this became the de facto 
communications hub. Facebook played 
an important role in providing updates. 
However, any lapse in updates would fuel 
rumours and misinformation, so posting 
regularly became a priority. Local media 
also began to rely on Yunesit’in’s posts for 
updates on the situation, and even used 
photos from members’ personal pages in 
their news stories. Keeping up with media 
requests proved too onerous on the Chief’s 
time, and hiring a media liaison would have 
been beneficial. 
It became the responsibility of one 
councillor to keep track of where people 
were and how they were faring, relying 
on scouts in Prince George, Quesnel, 
and Kamloops to report back on who was 
where. With people constantly moving 
around, the councillor would get calls 
all hours of day and night, from people 
trying to track down their family members. 
In addition to advocating for their needs, 
wherever they may be, the band had to 
make sure that those on social assistance—
about 40-50 people—were still receiving 
funds. 
Coordination with other Tsilhqot’in 
communities was also a challenge. 
Inundated with emergency burdens, 
each community operated largely in 
isolation from each other, and knowledge 
sharing, even around the bureaucratic and 
financial processes, was limited. There 
were successes when the nation did come 
together. TNG set up daily calls, during 
which each community could check in, and 
talk about any new issues they might be 
facing. CRD also set up a conference call, 
which would happen back-to-back with the 
TNG calls, during which support needs, 
weather updates, key contacts, and other 
information would be shared. 
Uncertainty as to which essential expenses 
would be reimbursed and by which agency 
created significant undue stress. This 
had a direct impact on decision-making, 
causing leadership to oscillate between 
exercising extreme caution, or taking 
a financial leap of faith, in hopes that 
expenses would eventually be repaid. The 
band and YDE had to bankroll expenses—
everything from paying fire crews’ wages, to 
equipment, to food, medical supplies, and 
accommodations. While they knew that at 
least some expenses had to be covered by 
EMBC, and that INAC holds federal reserve 
funds for these situations, these were not 
initially made available. After expending 
YDE’s full line of credit, the band had 
Recovery
Disaster Compensation
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to open an additional line of credit as a 
backstop. As the Response Coordinator 
recalls, “you can’t get paid… as fast as 
you spend it, so you are having to bankroll 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt 
just to keep the ball rolling.” 
Despite verbal assurances given to the Chief 
from the federal Minister of Indigenous-
Crown Relations, Carolyn Bennett, that 
all expenses would be covered, in reality, 
this has not borne out. The process for 
reimbursement has taken much longer than 
expected, while recovery plans have not 
been addressed adequately or in a timely 
manner. There are still major portions of 
reimbursement and recovery funding that 
is outstanding and under review at the 
provincial and federal levels, over a year 
later. 
Once the wildfires were better under 
control, financial scrutiny tightened 
up. Everything that was spent has come 
under a microscope. With a new finance 
representative every 12 days, each has 
different expectations and a different 
interpretation of the same form. The 
Response Coordinator often had to resubmit 
everything, or face the Wildfire Branch 
unilaterally reinterpreting the timesheets he 
submitted.
Conflicting instructions from FNESS, EMBC, 
and INAC caused staff to re-write and re-
submit reimbursement forms on multiple 
occasions. After hours of wasted work and 
frustration, by late September an individual 
from each of the three agencies visited the 
band office to guide Yunesit’in through the 
forms. However, a box of invoices that had 
been sent to the Province was lost in the 
mail, and staff had to go down to Victoria 
with the originals. Others, which INAC took 
with them from the band office are still 
outstanding, and it is unclear where they 
are. Yunesit’in did receive a “first batch” 
of reimbursement funding in December, 
for emergency on-call staff, including 
cooks and security. However, they haven’t 
received anything for the second batch, 
which includes supplies and equipment, 
and still a third and fourth batch are also 
outstanding. Ultimately, this was far too 
much work for one finance person, who 
had to resume regular duties to keep the 
band’s operations running. Eventually the 
Executive Assistant stepped in, but they 
realized they should have hired someone to 
take this on. 
In making the transition from response 
to recovery, Yunesit’in has continued to 
gamble on the assumption that funding 
that has been promised will eventually 
come in, while going into debt in the 
meantime. But, for something as simple as 
rebuilding fencing, where funding approval 
was supposed to expedited, these funds 
still had not come through a year after the 
fires. In October 2017, the community had 
to apply for funding from the Provincial 
government to hire a Recovery Manager. 
By October 2018 the funding still had not 
been provided to Yunesit’in. After going 
into debt to draft a Recovery Plan, the Band 
Manager had to lay off those he had hired 
to help him draft that plan. Recovery work 
is hugely time consuming, and the Band 
Manager still spends almost 50% of his 
time towards it. In large part, this is because 
recovery funds are still in negotiation with 
the Province. Leadership had hoped this 
would be funded well before summer 2018, 
so the community could begin preparations 
for the next fire season. Instead, the 
government continues to negotiate down 
the community’s Recovery Plan—an 
extensive and thorough document, which 
was drafted in close consultation with 
Yunesit’in leadership and membership. 
Yunesit’in is participating in the 
rehabilitation work that has begun on 
Crown land though a joint venture 
between the two communities of Yunesit’in 
and Tl’esqox and a local firm, Celtic 
Engineering.  The company, Elhdaqox, holds 
a contract to lead rehabilitation in one of 
the “zones” of the Hanceville fire complex. 
However, without a territorial land use plan, 
leadership feels this work lacks long-term 
vision, according to Tsilhqot’in authority. 
In the meantime, Federal funding has 
not been set up for comprehensive 
Rehabilitation
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rehabilitation work on reserves. While certain projects have begun, money seems to 
come slower on reserves, and in bits and pieces. Not knowing whether or when funding 
is coming, planning becomes impossible, and there are missed economic opportunities, 
particularly now that the field season is over. Again, they had to spend YDE money or ask 
the band to borrow money, paying interest on it, just to make repairs, buy hay, and cut 
firewood. There is a strong desire for the community to set its own priorities and choose 
the groups it collaborates with in rehabilitation work. While certain areas have been 
identified and prescriptions written, there are still lots of decisions to be made, and a lack 
of clear expectations from the federal government prolongs this uncertainty. 
Over a year later, the cultural impacts of the wildfires are still coming to light. The 
community members rely on traditional foods, including fish and deer, and so, as one 
councillor put it, “not being able to go out and practice that, so that really affected the 
yearly supply of food for our people and our community members.” Compounded with 
the loss of the foods they had frozen from previous seasons, many households were 
driven to depend on food donations. Meanwhile, things have become more dangerous 
on reserve, with more cougar, grizzly and brown bear sightings, in search of prey. While 
the vast majority berry and plant bushes are gone—including those traditionally used as 
medicine—the community was lucky in that the area people traditionally gather tea didn’t 
burn. 
Water treatment continues to be a huge concern, and the community had to implement a 
boil water advisory until long after the evacuation was lifted. The fire season proved that 
the need to repair the existing reservoir and water treatment plant and expand its capacity 
is urgent. However, INAC has only committed to repairing the damage directly caused by 
the 2017 wildfires, not to improving the facility to properly meet the community’s needs, 
particularly in the case of a future fire.
 
There have been residual impacts on other areas of community development as well, 
including delayed projects such as school and greenhouse construction, which band 
leadership then has to justify to its funding agencies. Meanwhile, with so many fences 
burnt and delays in the recovery programs to rebuild them, loose livestock have eaten up 
the hay they people rely on for income, causing lost revenue.
Fields surrounding Yunesit’in
Photograph By:  James Smith
Other Community Impacts
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In addition to the ongoing and chronic 
physical health impacts of the wildfire 
smoke, residual trauma has created an 
acute need for mental health supports, 
addictions counselling, and community 
healing. There is 
evidence of PTSD 
both among those who 
were working outside 
community and those 
who stayed and were 
exposed to the wildfire, 
as each experience was 
traumatic for different 
reasons. Burn out was a 
big issue for those who 
were working through 
the fires, many of whom haven’t had a 
break since. Unfortunately, one healing 
initiative—a horse-riding trip focused on 
cultural activities and recovery—only 
received half the funding requested by the 
band. 
Part of the work that needs to be done 
is also to mark the 
ceremonial element and 
importance of fire in 
Tsilhqot’in culture. 
Indeed, while the depth 
of the community’s 
resilience was 
demonstrated, and there 
is a profound sense 
of pride in what the 
community was able to 
do together, some of the lessons, including 
the cultural and spiritual significance may 
have been missed.
Mitigation and Preparedness
Mental Health and Community Wellbeing
Infrastructure and Capacity
 “If we aren’t taught these 
reflections and how to look at 
things you might not have seen 
some of the blessings that came 
along with it; it just seemed 
like chaos.” 
duane hink
While there was an existing emergency 
management plan going into the wildfires—
and a comprehensive one at that—the 
community was not prepared for an event 
of this magnitude. The existing plan needs 
careful review to reveal where it did work, 
where it fell short, which contacts need to 
be updated and any other adjustments that 
need to be made. But most importantly, it 
must be made as clear as possible so that a 
diversity of community members are able 
to implement it, including, but not limited 
to, the addition of templates for evacuation 
orders and alerts and procedures for 
checking on Elders. 
Further, leadership, staff, and citizens all 
need training and education to prepare for 
the next emergency. But this needs to be 
accompanied by more holistic strategic 
planning and year-round capacity building 
at the community level so that both 
leadership and citizens feel better prepared 
and more secure going into future wildfires. 
The fire crews have to maintain updated 
training and certifications and continually 
record lessons learnt from the wildfire 
experience. 
In addition to capacity building, the band 
has the need for an expanded credit limit, 
and/or assurance that it has expedient 
access to emergency reserve funds. 
Preparedness should also include planning 
around flooding and landslides as a result 
of wildfires. Finally, the community has 
identified a long list of hard infrastructure 
and equipment that is needed. Staff and 
leadership are unanimous in the opinion 
that it would be better for the band office 
to own this equipment, rather than having 
to wait for Ministry to provide supplies or 
approval.
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“We did all that, without a lot of help, and I think 
the real pat on that back is that… disaster brings out the best 




Fires burning behind Yunesit’in residences
Photograph By:  James Smith
• Achieved collective and consensus decision making despite leadership being strewn 
throughout the Province, and despite moving offices three times.
• set out clear roles and responsibilities among Chief and Council and staff. 
• Established an ad hoc ‘ops centre’ out of the band office.
• Initiated and managed community-led wildfire response, by drawing on strong coordination 
and land-based knowledge.
• Smoothly rolled forestry crews into fire crews and arranged training and certification.
• Assembled fire crews with a mixture of experience, including veteran crew members who 
could provide mentorship to those with less experience. 
• Provided essential services, support, and food to fire crews and citizens who stayed on the 
reserve.
• Developed a culturally-appropriate approach to evacuation and re-entry.
• Communicated with, supported, and advocated for evacuated citizens in Prince george and 
Kamloops, and when possible stayed together and provided accompaniment.
• bankrolled all expenses despite uncertainty as to how and when they would be reimbursed. 
• Provided constant, up-to-date information to citizens, media, Tng, and other levels of 
government. 
• liaised with all levels of government on response and recovery.
• strengthened relationships with non-Tsilhqot’in neighbours, and worked together to rebuild 
ranches and clean up debris.
• effectively asserted, maintained, and practiced community leadership and authority in all 
aspects of wildfire response, community services, and recovery.
• gained a network of governmental and local contacts. 
• brought in key assets and services, such as Fness, early on in the emergency.
Yunesit’in Best Practices
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TL’ESqOX FIRST NATION 
Toosey First Nation
Riske Creek Complex Wildfire
Photograph By: James McLure
Tl’esqox is located 40 kilometres west of Williams Lake, BC Due to the proximity to Williams Lake, BC the citizens can easily travel to the city for employment, supplies and education.
The population on and off reserve of registered citizens is over 360 people. The majority of the 
citizens reside on Tl’esqox IR#1, the closest reserve to Highway 20. There are a few homes located 
on IR#2, which is farther from the main reserve and also bordered by the Chilcotin Military Block 
– Lot 7741. Tl’esqox has had longstanding conflicts with the Department of National Defense 
and the operations that take place on the military block. There have been several documented 
requests for the ordinances to be cleaned up and a complete transfer of land returned to Tl’esqox. 
Two other reserves, IR#1A and 3 make up the remaining reserves identified by the Indian Act. 
However, Elders’ teachings have indicated that larger parcels of lands that Tl’esqox citizens 
dwelled on or used have been omitted from records and that they do not agree with lines 
segregating their communities. 
Tl’esqox is associated with two Nation-level organizations - the Tsilhqot’in National Government 
and the Carrier Chilcotin Tribal Council. Tl’esqox is not a signatory to the Aboriginal Fishing 
Agreement with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and had not entered a Community 
Tripartite Agreement (CTA) with Province and Federal Government for policing on the reserve. 
Much work needs to be done to strengthen the relationship between Tl’esqox and the BC and 
Canadian Governments.
The community’s public works, band-operated gas station and convenience store are run through 
Toosey Enterprises. Chilcotin Plateau Enterprise Ltd., a forestry silviculture company, runs many 
of the business operations at the Toosey Old School. The Toosey Old School, an ‘old school’ 
renovated in 2014 to become a multi-use building that houses trades, skills training, meeting 
rental space, sawmilling operations and various business operations generates significant 
employment and revenue for the community. 
A new health centre and band office was constructed and has a kitchen and meeting space. 
Most recently in the summer of 2018 the community opened a new multigenerational community 
learning centre.  The learning space will house children, youth, adults and Elders in an integrated 
learning and culturally-responsive atmosphere. 
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On the evening of July 7, 2017, the 
community received an alarming call 
from the British Columbia Wildfire Service 
that Tl’esqox was under evacuation alert. 
The leadership met initially together 
and then with staff to devise a plan. 
Overlooking the community’s outdated 
emergency operations plan, made many 
years previously, the 
leadership addressed 
the emergency in real 
time. 
On that same day, a 
fire northeast of the 
Williams Lake Airport 
caused the evacuation 
of the airport and the 
Cariboo Fire Centre. 
The Cariboo Fire Centre 
made an announcement 
that they were forced 
to log off from their 
communication 
channels even though multiple fires were 
progressing. Their last message, before the 
Fire Service went dark, included instruction 
to wildfire interface crews to do the best 
that they can and to stay safe. 
Tl’esqox’s wildfire personnel were 
dispatched to assist in the fires surrounding 
Williams Lake, moving them away from 
the community. Meals were not provided 
to them, so support staff was sent in to 
cook for them for one week. The on-reserve 
health and band office was opened to 
provide supports to their citizens and act as 
a central place for gathering. The leadership 
established a list of citizens that would 
need to travel to and from the community 
to provide essential services because 
roadblocks were already underway.  
The Toosey Old School was opened to 
provide a base location to muster and 
develop an approach 
to fight the fires. The 
site was equipped with 
basic services necessary 
to operate as a pop-up 
emergency operations 
centre.  
After mere hours, it 
became clear that the 
community and local 
residents were on their 
own. Craig Kennedy, 
the Manager of Toosey 
Old School, connected 
with wildfire personnel 
and received acknowledgement that the 
community would not receive support 
from them at that time and therefore 
the government gave authorization to 
implement an industry-led fire suppression 
strategy. Toosey, supported by local 
residents and business operators equipped 
with heavy-duty machinery and a locally 
owned helicopter started by building a fire 
guard around the Riske Creek Complex 
Fire. After one week they finally received 
external assistance. 
At the Toosey Old School, they were able 
The Tl’esqox Experience
wildfire fuel Assessment 
The community with the majority of dwellings in Tl’esqox lies within grasslands. There are 
patches of aspen north and east of the community and some are within a few metres of 
infrastructure. North east of the community Douglas fir, low-to-moderate in density, covers a 
smaller area and is mostly distant from structures. 
Douglas fir stands create significant forest cover approximately 1km west of the main reserve 
and surround the other reserves. Although this forest partially burnt in 2017 riske Creek 
Complex fire there are still significant areas that remain heavily forested. 
 robert gray, Fire ecologist 
r.W. gray Consulting ltd.
Tsilhqot’in Wildfire Fuels Assessment
“In each community we came 
together to fight 
the wildfires and provide services 
to our people. 
The fire mobilized us, building 
strength. We will always 
be here to protect our land and help 
one another to do that. 
The Nation has become even 
stronger now.”
Chief frAnCis lACeese
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to provide an extensive array of services: 
providing meals, unloading trucks with 
heavy duty equipment, and connectivity 
via phones and internet. The site also had 
safe and secure storage spaces, large areas 
for gathering to eat, and a backup generator 
powerful enough for 
the whole school. 
Staff were actively 
working to assist 
by whatever means 
necessary. 
For days, Kennedy 
sought a contract 
to host a fire camp, 
but it was difficult 








on persuading government officials to 
understand the capabilities of staff at the 
Toosey Old School were credible.  
Meanwhile, in the community, various tasks 
to safeguard buildings and dwellings were 
being conducted. Sprinklers were placed 
on the roofs of houses, water hoses were 
hooked up and tested, and yards were 
cleared from debris. 
On the evening of July 11, 2017, the Chief 
and Council signed an evacuation order. A 
number of police 
cruisers drove 
door-to-door to give 
citizens notice. A 
council member 
had offered to assist 
by talking with each 
household and 
accompanying the 
RCMP to provide 
translation services 
and a familiar face, 
so as not to scare 
the home owners. 
At each house, the 
council member 
spoke with citizens, 
not knowing that 
at the same time 
ribbons were being placed on porches 
to represent which houses had children 
in them, for apprehension purposes if 
necessary. 
These acts further strained Tl’esqox’s 
relationship with the RCMP. A Community 
riske Creek residents Assisting with Moving livestock
Photograph By:  Monica Lamb-Yorski - Williams Lake Tribune
“To hear the last announcement from 
the BC Wildfire Cariboo Fire Centre that 
they were signing off and that we were 
all on our own was striking. 
I was really proud of our crew, they 
really managed well. They were the first 
to go in when the Cariboo Fire Centre 
was evacuated. Throughout the entire 
summer we had 30 firefighters working 
around the clock.”
 craig kennedy 
toosey old school manager
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Tripartite Agreement (CTA) which would 
enable the RCMP to provide services 
on the reserve with a memorandum of 
understanding has never been signed by 
the community. Reconciliation efforts 
are required as well as strong protocols 
need to be established before the Tl’esqox 
leadership feel comfortable with these types 
of agreements. 
Tl’esqox leadership has expressed that they 
would not sign an evacuation order again 
unless it contained a recognition of Tl’esqox 
authority over their 
people and does not 
enable arrests or child 
apprehension. 
After the evacuation 
on July 11th, a 
smaller delegation of 
Tl’esqox leadership 
and staff stayed 
behind and operated 
from the government 
and health office to 
keep communication 
lines open to field 




was established to ensure that everyone 
was tracked regardless of whether they 
were staying or evacuating. If they chose 
to travel, the check-in system was alerted 
when they arrived at their next destination. 
People were asked to refrain from posting 
images of the fire on Facebook to prevent 
spreading unintentional fear. At times, 
the images could look more extreme and 
closer to the community than they were, 
and incited numerous calls from worried 
evacuees who had seen these graphic 
images in the media. To provide accurate 
information to citizens, selected staff 
would travel the roads to assess the fires 
frequently throughout the day. If there were 
any changes during the evacuation, citizens 
were updated via phone or in person. 
Leadership and staff who needed to 
evacuate visited the Emergency Operations 
Centres in the cities of Prince George 
and Kamloops to attend to citizens’ 
needs and keep in constant contact with 
those who remained. This was a busy job 
because people needed phone access, 
transportation, and assistance with 
completing forms.  
On July 20, 2018, the Toosey Old School 
was finally contracted to operate as a fire 
camp. Various wildfire crews were already 
using the site, which established a basis 
for the decision. Camp facilities, complete 
with wash trailers, a 
kitchen, and sleeping 
quarters were 
delivered to the site. 
The camp housed 250 
people. 
Initially, the Toosey 
Old School had 
been threatened by 
the wildfires and 
risked evacuations. 
Eventually a fire guard 
was built around the 
building area, and 
structural protection 
unit crews placed 
water bladders and 
sprinklers around the 
whole facility. The system would have saved 
the building from wildfires, but these were 
eventually removed and placed in different 
areas around the Tsilhqot’in territory. 
One day, the Cariboo Fire Centre issued 
an evacuation order for the Toosey Old 
School. The Riske Creek Complex Fire 
had already travelled through the area two 
times at this point. This time, it came back 
and burned through both local residences 
at Riske Creek and Tl’esqox citizen, and 
outbuildings. The Toosey Old School was 
providing essential services and Kennedy 
later confirmed with the Cariboo Fire 
Centre that they should not have had to 
evacuate and that the orders were incorrect. 
Once the fires stabilized, Kennedy 
held a meeting with Tl’esqox citizens, 
neighbouring residents and industry-
led wildfire personnel. Without official 
“I feel very upset that 
the RCMP placed ribbons on houses 
without my knowledge of what they 
were doing. The RCMP were deceitful 
to me and my people were upset with 
me – they thought I was actively 
assisting the RCMP with plotting the 
apprehension of our children. 
We were there to help for our peoples’ 
safety and it worked against us. It was 
an abuse of their power.” 
Councillor Gina Johnny
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ministerial wildfire personnel, they 
proceeded with a meeting based on the 
available maps and the most-current 
information. The ever-changing fires 
encouraged a constant need to seek as 
much information as possible to manage 
the risk. This information was so scarce that 
even enforcement staff at roadblocks often 
sought an update from him.    
The fire camp was thought to be both a 
blessing and a curse. Once the fire camp 
was established at the school, the decision-
making power had been removed from 
those who had been successfully managing 
the fire in the industry-led crew. 
There was an overwhelming concern that 
the fire was exacerbated because new 
strategies were employed and backburning 
was prioritized without local input. 
An additional growing fire camp was 
also developed less than 10 kilometres 
away. The Toosey Old School Fire Camp 
soon began to dwindle in attendance, 
without any notice, which became an 
inconvenience for logistical planning.  
Eventually, the fire protection group slowly 
diminished as well. Staff, whose services 
were no longer necessary, were encouraged 
to apply to the other fire centres, however 
they were not hired. 
Some community primary functions 
continued to operate, while at the same 
time, additional processes put added strain 
on the remaining staff. Bookkeeping was 
maintained to ensure accurate tracking and 
reporting. 
Initially, to preserve the fuel supply, 
the Toosey gas station provided fuel to 
residents and workers in moderation. After 
appropriate permits were secured, the local 
Petro-Canada commercial station continued 
regular shipments of fuel, which could be 
then sold to everyone without restriction. 
Supplies and food from outside of Williams 
Lake were delivered to the community and 
fire centre.
Tl’esqox cooks and staff were required 
to travel to and from the community and 
the Toosey Old School, a five-kilometre 
distance, along the highway. Since 
enforcement personnel at the roadblocks 
were inconsistent, many times these 
delivery drivers were denied access. A 
substantial amount of effort was put into 
obtaining official Cariboo Fire Centre 
documentation even when the Tl’esqox 
leadership authorization to travel should 
have sufficed. The evacuation order reduced 
leadership’s ability to provide circumstantial 
access to the community. As a result, 
community citizens perceived that the 
Tsilhqot’in leadership had lost authority, 
when in fact, they never stopped providing 
services to fight for the protection of their 
lands and people. 
Over fifteen years ago, Chief Francis 
Laceese, with other citizens from his 
community, blockaded industry at Bald 
Mountain from clear cutting a large area. 
The dispute ended with a court decision 
that the Tl’esqox should work together 
with the industry on an acceptable plan for 
harvesting. 
For years the community maintained its 
stand to halt mass resource extraction.  But 
as a result of the 2017 wildfires, industry 
proceeded with accelerated logging 
extracting a significant amount of the 
salvageable burnt timber. This is frustrating 
for leadership since they have long 
established their wish to work with industry 
to be involved in planning for forest 
management within their territory. 
The citizens were not surprised that massive 
wildfires came, and many expressed dismay 
toward the government and industry’s past 
management of the forests. Over countless 
years, their advice has not been regarded. 
The Chilcotin Military block, located within 
Tl’esqox caretaker area, was intensively 
impacted by the 2017 fires. It has long 
since been a concern because the dense fir 
belt was thought to be stressed by military 
activity throughout the years. Tl’esqox 
has had a strained relationship with the 
The Compounded Issues 
on the Land
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Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) since the 
military block restricts access to significant 
sites important to the community citizens. 
Breakdowns in communication amplified 
with the community’s’ discontent with 
military activity impacting the forest and 
the wildlife. This lead to a disrespectful 
relationship between the CAF and Tl’esqox. 
Caravans of CAF recruits would travel to 
the training grounds during the evenings 
without giving notice to the community 
for training endeavors. Senior officials that 
did speak with Tl’esqox leadership would 
turnover quickly and therefore a consistent 
interaction could not be maintained. 
Additionally, significant amounts of 
technical information would be sent to 
Tl’esqox without the funding to review the 
documents appropriately.
In recent years, the CAF has made attempts 
to bridge their relationship with Tl’esqox. 
They have rented space from the Toosey 
Old School to provide simulated military 
training and have offered more notice when 
travelling to the military block. 
• established an emergency operation process through consistent Chief and Council 
communication. 
• Established cooking team to support and travel with firefighters since they did not receive 
access to meals.
• Opened the band office to create a muster point and gathering point for citizens while Chief 
and Council assumed roles in emergency management. 
• Commenced basic emergency operations at the Toosey old school.
• Launched an Industry-led fire suppression strategy with the support of the local residents. 
• Initiated a BC Wildfire Service Fire Camp offering meals, communication connectivity, 
support staff, heavy-duty equipment, large indoor gathering areas and back-up power. 
• Persuaded BC Wildfire Service to accept the Toosey Old School as a fire camp through 
continual advocacy as to the suitability of the infrastructure and services.
• Coordinated community approach to working together through an emergency situation (i.e. 
prepare houses for wildfire protection, hiring on-call cooks, etc.)
• escorted rCMP through the community when they arrived on the reserve.
• Maintained constant communication networks for citizens who were evacuated. 
• established a check-in system for citizens who chose to stay and those who chose to 
evacuate. 
• inhibited negative communication through limiting Tl’esqox citizens from posting graphic 
wildfire images which would scare citizens. 
• Provided updates to community, local non-First nation residents and enforcement personnel 
about the state of the wildfires equipped with detailed and sophisticated maps developed by 
Tsilhqot’in national government. 
• Maintained fuel services.
Tl’esqox Best Practices
“I am considered a criminal under Canadian Law because we 
were in court for blockading the military protecting our territory. 
The military block is on our title land and we want the ordinates 
cleaned up and the land returned to us.  
Our people are familiar with the military, but when I saw an army 
tank travel down our main reserve road during the wildfires of 
2017, it surprised me. Some of our people have bad memories of that 
time. 
Protocols need to be established for RCMP and military to lay out 
our ground rules.”
                                            
Chief francis laceese
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TSI DELDEL FIRST NATION 
Redstone, Alexis Creek First Nation
The Tsi Deldel (Redstone) community is located approximately 177 kilometres west of Williams Lake on Highway 20. The name of the community depicts the red rocks surrounding the 
community. Oral teachings account that the Alexis Creek First Nation, once governed by Chief 
Alexis, was located 63 kilometres south on Highway 20 where the township of Alexis Creek, BC is 
now located. Once settlers moved in they moved the First Nations peoples to farther west parcels 
of land. Nevertheless, Tsi Deldel is situated amongst beautiful mountains, meadows, creeks 
and rivers.  Tsi Deldel is the second largest Tsilhqot’in community with around 700 people as 
registered citizens as well as 38 designated reserves (Indian Act). 
Tsi Deldel operates many successful businesses. The numerous economic and social ventures 
include Tsi Del Del Enterprises Ltd., Redstone Gas Bar, Crazy Horse Energy Drink, Tsi Del Del 
Resources, and ?Eniyud Community Forests. The community hosts the Redstone Rodeo and 
Gymkhana yearly, which is a BC Rodeo Association sanctioned event. 
Tsi Del Del Enterprises Ltd., a joint venture logging company between Alexis Creek First Nation 
and partner Tolko Industries Ltd., established in 1992, has grown to be the largest logging 
company in the Williams Lake area.  
Tsi Deldel citizens speak their language and practice their culture regularly. Traditional gatherings 
are held yearly in the summers where the people hunt, fish and gather, and language and story 
teaching is shared.  
Within the community, there is a band office, health building, Kindergarten to Grade 9 school, 
cultural centre, daycare, gas station, and an outdated and unused fire centre.  Many of the citizens 
are farmers and ranchers. 
Flight Over Chilcotin
Photograph By: Grand Chief Ed John
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While the fires were igniting in several areas 
throughout the Central Interior of British 
Columbia, the Tsi Deldel community began 
to see signs of fires starting to surround their 
reserves. The Chezacut fire began on July 
7, 2017, approximately 50 kilometres north 
east from the reserve. The Kleena Kleene 
fire also started that day and was around 40 
kilometres further west from the village. The 
community was placed on evacuation alert. 
In the first three 
days, the community 
members prepared 
for a potential 
evacuation. 
Efficiencies were 
created to eliminate 
overlapping duties. 
A community 
nurse cared for the 
medical needs of 
the community and 
ensured the delivery 
of medicines. 
A team traveled door-
to-door frequently 
through the weeks 
to collect details of people remaining 
in homes, while reinforcing the need to 
maintain communication in the event of 
leaving the area. It was important to discuss 
the many restrictions on travel with the 
citizens.  
Otis Guichon, now Chief of Tsi Deldel, 
was a council member at the time and had 
worked in operations and maintenance for 
years in the community. Chief Guichon’s 
initial steps ensured that backup generators 
were functioning for the community water 
treatment plant, gas bar, and band offices. 
Chief Guichon became a point person 
for communications with government, 
the TNG, and 
community members 
at large. Tsi Deldel 
connected with the 
Cariboo Emergency 
Operations Centre 
call-in for daily 
updates, and 
frequently connected 
with staff at the 
Tsilhqot’in National 
Government.  
The Tsi Deldel 
Finance Manager 
immediately worked 
to connect with 
Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs 
Canada (INAC) to seek paperwork to access 
the emergency funding from Emergency 
Management British Columbia (EMBC). 
Once a State of Emergency was declared 
they were able to start this process. 
wildfire fuel Assessment 
Tsi Del Del’s main inhabited reserve is located on both sides of highway 20 in the Central 
Chilcotin. The northern part of the community has a grassland buffer for approximately 100 
metres and has an open slope dominated by Douglas fir. Surface fuels are moderate-to-light in 
both the grasslands and the forested slopes. 
south of the highway, the forest fuel within the community is light however on the edge of the 
residences forests are within metres of structures. This second growth lodgepole pine forest 
has discontinuous crowns and low-to-moderate surface fuels. The many other reserves are 
surrounded by older Douglas fir and lodgepole pine forests which have continuous crowns and 
an abundance of ladder fuels. 
 robert gray, Fire ecologist 
r.W. gray Consulting ltd.
Tsilhqot’in Wildfire Fuels Assessment
The Tsi Deldel Experience
“We did what we could with what we 
had in the community and came together 
during the 2017 fires. It was a learning 
experience and we hope to never go through 
that again.
This past year in 2018, we have been 
able to become more involved in 
the wildfires. Our logging company 
has a skilled workforce and we have many 
citizens that can do the jobs.
 
Tsi Deldel will be recognized for 
our authority over our lands.”
Chief otis GUiChon
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Daily financial transactions were 
maintained to keep the community 
operational. Financial assistance was 
provided to citizens who were caught in 
between roadblocks and not able to get 
to Emergency Response Centres. Supplies 
and food were constantly being ordered. 
In haste, and with several people on 
the ground, it was difficult to maintain 
all receipts and proofs of payments. At 
times, such receipts were misplaced, and 
resulted in a loss of 
reimbursement for 
large portions of 
expenditures during 
the wildfires. 
The Redstone Gas 
Bar maintained 
services full-time. 
The gas bar had a 
backup generator, 
and therefore 
service was not 
interrupted by the 
power failures. 
Fuel was limited to 
ensure that there 
was enough until 
deliveries were 
stable. 
As prepared as the community was, 
it was not prepared for an influx of 
evacuees relocated from local Tsilhqot’in 
communities. Supplies, food, and lodging 
essentials were not readily available; 
however, the community pulled together 
to offer a comfortable setting for everyone 
at the community centre and some were 
placed within homes in the community. 
Tsi Del Del Enterprises Ltd., the largest 
logging company in the region, was logging 
at Minor Lake, BC, at the first signs of 
wildfires on July 7, 2017, but lightning 
strikes had shut down the operations for the 
day. The fire began to progress aggressively. 
Equipment had been staged for a few days 
on the Tl’etinqox reserve and was available 
immediately when dispatched. The 
company foreman with backup equipment 
was instructed by Chief Alphonse to create 
a fire guard around the Tl’etinqox reserve 
with backup equipment. TDDE manager, 
Phil Theriault connected with the Alexis 
Creek Ministry of Forests staff for approval 
to assist where possible, but to proceed 
safely. 
The company employs over 80 staff and 
contractors and therefore was able to 
organize efficiently with experienced 
equipment operators familiar with 
Tsilhqot’in territory. Through their joint 
venture partner, 
they were able 
to attain permits 
to travel back to 
Williams Lake 
and for those who 






Percy Guichon was 
coordinating the 
wildfire crews and 
registering them to 
work on the local 
fires. This was quite 
a process to ensure 
that the crews were 
established with safety equipment and 
reliable vehicles that were registered with 
the BC Wildfire Service. 
Within three days, the Cariboo Fire Centre 
deployed a fire camp in Puntzi Lake, 
B.C.  However, in Chezacut, the fire was 
smaller in comparison and had burned 
quietly with little response for one week. 
Ervin Charleyboy, then Chief of Tsi Deldel, 
traveled to Chezacut to assess the situation 
and assisted by extinguishing fire spots 
along the road. When he stopped at the 
Chezacut Ranch, he was startled to find that 
there was no assistance for the residents. 
He immediately sent Tsi Deldel firefighters 
to help them. Heavy duty equipment and 
water trucks from the logging company 
further supported the effort. 
Several days into the wildfires, a 
temporary First Nations Liaison Officer 
working at the Puntzi Lake fire camp, by 
“At the beginning, the Puntzi 
Fire Centre was disorganized, but it was to be 
expected. On the safety front they did make 
some sound decisions. The fires were as tall 
as buildings in some areas. Like it or not, it is 
a pretty humbling experience. There would 
have been casualties if we had people out there 
without communication or the proper equipment. 
I can see a strong emergency response if there 
was a partnership between the people that 
know the territory and the government – it 
is a complement of skills. At the fire in Kleena 
Kleene, we built the roads that we logged and 
we should have been considered a bigger asset to 
them.” 
phil theriault, Manager 
tsi del del enterprises ltd.
74Tsilhqot’in Report on the 2017 Wildfires
happenstance ran into the Tsi Deldel crew 
at the Redstone Gas Bar. His position was 
going to be vacant soon and he urged Tsi 
Deldel citizens to apply to fill the position. 
After lengthy discussions attesting to his 
qualifications, Councillor Guichon was 
officially named the liaison between the fire 
centre and the community. 
The Fire Centre’s shift changed every two 
weeks, creating a lack of continuity and 
follow through. TDDE had company staff, 
contractors, and equipment spread between 
four fire complexes: Hanceville, Chezacut, 
Kleena Kleene, and Anaham Lake. It was 
difficult to maintain Safe Certification 
protocols and appropriate safety measures 
with such a geographical span and different 
Incident Commanders at each site. On the 
two-week shift turn over, Theriault pulled 
the company operators together in one crew 
so that he could manage the crews with 
safety measures employed by the company. 
Even though the company had an extensive 
amount of safety gear, vehicles, and heavy-
duty equipment, they did not have all the 
tools necessary to fight fires. The company 
suppliers shipped in truckloads of pumps 
and hoses. Those that were able to work on 
the fires did not have access to vehicles, 
but TDDE was able to provide them with 
company vehicles, so they could deploy 
firefighting crews. 
Advice was often given to the provincial 
wildfire personnel, however it was not often 
not heeded. The community expressed that 
they were kept in the dark. For example, 
during helicopter flights for aerial views of 
the land, community assessors observed 
that other aircrafts were backburning in 
Sun Through the Smoke
Photograph By: TNG
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areas. Their requests for clarification were 
often met with silence. 
The fires were moving closer to the logging 
site where there was still equipment and 
logged wood left from the first day of 
the fires. Backburning near the site had 
been expressly discouraged by Tsi Deldel 
because of the stored equipment, and 
the differing climate and mountainous 
geography of the region. However, the 
request was disregarded. That evening, 
the wind changed and TDDE had to work 
throughout the night to move equipment 
away from the fire. They managed to 
move all but one piece of equipment from 
harm’s way. As the fire converged on the 
site, it burned all around the last piece of 
equipment, but remarkably left it intact. 
However, weeks’ worth of bunched wood 
had burnt in the fire. 
Highways were closed, and roadblocks 
were set up throughout the Tsi Deldel 
community and Williams Lake, yet many 
of the community’s citizens had been 
constantly fighting the fires and needed 
provisions. Chief Ervin Charleyboy met 
the RCMP at a roadblock, followed by a 
convoy of travelers, and had to exercise his 
authority to push through the roadblock. 
Later into the wildfires, a helicopter delivery 
had dropped off supplies and food. 
In the community, Elders were constantly 
stressed seeing the fires and the smoke, 
but leadership reassured them about the 
fire locations and that they were safe from 
harm. The Elders community hall was 
established as the main communication 
hub where people could gather to receive 
updated information about the fires and 
share meals together.  
Enforcement authorities not local to the 
area, had made the mistake of issuing 
evacuation orders a number of times to 
the Tsi Deldel citizens because they did 
not understand the difference between the 
First Nation community itself and the town 
of Alexis Creek, BC Redstone and Alexis 
Creek are populated centres, but should 
not be confused with the Tsi Deldel (Alexis 
Creek/Redstone) First Nation whose Indian 
Reserves (I.R.) are located farther west 
on Highway 20. These mix-ups were not 
simple to work through.  
The band office internet was on a server 
and with power outages, the staff and 
leadership were unable to connect. Many of 
the residents had internet through Xplornet, 
which is a broadband voice and data 
communication company tailored to rural 
customers; it is operated through wireless 
and satellite networks. The community kept 
in contact additionally through Facebook 
Messenger. 
Tsi Del Del citizens who owned generators 
were able to stay at their houses, but others 
who did not have power, gathered at the 
Cultural Centre so they could cook with 
portable propane stoves and BBQs. The 
community held gathering activities to bring 
their people together. 
The Tsilhqot’in National Government 
mapping team sent out maps to the 
community regularly to show fire 
progression in relation to areas of 
Tsilhqot’in significance and community 
boundaries. The maps were helpful for the 
Tsilhqot’in citizens because the locales 
were clear, timely, and culturally relevant. 
Tsi Deldel has continuously endured 
wildfires in the area and has progressively 
strengthened the planning and coordination 
for such events. In 2018, the TDDE was 
designated as a ‘strike-team,’ which 
if initiated would pool personnel and 
equipment resources into tactical response 
for wildfires. They were initiated for eight 
fires within their geographical area and had 
them extinguished within 48 hours.
Tsi Deldel is confident that they are 
prepared to handle the next wildfire but 
require additional training, supplies, 
equipment and infrastructure.
Where Experience Meets 
Local Knowledge, The Next 
Years 
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• Provided a venue for neighbouring First nation communities when they were evacuated.
• Assisted the Tl’etinqox with Tsi Del Del enterprises ltd.’s (TDDe) heavy-duty equipment 
support to build fire fuel breaks. 
• Maintained fuel services. 
• received support by TDDe’s joint venture partner to get immediate access to training, 
supplies and authorizations.
• Persistently advocated to BC Wildfire Service to hire a competent Tsi Deldel leader and 
citizen in a First nation liaison role.
• Assumed control of TDDE equipment and staff over BC Wildfire Service direction to 
ensure that safe procedures were maintained, and the entire crew was operating from one 
command. 
• Continued to make recommendations regardless of the fact that they were not being followed 
to maintain a consistent voice.
• Persisted in local wildfire suppression efforts at the onset of the wildfires while touring local 
residences to identify the community and local non-indigenous neighbours‘ vulnerability.
• Advocated for wildfire support for local residents.
• Honed emergency management operations within the first three days while preparing for an 
evacuation.
• Provided medical support and identified prescription and medical needs in the event of 
evacuations or abandonment. 
• Frequented Tsi Deldel citizens homes to maintain communication.
• sustained emergency back-up systems on major infrastructure to ensure the continual 
operation. 
• Appointed main contacts for government, the nation and community citizens.
• Maintained an electronic communication system for evacuated citizens and family despite 
the power outages and established a community gathering site for persistent communication. 
• Advanced community needs through innovative methods.
• Established a positive reputation through TDDE in wildfire management and were designated 
as an initial ‘strike-team’ in 2018 with 100% success.
Tsi Deldel Best Practices
Fire Retardant Drop on Highway 20
Photograph By: TNG
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Situated between Williams Lake, BC and Quesnel, B.C, ?Esdilagh (Alexandria) is separated by the Fraser River, and the two main reserves are known as East Side or the West Side.  
 
?Esdilagh has faced many challenges over the years. Houses have not been built on the 
community for over 40 years. For many years, until 2004, the citizens could utilize the Marguerite 
Ferry to travel across the river to either one of their communities. The ferry was removed, 
increasing the community commute.  In 2014, the band office, the only building besides the 
church at the time, burnt down, losing a plenitude of important records and documentation. 
Currently, the band office is located in Quesnel, BC 
 
?Esdilagh citizens have been striving to build back the community, and in 2016 the community 
constructed a new health centre. The health centre is utilized as a gathering space as well. In 
2018, a youth centre, skating rink, ball diamond, and pump track were built to provide healthy 
recreational infrastructure close to home. In addition, for the past two years, the community has 
been advancing its agricultural rural development.  
Over the past few years, the community has been seeking dependable high-speed internet 
connectivity. High speed internet access is necessary to provide the broadband power to run 
Telehealth technologies, which not only eliminate travel for specialized health appointments, but 




Smoke Filled Skies at Fort Alexandria, BC
Photograph By: Richard Lam/PNG - Vancouver Sun
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The ?Esdilagh Band Office, located in 
Quesnel, BC, fielded emergency calls on 
July 7, 2017, which alerted the staff and 
leadership that wildfires were developing 
in close proximity to the west side reserve. 
Immediately, a team of staff commuted to 
the community, 
and while travelling 
south on West Fraser 
Road, the team 
passed through 
many wildfires 




the team was not 
permitted to travel 
through. They had 
to find an alternate 
route to reach the 
community, leading 
them closer to the 
wildfires. 
Once at the west 
side community, 
the team worked 
diligently to identify who was still there, as 
well as remove flammables from around 
buildings, and to set sprinklers on and 
around the homes. They assisted Elders 
with packing and helped transport them 
to Quesnel. A wildfire was advancing 
rapidly, less than four kilometres southwest 
of the reserve. Some of the team members 
volunteered to stay to keep the fires away 
from the main structures and keep the water 
systems operating. The irrigation pump fed 
water from the river to assist with fighting 
the fires surrounding the community. 
Local non-Indigenous residents banded 
together to fight 
the fires that 
threatened their 




over to update 
them on the fire 
development and in 
turn informed them 
that the abundance 
of wildfires were 
detrimental to 
them assisting 
the residents. The 
residents were on 
their own.  
The band office 
was opened as 
an emergency 
operations centre in Quesnel. Staff 
remained in close and constant contact 
throughout the day with the team back on 
the reserve. The office became the main 
communication centre for members, and 
the staff turned into an emergency response 
team. 
The ?Esdilagh Experience
“Our priority is toward our people. I sat 
in a number of emergency meetings with 
government and did not feel that my voice was 
being heard. I would not sit there again unless I 
knew there were protocols in place 
that take our leadership input into account. 
We have so many issues with emergency 
accessibility that I need to see some 
changes. The road washed out between 
Quesnel and the east reserve adding a lengthy 
drive for our members. The ferry stopped 
in the early 2000’s creating a separation 
between the two reserves on 
each side of the river. 
We need a bridge because when the wildfires 
come back again we are at risk. “
      
Chief Victor roy stump
wildfire fuel Assessment 
?esdilagh is located on the east and west side of the Fraser river located between quesnel, bC 
and Williams lake, bC Forest fuels that surround the community consist of steep and moderately 
sloped forest dominated by Douglas fir, aspen and paper birch. 
Areas of these forests have been harvested but generally the forests are mature & continuous, 
with high crown closure, abundant ladder fuels and moderate-to-high surface fuel loads. 
on the west reserve, between the community dwellings and the river, are large irrigated 
hayfields on flat bench lands that are densely dominated by Douglas fir on the sloping hills. 
robert gray, Fire ecologist 
r.W. gray Consulting ltd.
Tsilhqot’in Wildfire Fuels Assessment
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Staff were constantly busy. They 
worked with the Canadian Red Cross 
to register ?Esdilagh citizens. Blocks of 
accommodation were booked for relocated 
citizens. ?Esdilagh partnered with Red Bluff 
First Nation to coordinate meals and events 
at the Red Bluff Quesnel-based community 
hall and they offered many activities for 
the children and youth. Staff assisted with 
hauling supplies, and cooking and cleaning. 
The Elders were kept busy. On one occasion 
they offered a health and healing day where 
a local spa hosted an evacuee program and 
healers specializing in trauma were invited. 
The healing services were later expressed 
as a need throughout the entirety of the 
evacuation and after.  
Days into the wildfires, the ?Esdilagh 
neighbours who remained on their 
properties to ward off the fires were low on 
supplies for themselves and their livestock. 
They were unable to cross the roadblocks to 
shop, at risk that they would not be allowed 
to go back to their homes. They expressed 
that they were made to feel as though they 
were irresponsible for staying behind to 
care for their livestock and protect their 
homes and businesses from the wildfires. 
At the same time, ?Esdilagh leadership was 
reluctantly provided with access passes to 
deliver food and supplies to their citizens 
that were left in the community. 
After the protection systems were in place 
and the wildfire threat had subsided, some 
staff maintained the community garden 
and carried on daily activities to look after 
the homes and buildings. However, the 
wildfires had threatened access points on 
both sides of the community and the team 
was evacuated. 
Although there was some animosity towards 
the RCMP from the disagreements held 
at the roadblocks, the relationship still 
grew strong. The RCMP would check in 
with ?Esdilagh leadership daily. The RCMP 
also escorted an ?Esdilagh parent from 
Quesnel to Anahim Lake, BC to retrieve the 
child who was visiting family, but became 
stranded when the Anahim Lake area was 
also evacuated. ?Esdilagh First Nation 
expressed gratitude for the respect and 
support that they had eventually received.  
From the outset, ?Esdilagh leadership 
participated in emergency management 
meetings with the local authorities. The 
comments and concerns from ?Esdilagh 
representatives were not acknowledged, 
and suggestions were ignored. Most 
notably, leadership expressed animosity 
toward the senior fire marshal for this 
behaviour. For five meetings, the ?Esdilagh 
leadership attempted to have their voices 
heard, but stopped attending when they 
did not feel it was beneficial anymore. The 
meetings were taking time away from the 
citizens and other important duties, but  
bearing no results. 
?Esdilagh felt it was difficult to receive 
support and information from the 
government. The many bureaucratic silos 
made it difficult to seek assistance. They 
were met with resistance if the information 
they sought was outside of the staff 
members’ portfolio. 
Furthermore, staff found it particularly 
hard to seek financial support for expenses 
that were overlooked. The ?Esdilagh First 
Nation assisted evacuated citizens with the 
purchase of clothing, everyday toiletries, 
fuel, and various other daily expenses. 
These expenses were financially impossible 
for the citizens. 
 
On August 16, 2017, the West Fraser Road 
area was downgraded to an alert and 
citizens were able to return home. Knowing 
that the fires had subsided incredibly and 
that the community was out of immediate 
danger, the leadership received a permit for 
the maintenance and operation manager to 
prepare the community water system for the 
arrivals.  
Once the citizens were back at home, 
numerous issues came to light. Citizens 
had accumulated expenses and needed 
assistance to pay back these debts. Hydro 
and phone lines were at risk of being cut off 
and even one year later, some Elders have 
not been able to recover financially. The 
burden has been felt even from the people 
who were financially independent because 
their employers had laid them off during the 
wildfires. 
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The work that was put into maintaining the 
community garden was highly praised since 
the staff were able to provide families with 
an abundance of fresh vegetables. The food 
in individual freezers had spoiled during the 
evacuation due to power outages. 
Post-traumatic stress has impacted ?Esdilagh 
citizens. The leadership are concerned for 
the wellbeing of their elderly because this 
type of stress could be especially dangerous 
to their health. These issues seem to be 
presenting themselves in different ways. 
Added sicknesses and unexplained health 
issues are increasing.
Since the wildfire of 2017, ?Esdilagh has 
been working to conserve the impacted 
resources and protect traditional areas 
that are culturally significant. In October 
of 2017, ?Esdilagh declared a ban on 
moose harvesting within its caretaker 
area. The moose populations were at 
an unprecedented low level prior to the 
2017 wildfires, and the wildfires further 
devastated the wildlife. As a community, 
they encouraged their own citizens who 
rely heavily on moose for the majority of 
their meals to sacrifice hunting moose for 
conservation purposes. Leadership was 
disappointed that the government did not 
recognize the efforts of the people and 
support their efforts with a moratorium on 
the Limited Entry Hunt.16
 
The challenges that the community face 
regularly have been recently compounded 
by the 2017 Plateau Wildfire. The 
community was evacuated for over two 
months and is still working to secure 
recoveries for their displacement. On May 
7, 2018, the West Fraser Road—connecting 
?Esdilagh to Quesnel—at the Deep Creek 
Hill was severely damaged by a landslide 
as a result of the intense wildfire damage to 
the forest floors. Recent news reports have 
indicated that the road will be closed until 
at least 2020. 
The community now travels an hour and a 
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Fire data is a compilation of BC Provincial wildfire perimetres
and buffered fire detection points from VIIRS Satellite as
compiled by USDA. Areas labeled are current day estimates 
from BC Provincial perimeters.
Fire perimeter does not necessarily indicate instances of wildfire.
Fire detection from VIIRS satellite may be due to heat detection
in smoke. Please interpret with discretion.
Continual Impacts From the Wildfires
Plateau Wildfire in Proximity to ?Esdilagh
Map By: TNG GIS Department
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half through the detour to get to Quesnel 
– this has increased the commute by an 
extra 30 minutes each way. Such a detour 
has created a significant financial and 
emotional strain on 
?Esdilagh as they are 
part of the Northern 
Health service area 
(situated in Quesnel) 
and their children 
are enrolled within 
the Quesnel school 
district. The bus 
route has increased 
in time and children 
are spending more 
time away from the 
community. ?Esdilagh 
had long asked for 
the ferry service to be 
reinstated for safety, 
ease of travel and 
most importantly to 
once again restore 
the connection between the communities. 
Recent discussions have reinforced the need 
to develop a bridge across the river. 
In April 2018, within ?Esdilagh traditional 
territory, the leadership imposed a ban on 
mushroom harvesting, restricting activity 
within the Castle Rock-Twan Lake area 
because of the effects of the wildfires.  
An endangered pelican species native 
to the area’s habitat had been negatively 
impacted. Cultural artifacts within the 
area’s traditional burial 
grounds had been 
disturbed. The ban was 
in place to allow the 
lands to regenerate. 
While this area was 
off limits, the Nation 
provided permits for 
other areas within its 
territory.17 
 
In the event of another 
wildfire close to 
the community, the 
leadership and selected 
emergency staff have 
decided that they will 
not evacuate based 
solely on external 
source information but 
would also consider their own assessment 
of risk before determining the best course 
of action. ?Esdilagh staff and leadership feel 
comfort in knowing that as a community 
they established a system and can work 
united as a team with their neighbours to 
handle another emergency of its kind.
• Responded quickly from Quesnel-based Band Office to immediately travel to the community 
to support the on-reserve citizens with relocating. 
• relocated ?esdilagh citizens to safe and suitable lodging. 
• Cleared fuel generating debris away from community houses quickly and as a team.
• Established an emergency centre at the Quesnel band office and transformed all staff to 
emergency operations.
• Partnered with red bluff First nation to provide meals and events for evacuees.
• Provided a health day for citizens with trauma support needs. 
• established a strong working relationship with the rCMP.
• Persisted with attending local authority emergency management meetings and made the 
decision to spend time on community needs after advice and recommendations were not 
heeded.
• Provided consistent communication system with citizens.
• Maintained community garden throughout evacuations and the community relied upon the 
produce after they returned home. 
• launched conservational efforts with restrictions to moose and mushroom harvest within 
their traditional territory and enforced restrictions within the community. 
?Esdilagh Best Practices
17       ?Esdilagh First Nation Government. No Mushroom Harvest in ?Esdilagh: Castle Rock/Twan Lake South Wildfire Area. 2018, http://
www.esdilagh.com/PDF/Castle%20Rock_TwanLk%20_Mushroom_PSA_APRIL_11[1].pdf
“As a community we surrendered 
our right to hunt moose because the 
wildfires had such a negative impact 
on the species. I see our people daily 
struggling from this as a consequence 
and meanwhile BC continued to allow 
an LEH.
We brought in meat and we had food 
from the community garden. We put 
on meals weekly. This is extremely 
important to the leadership and staff 
that BC recognize the impact from 
their decisions. The decision makers 
in the province are not left hungry.”
Councillor Chad 
stump
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Ministry Firefighters Extinguishing Hot Spots
Photograph By: Jason Payne/PNG - Vancouver Sun
The Xeni Gwet’in First Nation is located 250 kilometres west of Williams Lake, BC in the Nemiah Valley or a mere 60 minutes by air from Vancouver, BC The caretaker area of the 
Xeni Gwet’in lies between Chilko Lake and Taseko Lake.  
The community of Xeni is situated in a rural valley surrounded by snow-capped mountains, 
lakes, and glaciers. Public access to the area began after a road was built into the community 
in the 1970’s. The community is off the grid; buildings operate with generators, houses rely on 
propane, and a telephone system was only connected in 2009. The area is virtually un-touched. 
The community’s traditions and culture are strongly intact, and many of the people only speak 
only their traditional language. Much of their territory has been declared as a protected area, 
designated under the Aboriginal Wilderness Preserve (1989), and the ?Elegesi Qayus Wild 
Horse Preserve (2002). 
XENI GWET’IN FIRST 
NATIONS GOVERNMENT 
Nemiah Valley First Nation
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The Chilko River is marked by a well-known landmark, “Henry’s Crossing”. In 1989, the “Nemiah 
Trapline Action” was brought forward in the Supreme Court of BC to claim Aboriginal rights to 
the community trapline in order to protect it from intended logging activities, which would clear-
cut the Brittany Triangle, a wild horse inhabited area. In 1992, access to the logging development 
started with an attempt to build a bridge into the area, at which time Xeni Gwet’in blockaded the 
road. By December 1998, the “Brittany Triangle (Tachelach’ed) Action” began with a claim to 
approximately 438,000 hectares of land. 
A 339-day trial commenced in 2002 and ended in 2007. The court heard the oral history traditional 
evidence from the people and also considered information from many historical documents. In 
2007, Justice David Vickers ruled that the Tsilhqot’in people have proven rights to the territory 
claimed in court and had established Aboriginal title to a part of the land, but he stopped short 
of declaring Aboriginal title. This was appealed by BC, Canada, and Tsilhqot’in Nation. In 2012, 
the BC Court of Appeal upheld the Aboriginal rights to hunt, trap, and trade in their traditional 
territory, but disagreed that Aboriginal title could be proven to anything more than small, 
intensively used tracts of land. Therefore the Nation went back to court. 
For the first time in Canadian history, on June 26, 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada 
unanimously granted a declaration of Aboriginal title to approximately 1900 square kilometres of 
land.  Aboriginal title includes the rights to control the lands and decide how it should be used. 
Transitioning the land now termed the “Declared Title Area” to full Tsilhqot’in management 
and control is a complex and expensive process. Through the Nenqay Deni Accord, a process 
to ‘transition’ the lands back to the community is a restorative healing progression that the 
community strives to do respectfully. While the transition is underway, financial resources to 
manage the lands to the extent necessary are not in place. 
A challenge lies in delineating the responsibilities between government and the 
Xeni Gwet’in in emergency response and mitigation of risk. The community and 
Nation must ensure they have the capacity (human and financial) to manage 
such issues as they arise. The Declared Title Area (DTA), since it sits in a grey 
area through the transfer of ownership, does not qualify for Provincial funding 
to participate in fuel mitigation measures while other First Nation communities 
do. This delay in funding leaves the community and its citizens extremely 
vulnerable to wildfires. Without the assistance of government funding or alternatively settlement 
compensation it is impossible to address suitable land management measures. 
British Columbia has accepted responsibility for emergency response and wildfire liability in the 
Title Area under the Emergency Response Protocol, 2015. Accordingly, it is in all parties’ interests 
to take adequate and proactive measures to mitigate fire risk in the DTA. 
The DTA did not burn during the 2017 wildfire season. It is known by the Tsilhqot’in Nation and the 
province to be a high-fire risk forest area. While forest management is properly in the jurisdiction 
of Xeni Gwet’in and supported by the Tsilhqot’in National Government, capacity issues and an 
unwillingness to collaborate on the part of provincial agencies is impeding proper preventive 
emergency measures. As a result, the Tsilhqot’in Nation has not had access to the support 
needed to develop and implement Forest Management Planning in the DTA. The DTA therefore 
continues to pose a significant fire risk within Tsilhqot’in territory and beyond. 
Transition of Lands Back into the Community Control
The Long Road to the Title Lands
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In Xeni Gwet’in, the skies were blue, 
and the air was clear of smoke. Because 
the community is virtually off the grid, 
the power outages 
did not affect them. 
Although the fires were 
kilometres away, there 
was much work to do. 
The first signs of fires 
began around Williams 
Lake, BC and in the 
Tsilhqot’in territory on 
Friday, July 7, 2017. 
Xeni Gwet’in citizens 
became increasingly 
concerned that access 
in and out of their 
community would be 
obstructed via the one 
road in. The community of Yunesit’in was 
evacuated, and some of their citizens began 
arriving in Nemiah Valley and were placed 
with families or in vacant homes.  
Staff within the community reviewed their 
Emergency Management Plan at the outset 
of the wildfires. In a meeting, Xeni began 
planning to establish evacuation muster 
areas, prepare water trucks, and validate 
the GPS points for emergency helicopter 
landing sites; all 
emergency protocols 
were collectively 
decided upon with the 
community.
At the meeting the Xeni 
Gwet’in Elders decided 
they still wished to 
go to the BC Elders 
Gathering in Campbell 
River, BC They were 
escorted through the 
various roadblocks to 
Williams Lake, BC to 
meet their chartered 
bus to begin their 
journey with Elders from their neighbouring 
community, Tl’etinqox First Nation. 
Xeni Gwet’in citizens still in Williams Lake 
assisted with transporting livestock to safety, 
and shopping for supplies and food to be 
delivered to remote communities. When 
travelling to the community, enforcement 
“Our mandate is to protect our land. We 
know how long it has taken to build the 
communities we have. With the very little 
resources we have, we need to fight for the 
community and our resources since no one 
else will. 
We need a relationship with our local 
governments in order for them to 
understand what our values are and 
support us. We cannot spend all of our 
time in court, but we also cannot continue 
to be disrespected on our own land.”
Chief Jimmy lulua
The Xeni Gwet’in Experience
wildfire fuel Assessment 
in Xeni gwet’in fuel management is necessary surrounding Konnie lake and within the dwellings 
around Chilko lake.  The forest fuels are the highest, most extensive and continuous than any 
other Tsilhqot’in community examined. They consist of high-to-moderate density lodgepole pine 
with some woody debris in places.
The fuels are moderate-to-heavy on the western edge of the community centre with a number 
of structures in the interface. The eastern side of the community consists of grasslands with 
aspen that has some coniferous patches, however on the north and southern side the forests 
are dominated with conifer. Vegetation along the valley consists of a variety of hayfields and 
wetlands of both herbaceous and shrubby vegetation. The fuels in this area are patchy and 
discontinuous, but a number of dwellings are located in and adjacent to the heavier timber 
around this open area.
At the west end of Konni lake, the forest fuel is mixed with low productivity aspen and pine 
stands with some dense Douglas fir patches. Surface fuels are light and tree crowns are both 
mixed and discontinuous. The eastern half of the north shore of lake is open with grass/
herb vegetation with a number of aspen patches. on the southern side there are continuous 
coniferous forests across the entire area, which increase the fuel load.
 robert gray, Fire ecologist 
r.W. gray Consulting ltd.
Tsilhqot’in Wildfire Fuels Assessment
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personnel at road blocks did not understand 
the location of Xeni Gwet’in and would 
often obstruct all traffic, even those with 
TNG-approved passes. 
The band office was then transformed into 
a communication centre, which would 
become a safe place for people to meet. The 
gas station, laundry mat, and convenience 
store remained open. Because of the 
geographic separation between leadership 
and citizens, a private 
Facebook page was created 
to keep the community 
connected. 
Due to the intensity of the 
situation, a handful of staff 
assumed roles. On the first 
day, the small group of 
people available to assist 
visited the citizens going 
door-to-door. They created 
a list of residents in each 
house, and determined 
what, if any, additional 
rooms were available in 
case of the need to harbor evacuees from 
other communities. Types of available 
transportation, vehicle reliability, and fuel 
quantities were recorded. A nurse in the 
community helped with medical support. 
The Tsilhqot’in Land Rangers were sent to 
assist with day and night fire watches in the 
other communities and also were stationed 
within the higher elevations of the Nemiah 
Valley for better views. 
David Setah, now a councillor for Xeni 
Gwet’in, managed the Xeni Gwet’in 
Enterprises and made assessments on the 
status of supplies. He was to determine 
how long the vehicle fuel would last and 
how long the community infrastructure 
generators could run for without receiving 
a delivery of fuel. However, fuel was 
delivered a few weeks after the fires had 
started in the Tsilhqot’in. 
The Xeni Gwet’in connected with the 
Yunesit’in to receive S100 training for some 
of their citizens, and to order supplies. 
Xeni sought insight into which supplies 
would be reimbursable if they were 
purchased in advance. Advance purchases 
were necessary to prepare their teams for 
fighting the fire, but they felt overall that the 
government was not openly communicating 
what they could expend. The community 
thus limited their purchases, and in turn 
were unable to send more crews out to 
assist. 
A fire progressed towards the community, 
at the 22-kilometer 
distance sign along the 
Nemiah Valley Road.  The 
community was told that 
they should prepare for 
an evacuation but still 
the location of the fire 
was 63 kilometres away. 
Residents determined that 
the community was not at 
risk. Xeni Gwet’in provided 
their main firefighting crews 
and cooks to support the 
wildfire suppression efforts 
and the fire was eventually 
extinguished.  The citizens 
were surprised that wildfire personnel and 
emergency staff did not appreciate the 
location distances and terrain to determine 
that the community was still very far from 
the fire. 
Another fire began close to Teztan Biny 
(Fish Lake). The community took this 
fire into their own hands and the fire 
was quickly suppressed. Teztan Biny has 
profound cultural and spiritual significance 
to the Tsilhqot’in people. Uniquely 
abundant with 85,000 rainbow trout, the 
site is where Tsilhqot’in people come for 
ceremonial purposes and to hunt, trap, and 
gather. The Xeni Gwet’in citizens were not 
going to wait to see if additional support 
would arrive before attempting to stop 
the fire from decimating an area of such 
significance. 
Part of the Xeni Gwet’in leadership had 
accompanied the Elders to the 41st Annual 
BC Elders Gathering in Campbell River, 
and while they were at the gathering, they 
realized that the magnitude of the fires back 
“I feel the fires could 
have been extinguished 
much quicker. 
I heard from people on 
the fires and some said 
at times they didn’t receive 
direction until noon. They 
said they had to sit back and 
let it burn” 
Councillor James 
lulua Jr.
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in the Tsilhqot’in was intensifying in the 
territory. After the gathering they moved the 
Elders to Abbotsford, BC and leadership 
and family chaperones worked tirelessly 
to care for the needs of their Elders. When 
it became evident that they would not be 
able to travel home due to the Williams 
Lake BC evacuations they had received 
immediate external 
support. The Stó:lö 
First Nation assisted 
the Xeni Gwet’in 
Elders and leadership 
by arranging rooming 
and meal vouchers at 
the affiliated restaurant 
in Abbotsford, BC 
Fifty-four people were 
on the chartered bus 
and 20 rooms were 
blocked off indefinitely 
for them. 
The Elders were hosted 
for dinner by the 
Stó:lö Nation, and The 
First Nation Health 
Authority (FNHA) 
assisted with providing medical support 
for the Elders and arranged activities such 
as canning, every other day. The Canadian 
Red Cross visited the people at their 
accommodations, and form filling was a 
constant process. 
In the community, staff helped people 
connect with their families and the Elders 
that were evacuated and unable to travel 
back to Nemiah Valley. The community 
felt that it was virtually ignored at times 
during the wildfires but understood that 
the focus was on immediately impacted 
communities.  Certain staff and leadership 
advocated on behalf of their people’s needs 
to eventually receive support.
The conference calls with the Cariboo Fire 
Centre were helpful for Xeni Gwet’in to 
understand what was happening outside of 
their caretaker area, so that they could in 
turn determine their own level of risk. 
The Tsilhqot’in Title Rangers visited each 
home to develop a list 
of needs from each 
of the 62 households. 
Provisions and supplies 
were then flown into 
the village for the 
citizens. Community 
summer students 
and the Title Rangers 
divided delivery 
tasks between them, 
ensuring that everyone, 
including homes with 
pets and livestock 
had enough supplies 
and support. Satellite 
phones were also 
delivered in the event 
that other methods of 
communication were 
cut off.    
The Nemiah Valley was not impacted as 
significantly as the other five Tsilhqot’in 
communities. Still there were wildfires 
and later flooding.  A growing concern 
regarding the impact on fish and wildlife 
was still at the forefront of people’s minds. 
The extent of the burnt land within the 
Tsilhqot’in territory will inevitably drive 
people into the declared title area. As this 
area had not been as impacted additional 
resources will be required to govern the 
lands in the title area as a conservational 
measure. 
“We have a large land base to 
manage but very few resources to 
manage it with. 
This is especially the case 
with respect to wildfire management. 
We have very high fuel loads and intact 
forests but to date it has been very 
difficult to find support to help 
control fire risk in the Title Lands. 
As a result, the Xeni community and 
other residents of the Title Lands are 
at high risk - forests here could burn 
catastrophically.” 
John lerner, dtA sub-
table Manager
Additional Issues in the Midst of the Wildfires
On July 31, 2017, the Tsilhqot’in Nation 
challenged a provincial drilling permit 
issued to the Taseko Mines Ltd. on July 14, 
2017, in the BC Supreme Court. The permit 
would approve extensive drilling, road 
clearing, the creation of hundreds of test 
pits, and kilometres of seismic lines, right 
near Teztan Biny, where the Government 
of Canada had already twice rejected the 
proposed “Prosperity Project”. 
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The proposed project has been a thorn in 
the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s side for years as it 
has undergone extensive environmental 
assessment under the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012. 
For the first time in Canadian history, this 
project underwent two environmental 
assessments and each time it was deemed 
to have significant and immitigable adverse 
environmental and cultural impacts that 
could not be justified. 
Xeni Gwet’in and Tsilhqot’in representatives 
appeared in court in Victoria, BC while fires 
were still threatening their livelihoods back 
at home. One year later, the BC Supreme 
Court upheld the permit for Taseko Mines 
Ltd. to undertake the drilling program, 
however the Tsilhqot’in Nation appealed 
the ruling and was granted an injunction 
temporarily prohibiting drilling to enable 
the court to hear the case.
Shortly after the Elders, leadership, and 
chaperones left the court in Victoria, the 
evacuation of Williams Lake, BC was lifted. 
Part of the group stayed in Abbotsford 
due to health issues, to ensure that the 
air was cleared from smoke and that the 
community had time to prepare for their 
homecoming. Various areas flooded along 
the Nemiah Valley Road making safe 
accessibility an issue. Upgrading the road 
to ensure that the road safety has become a 
priority. 
Tsilhqot’in national government loading supplies for Communities
(right to left) Tl’etinqox Councillor Daana gilpin, Chief Jimmy lulua, linda haig-brown
Photograph by: Jason Payne/Png,  vancouver sun
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Campfire bans prohibited drying salmon. Traditional fishing sites were inaccessible. Long-
established medicine and berry grounds were restricted. Hunting ceased. Xeni Gwet’in 
citizens feel the consequences now, but also believe that the environment needs a chance 
to rest and recover. 
Xeni Gwet’in was not on an evacuation order but was obstructed from travelling within 
Tsilhqot’in territory or even to Williams Lake, BC due to the emergency road closures. 
Virtually stranded, the community felt that they were not acknowledged as being 
disadvantaged, however they were still in need of everything from food to medicine.
Workers were prevented from working for months since the wildfires ceased operations of 
numerous companies in and around the Tsilhqot’in and Williams Lake, BC Consequently, 
these individuals experienced financial impacts. At first it was difficult to receive Red Cross 
assistance, so the community still supported their people to bridge the burden. 
Before the Nemiah Valley is ever threatened by a wildfire again, extensive planning in 
emergency management and fuel management is required to ensure safety. The overall 
need in Xeni Gwet’in is for adequate financial resources to manage the Declared Title 
Area. Financial resources have a significant impact on developing capacity and managing 
the land.
• Reviewed emergency management plan at the outset of the wildfires. 
• established duties and emergency procedures at a community meeting informed by the 
citizens.
• Assisted with livestock transportation.
• Transported an immediate cache of food and supplies to the community.
• Transformed the band office into the main community communication centre.
• Created an electronic communication system to inform off-reserve or relocated citizens of 
daily events. 
• Traveled door-to-door to all Xeni gwet’in citizen homes to establish an inventory of 
transportation ability, additional rooms and to determine who was in the community. 
• Stationed Tsilhqot’in Land Rangers at higher elevations to scout the distance of wildfires in 
proximity to the community. 
• Assessed the fuel and propane supply and determined the days until the supply would run 
low.
• Collaborated with Yunesit’in to provide training and receive supplies. 
• Utilized own best judgment when determining the true location of wildfires and the 
vulnerability of the community.
• Worked with the stó:lö nation and First nation health Authority to provide safe 
accommodation for elders, events and services. 
• Assigned summer students to deliver supplies to 62 houses making use of all available staff. 
• Challenged Provincial drilling permit issued to Taseko Mines ltd. despite being amid an 
extreme emergency situation to advance the community citizens’ continual opposition of the 
Prosperity Project. 
Xeni Gwet’in Best Practices
The Aftermath of the Wildfires
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CONCLuSION
The 2017 wildfires continue to leave a lasting impact on the Tsilhqot’in people and lands. 
Nevertheless, in the face of overwhelming odds, the communities, the Nation and their 
neighbours worked together effectively and successfully, demonstrating true expertise and 
leadership. Within the Nation, individual differences were set aside, and people united 
to work for their common goal. The wildfire tragedy healed long-standing relationship 
breakdowns. The strength and amazing capacity for resilience in these rural remote 
communities can never be forgotten.  
Despite all of the challenges laid out in this report, the wildfires also revealed the strength 
of Tsilhqot’in stewardship and exposed important traditional knowledge that can support 
the Tsilhqot’in in its goal of playing a central role in land management and long-term 
planning at the territorial level. Tsilhqot’in people noted that the forests are their foods 
that sustain them. Their traditional structures support and encourage knowledge of the 
land and conservational measures. The wildfires took this away. However, there have to 
be structures in place that honour this knowledge, which not only make space for, but are 
built around community stewardship on the land. 
The archeological sites that were exposed as a result of the wildfires need protection 
measures and the Tsilhqot’in need the opportunity to expand their knowledge and history 
on these sites. These provide a window to learn more about Tsilhqot’in history, heritage, 
rights, and title. In this way, the wildfires may provide an opportunity to strengthen 
Tsilhqot’in knowledge, to better understand the full story of how Tsilhqot’in lived on the 
land prior to colonization, and pass this on to future generations. 
The process to recovery in the communities has been taxing on the citizens, staff and 
leadership and is also negatively impacting the lands and wildlife that are within the 
territory. The recovery process from emergencies is slow, however financial resources 
can alleviate the stress on staff who are already significantly overburdened. In addition to 
this, the communities require dedicated financial resources to properly prepare for future 
emergencies. 
The health and safety of the many residents in the Tsilhqot’in, Indigenous and non-
Indigenous, were threatened by the 2017 wildfires. The lack of emergency operation 
centres and satellite centres in the rural communities revealed the vulnerability that 
could impair the entire territory. By several accounts, many areas across the expansive 
territory were neglected; however, a very different scenario is possible through progressive 
inclusion of local First Nations and residents. 
The true strength of the Tsilhqot’in people shone through and demonstrated that the 
communities can undeniably unite to take care of their homes, lands and people and they 
will voluntarily. In the aftermath of the wildfires of 2017, the mental and physical tolls that 
the Tsilhqot’in people have endured through historical oppressions have intensified. The 
fires awakened the people marked the earth and animals—these marks have revealed the 
dominant colonial practices that the Tsilhqot’in have long resisted.  
It is impossible to ignore the systemic problems with a purely government-led emergency 
response that was non-inclusive of local First Nations and residents. Nation-wide media 
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coverage, matched with several documentaries, oral testimonies and reports have exposed 
the urgent demand for a sizably restructured approach to emergency response and 
management in the Tsilhqot’in territory. 
Overall, management of the lands and resources does not squarely fit in provincial and 
federal decision making. A united approach to decision making on the lands where the 
Tsilhqot’in have lived since time immemorial is overdue and critical. To finally achieve 
this level of respect and recognition would be revolutionary and a true testimony of 
reconciliation.
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The Tsilhqot’in Nation is comprised of six First Nation communities – ?Esdilagh 
(Alexandria), Tl’esqox (Toosey), Tl’etinqox (Anaham), Tsi Deldel (Alexis Creek/Redstone), 
Xeni Gwet’in (Nemiah) and Yunesit’in (Stone). The Tsilhqot’in Nation and the Tsilhqot’in 
National Government (TNG) promote the autonomy of their governance systems and 
protect the interest of the Tsilhqot’in citizens’ culture and traditional life. 
On July 7, 2017, lightning strikes ignited over one hundred wildfires throughout 
the Province of British Columbia. That same evening, Todd Stone, BC Minister of 
Transportation, declared a Provincial State of Emergency. That same afternoon citizens of 
the Tsilhqot’in Nation had observed a progression of lightning strikes, which led to the 
advancement of several wildfires surrounding their communities. At the early stage of the 
wildfires, the Tsilhqot’in had no idea what they would have to deal with for well over two 
months. At first the communities awaited provincial support, but soon realized that they 
would have to take the helm in managing the emergency situation. 
The Nation fought relentlessly to protect their homes and community buildings from being 
engulfed by the wildfires. The citizens were overextended and endured mental, physical, 
emotional and spiritual demands on their health. From the outset, the communities not 
only faced the threat of the wildfires, they were met with threats of intimidation by law 
enforcement officers to apprehend children from families and to forcibly evacuate or arrest 
citizens that chose to not evacuate. 
The fires revealed the ongoing struggle between the Tsilhqot’in and the provincial 
government over the exercise of jurisdiction in Tsilhqot’in territory. Tsilhqot’in leadership 
exercises inherent jurisdiction over Tsilhqot’in territory and people. During the wildfires, 
leadership exercised this inherent responsibility to act in the best interest of its citizens and 
to protect its traditional territory. The Tsilhqot’in communities worked with local residents 
to fend off the Kleena Kleene fire and two of the largest wildfires in 2017— the Plateau 
Fire and the Hanceville Complex Fire.
The Tsilhqot’in have deep traditional knowledge of their territory, which they have 
inhabited since time immemorial. Their awareness of the lands and weather systems are 
part of their daily teachings. Many of the people work on the lands that surround the 
communities and make a livelihood because of their familiarity with the terrain. Despite 
this, the Tsilhqot’in were underutilized, their jurisdiction was disrespected, and their 
knowledge was disregarded and treated with disdain. 
After the 2017 wildfires had subsided and the Tsilhqot’in leadership had time to reflect on 
the scope of what their Nation as a whole and their individual communities experienced, 
they began their long work to recovery. On Nov. 21, 2017, the Tsilhqot’in National 
Government called for a public inquiry into the wildfires stating that the government 
agencies failed to acknowledge the Tsilhqot’in Nation — their authority, expertise and 
capabilities. The Tsilhqot’in Nation challenged the Provincial and Federal government 
Executive Summary
Tsilhqot’in Nation in a State of Emergency
Tsilhqot’in Nation Inquiry Into Wildfires
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to take a hard look at developing coordinated emergency response efforts integrating 
Tsilhqot’in legal authorities.
In April of 2018, the Nation signed a Collaborative Emergency Management Agreement 
with both the Federal and Provincial Governments.  The agreement was founded 
upon establishing emergency response assistance comparable to those availed to non-
Indigenous communities, providing safety and security to the First Nation communities.  
The Tsilhqot’in Nation compiled a team of experts to capture the wildfire experiences 
from their communities, develop a collective set of recommendations and highlight the 
best practices in a Tsilhqot’in-led inquiry report — The Fire Awakened Us. The research 
team consisted of a cross-section of expertise and perspectives. This included: senior level 
Tsilhqot’in National Government staff experienced in negotiations, health, forestry, lands 
and resources; community representatives and knowledge holders; as well as external 
partners with expertise in disaster management, fire ecology, and disaster law. Over five 
months, the team conducted extensive research in each of the communities through 
interviews, facilitated Nation and specialized services meetings. In addition, the research 
included a review and analysis on the statutory and regulatory laws governing emergency 
management for First Nations in British Columbia, an extensive review of existing reports, 
a scientific assessment of the wildfire forest fuel risks and community risk vulnerability 
assessments.
The report highlights a series of calls to action based upon the core challenges that 
the Tsilhqot’in experienced throughout the wildfires. The challenges that the Nation 
encountered are a/an:
• Inadequate building and water infrastructure on reserve not at a standard to meet 
basic emergency guidelines; 
• Lack of respect and acknowledgement toward First Nation leadership and 
decision making; 
• Complete disregard to community skills, qualifications, and knowledge of the 
lands; 
• Widespread treatment of inferiority felt by local First Nation and non-First Nation 
residents and regional industry experts; 
• Tremendous shortage of emergency management financial resources devoted 
to First Nation community mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery 
measures leaving them disproportionately susceptible to risk compared to similar 
size non-First Nation communities; 
• Shortfall in a collaborative approach by First Nation service agencies to provide 
support to the affected communities during the wildfires; and 
 
• Disregard for Tsilhqot’in advice and recommendations on recovery measures 
within the Chilcotin provided by Tsilhqot’in.
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The 33-recommendation report outlines infrastructure requirements, pre-disaster 
agreements, land-based stabilization measures and dedicated financial resources 
through all stages of emergency management. The condensed recommendations are: 
1. Developing a centralized 
Indigenous-led Emergency Centre 
in Tsilhqot’in territory with satellite 
sites at each community with 
advanced safety and emergency 
equipment.
2. Constructing or updating equipped 
fire halls in each reserve.
3. Building gathering spaces and safe 
muster areas. 
4. Creating an immediate on-reserve 
housing & infrastructure strategy 
fund to address recovery and basic 
needs. 
5. Establishing lodging in and around 
each community to accommodate 
emergency personnel.  
6. Investing in basic public services 
along Highway 20 and Taseko Lake 
Road corridor.
 
7. Establishing highway signage to 
clearly identify community locations. 
8. Widening and maintaining roads to 
communities and egress routes.
9. Investing in an extensive and 
advanced protocol agreement 
that establishes an active and 
collaborative leadership role for the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation. 
10. Ratifying Nation-to-Nation 
evacuation location agreements with 
First Nation partners.
11. Entering into a Service Agency/
Tsilhqot’in agreement built upon 
respect and recognition of Tsilhqot’in 
jurisdiction. 
12. Developing an inter-agency First 
Nation service provider agreement in 
the event of an emergency.
13. Launching a progressive framework 
contract with British Columbia for 
on-the-ground emergency response 
within Tsilhqot’in territory. 
14. Establishing subsidized direct, 
ongoing, dependable funding for 
training and certification promoting 
Tsilhqot’in expertise. 
15. Providing subsidized direct funding 
for Tsilhqot’in communities to 
plan in all areas of emergency 
management.
16. Establishing subsidized direct 
funding for Tsilhqot’in emergency 
management personnel.
17. Establishing a subsidized Tsilhqot’in 
Association of Emergency 
Responders with the responsibility 
to coordinate an integrated 
Nation-level response emergency 
management. 
18. Providing direct funding for 
Tsilhqot’in-led targeted skills and 
employment training and reduction 
of barriers to employment initiatives.  
19.  Crafting a holistic health support 
system that includes short-to-mid 
and long-term health support 
initiatives. 
20. Piloting forest fuel reduction 
practices with training through 
Indigenous-led fuel mitigation 
measures. 
21. Conducting a Tsilhqot’in-managed 
comprehensive study on the Cariboo 
Chilcotin forest ecosystem affected 
by the wildfires.
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22. Applying joint management methods 
to the Tsilhqot’in territory beginning 
with the separation from the Williams 
Lake Timber Supply Area. 
23. Engaging in Tsilhqot’in-led 
rehabilitation planning at the territorial 
level. 
24. Creating a mechanism for tracking 
and compensating ongoing cultural 
impacts and cumulative impacts. 
25. Performing geotechnical work to 
stabilize banks, roads and install 
culverts in response to wildfire 
vegetation damage.
26. Conducting a damage assessment 
to archeological sites and creating/
implementing mitigation and 
protection measure for sensitive sites. 
27. Developing a Tsilhqot’in Economic 
Diversification report in anticipation 
of the decrease of forestry-related 
economics. 
28. Strengthening and expanding 
collaborative enforcement efforts 
on Tsilhqot’in territory to promote 
cultural, economic and ecological 
values as the land recovers from 
wildfire.
29. Establishing a one-stop reimbursement 
process for First Nations governments.
30. Reimbursing communities in 
accordance with the principle of 
building back better to mitigate future 
disaster risk. 
31. Advancing Tsilhqot’in recovery 
requests for financial assistance 
towards community rebuilding before 
2019 (seventeen months after the 2017 
wildfire began). 
32. Developing clear financial 
arrangements and compensation 
measures in advance of the next 
emergency.
33.  Applying Jordan’s Principle to 
emergency management on reserve.
The core challenges highlight a complete disregard for First Nation authority governing 
their citizens and the lands on which they reside.  These calls to actions are the first 
steps to recognizing the role of First Nations governments in leading emergency 
response in their own communities and territories.
Perseverance Despite All Odds
The Tsilhqot’in territory, while expansive and remote, is deprived of major emergency 
infrastructure, leaving Tsilhqot’in citizens and non-First Nations residents vulnerable to 
disasters. The First Nation communities have unsatisfactory basic infrastructure and are not 
prepared with a cache of wildfire suppression equipment.  Nevertheless, the Tsilhqot’in 
commenced culturally-informed emergency operational processes, appointed emergency 
operational staff and established wildfire crews immediately. They set up Emergency 
Operation Centres, base camps, muster camps and provided food to hundreds of people at 
outdoor kitchens operating without electricity. 
Despite threats of child apprehension, intimidations of arrests, an overall lack of wildfire 
suppression support and cooperation, the Tsilhqot’in communities knew the only way to 
protect their homes, community and territory was to assume the responsibility of fighting 
the fires. 
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The 2017 wildfires and the provincially-led response has had devastating effects on the 
Tsilhqot’in people and their lands. As advocates for their citizens and First Nation people, 
the Tsilhqot’in Nation has chosen to publicly tell their story and are actively seeking 
methods to instill true participation in emergency management that is respectful of their 
values and traditions. 
This is an opportunity to reconcile government-to-government relationships in an area 
that is complex but critical. Advancements to co-management in emergency management 
create fundamental building blocks that could be applied to resolving the many First 
Nation jurisdictional battles. A transformation in emergency management should be led by 
First Nations but supported by the Provincial and Federal Governments to make the most 
appropriate and meaningful change. Recognizing First Nation values and decision making 
require courage and leadership by all governments.
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dr. JoCelYn stACeY & eMMA feltes
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This appendix analyses the question of jurisdiction arising from the 2017 wildfires that 
spread across Tsilhqot’in territory. Jurisdiction answers the question: who has the authority 
to govern or decide? The attached report, Nagwedizk’an gwanes gangu ch’inidzed 
ganexwilagh; The Fire Awakened Us, notes numerous significant decisions and actions 
taken during wildfire response, recovery and mitigation in which the answer to the 
question of jurisdiction was unclear or contested. These issues are flagged throughout the 
report with the Tsilhqot’in flag.
This appendix addresses those jurisdictional markers that are flagged throughout the 
report. It explains the core jurisdictional challenge, source of the jurisdictional ambiguity, 
conflict or gap and it elaborates the specific calls to action that are identified as 
jurisdictional recommendations.  
That the emergency revealed a complex set of jurisdictional issues is a symptom of 
the complex legal web in Tsilhqot’in territory. This web creates barriers as well as 
opportunities for the exercise of Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction. Preparedness for the next 
emergency requires British Columbia, Canada and the Tsilhqot’in Nation to collaboratively 
and meaningfully work toward addressing fundamental jurisdictional challenges with 
respect to land, resources, people, and economic opportunities in Tsilhqot’in territory. This 
chapter of the report is one piece of this ongoing collaborative project.
The appendix discusses jurisdictional calls to action in relation to three headings: (1) 
Pre-Disaster Agreements, (2) Land Based and Economic Stabilization Measures, and (3) 
Dedicated Financial Resources.
Prime Minister Trudeau Delivered statement of exoneration for Tsilhqot’in Chiefs
(right to left) Chief Jimmy lulua, Chief Joe Alphonse, Prime Minister Trudeau, Chief otis guichon,
Chief victor roy stump, Chief Francis laceese and Chief russell Myers ross
Photograph By: TNG
Recognizing Tsilhqot’in 
Jurisdiction in Emergency Management
Dr. Jocelyn Stacey & Emma Feltes
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Core Challenge: 
 First Nations leadership ought to be at the centre of effective and appropriate emergency 
management in First Nations communities. This requires the recognition of Indigenous 
emergency management laws and practices and the coordination and support of 
regional, provincial and federal agencies. 
Emergency management in Tsilhqot’in territory is governed by the Tsilhqot’in people’s 
inherent jurisdiction over their land, resources and people. It is also governed by 
delegated powers exercised under the federal Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5. In Tsilhqot’in 
territory, emergency management is also governed by local and provincial authorities 
exercising powers under the Emergency Program Act, RSBC 1996, c 111. The federal 
government plays a supportive role in emergency management through Emergency 
Management Act, SC 2007, c 15.
As described in the report, these overlapping authorities created conflict and confusion. 
The failure on the part of regional, provincial and federal agencies to recognize 
Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction and expertise left Tsilhqot’in communities and territory vulnerable 
to ineffective, disrespectful and traumatic emergency management operations.
Multiple emergency management regimes must be reconciled through respectful, clear 
and detailed pre-disaster agreements that honour Tsilhqot’in authority. 
CAll to ACtion 9
Advanced protocol agreements that outline an active and  
collaborative leadership role for the Tsilhqot’in Nation
A fundamental step for building on the Collaborative Emergency Management Agreement 
(2018) is to establish advanced protocol agreements that place Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction at 
the centre of emergency response in Tsilhqot’in communities. 
Protocol agreements ought to recommit the parties to a partnership of mutual respect and 
understanding. It is clear that in recognizing and maintaining a respectful, collaborative 
partnership in emergency management there is no place for threats to force Tsilhqot’in 
leaders into decisions that are not in the best interests of their communities in which they 
govern.
These advanced protocol agreements should outline how British Columbia and Canada 
can play a supporting and coordinated role in Tsilhqot’in emergency management by 
outlining the procedures, roles and responsibilities for critical emergency management 
decisions such as the declaration of a state of emergency and evacuation orders. When 
the Province and Tsilhqot’in leadership agree on evacuation, for example, established 
protocols should recognize a tiered approach to relocations with room for Chief & Council 
led conditions. Effective emergency management in Tsilhqot’in territory requires advanced 
protocol agreements that address jurisdictional coordination at all stages of emergency 
management (preparedness, response, recovery and prevention).  
Pre-Disaster Agreements
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Implementing these protocols will also require updating existing regional, provincial 
and federal emergency response policies which currently assume passive involvement 
of First Nations governments and deference to provincial decisions. For example, British 
Columbia’s Evacuation Operational Guidelines (2009) and Indigenous and Northern 
Affairs Canada suggest that Band Councils should have a standing, pre-signed evacuation 
order in place, presumably so that it can be invoked automatically whenever a provincial 
evacuation order is issued. This effectively neutralizes First Nations’ legal jurisdiction over 
evacuations. This policy should be changed to address provincial emergency response 
procedures when First Nations communities have assessed their emergency risk exposure 
and decided not to evacuate.
Recognition of Tsilhqot’in adaptable emergency measures, orders and 
culturally appropriate relocation protocols that differ in form and substance from 
regional, provincial and federal actions
Recognition of Tsilhqot’in leadership entails respect for emergency measures that differ 
in both form and substance from regional, provincial and federal emergency measures. 
Tsilhqot’in leadership implemented innovative emergency measures during the 2017 
wildfires. In Tl’etinqox, Chief and Council issued a “relocation order” rather than an 
evacuation order. The relocation order directed vulnerable citizens to move to another 
Tsilhqot’in community (Tl’etinqox 2017 Wildfire Report). In contrast, an evacuation order 
would have required Tl’etinqox members to move to evacuation centres in larger cities. 
The relocation order was designed to avoid the harmful effects of the 2009 and 2010 
evacuations that were reminiscent of community members’ experiences in Residential 
Schools.  
In Yunesit’in, after the evacuation order had been downgraded to an alert, Chief 
and Council understood that the air quality conditions were too poor for vulnerable 
community members to return. In response, they worked to identify vulnerable community 
members, and facilitate a staggered re-entry process into the community. This allowed 
for continued support for Yunesit’in members, despite the lifting of the evacuation order. 
?Esdilagh evacuated their citizens to the city of Quesnel, but only after ensuring that there 
were adequate lodging available for their members. While the community evacuated 
they made arrangements to ensure that key personnel were enabled entry to maintain the 
existing community systems and facilities.
These orders are examples of the exercise of Tsilhqot’in emergency management practices 
that can and should be recognized through protocol agreements. They present concrete 
opportunities for regional, provincial and federal support in realizing Tsilhqot’in leadership 
in emergency response.
Protocols for child protection during emergencies
The threats of child apprehension and preparations for removing children from Tl’esqox 
were excessive and disrespectful. If acted upon, they would have undermined the exercise 
of Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction over emergency management. Notably, Tl’etinqox had in place 
a relocation order for vulnerable citizens. This demonstrates that leadership had already 
established Tsilhqot’in emergency response plans to protect children during the wildfire.
In light of Canada’s recently announced plan to transfer responsibility for child welfare 
from provinces to Indigenous governments, protocols specifically addressing child 
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protection during emergencies ought to be developed between the Tsilhqot’in Nation, 
Ministry of Child and Family Development and Indigenous Services Canada. These 
protocols should delineate the supportive role that the Ministry of Child and Family 
Development can play in facilitating the development and implementation of Tsilhqot’in 
emergency response measures for the protection of children. To this end, the Tsilhqot’in 
Nation notes the existence of detailed yet unimplemented recommendations on improving 
child protection services on reserve that provide a strong foundation for moving forward 
on this issue.1  
 
Protocols on geographic coordination of wildfire response 
that reflect Tsilhqot’in fire crew knowledge of the land
As the report documents, the 2017 wildfire response contained countless missed 
opportunities for integrating Tsilhqot’in knowledge of the territory. Moving forward, 
protocol agreements that focus on geographic coordination of local fire crews can help 
ensure that firefighting expertise is strategically deployed to reflect knowledge of the land. 
Protocol agreements can incorporate a tiered approach that prioritizes Tsilhqot’in crew 
work in the crews’ home communities; secondarily, elsewhere in Tsilhqot’in territory; 
and finally, other locations across the province where additional fire fighting capacity is 
needed. Formalized protocols will help ensure that Tsilhqot’in capacity and expertise is 
harnessed in a way that protects both Tsilhqot’in communities and the province at large.
Protocols should also address opportunities for collaboration and sharing of technical 
expertise on wildfire response to protect Tsilhqot’in lands. The Tsilhqot’in National 
Government has significant land-based and technical expertise. The Tsilhqot’in National 
Government GIS and mapping team provided detailed and dynamic information on the 
fires to Tsilhqot’in communities throughout the 2017 wildfire season. Only at the end of 
the 2017 wildfires was this mapping and technical expertise incorporated into wildfire 
strategy to minimize or avoid impacts on important cultural sites.
Protocol agreements should immediately establish formalized community liaison 
positions within regional and provincial emergency operations for Tsilhqot’in citizens 
as an immediate stop-gap measure for the next emergency. This will establish a direct 
community-incident commander communication channel as BC, Canada and the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation move toward an emergency management model that has significant 
First Nations expertise embedded in provincial agencies (see Call to Action 13).
Revision of protocols to ensure that land, resource and wildlife recovery and mitigation 
decisions are based on Tsilhqot’in cumulative impacts assessment and 
value-based approaches and incorporated into territorial management plans
Moving forward on wildfire recovery requires a commitment by all parties to make 
informed decisions that account for cumulative impacts and are respectful of different 
value-based systems with respect to land, resources and wildlife. For example, BC’s 2018 
Limited Entry Hunt decisions for moose have been based largely on well-developed 
studies on the impact of human threats. The Tsilhqot’in Nation opposes this approach 
because it has been taken in the absence of a full cumulative impacts assessment of 
1 Representative for Children and Youth, Lost in the Shadows: How a Lack of Help Meant a Loss of Hope for One First Nations 
Girl (February, 2014); Special Advisor Grand Chief Ed John, Indigenous Resilience, Connectedness and Reunification – From 
Root Cases to Root Solutions: A Report on Indigenous Child Welfare in British Columbia (November, 2016).
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human, habitat and non-human predation threats to the moose population. Tsilhqot’in law 
accounted for these three pillars of threats identified in the Tsilhqot’in Moose Management 
Plan. The Nation has also taken into account the well-established environmental principle 
of precaution, which guides decision-making in the absence of full information about 
environmental impacts. 
The 2018 Moose Co-Management Agreement affirms a partnership between BC and 
Tsilhqot’in governments in establishing a moose management framework for 2019. It 
remains to be seen whether this co-management agreement will adequately incorporate 
and implement Tsilhqot’in cumulative impacts assessment and values with respect to 
wildfire in Tsilhqot’in territory.
Call to Action 11
Enter into Service Agency/Tsilhqot’in agreements built on 
respect and recognition of Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction 
At a fundamental and practical level, recognition of Tsilhqot’in leadership requires 
that emergency response officials — regional, provincial and federal — have a basic 
understanding of Tsilhqot’in communities, including their jurisdiction and governance 
structure. Agreements with service agencies must enshrine a commitment to respectful, 
ongoing and collaborative working relationships with Tsilhqot’in communities. Building 
these relationships is a year-round task, not limited to the fire season.
Agency-specific agreements should establish protocols for entering into the communities 
and working with the communities on all matters, including emergency management. 
These protocol agreements should mandate cultural awareness and sensitivity training 
for all agencies providing services to the community. Training ought to include 
fundamental training in Tsilhqot’in governance structures and jurisdiction in order to avoid 
confrontation based in misinformation on the part of officials during the 2017 wildfires. 
Core Challenges: 
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The wildfires revealed a set of fundamental jurisdictional challenges and opportunities 
in relation to land and wildlife stewardship. The exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by 
British Columbia and the Tsilhqot’in over mushroom harvesting and moose hunting 
in Tsilhqot’in territory present case studies in collaboration and conflict. Long-term 
rehabilitation efforts and fire mitigation measures present opportunities for collaborative 
planning and decision-making throughout Tsilhqot’in territory.
The jurisdictional issues over land and stewardship arising from the 2017 wildfires 
are products of the complex jurisdictional web that overlays Tsilhqot’in territory. 
The Tsilhqot’in Nation exercises inherent jurisdiction over its territory. Canadian law 
recognizes and affirms Tsilhqot’in rights and title in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982. Tsilhqot’in title to a portion of Tsilhqot’in territory was recognized by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in 2014. Since this decision, issues of jurisdiction with respect to the 
Declared Title Area (DTA) and the rest of Tsilhqot’in territory are guided by Nenqay 
Deni Accord (BC and Tsilhqot’in Nation) (NDA)2 and the Letter of Understanding (LOU)3  
between the Tsilhqot’in Nation and Canada: January 27, 2017.
2 “Nenqay Deni Accord” February 2016,  http://www.tsilhqotin.ca/Portals/0/PDFs/Nenqay_Deni_Accord.pdf
3 “Letter of Understanding” January 27, 2017, http://www.tsilhqotin.ca/Portals/0/PDFs/Press%20Releases/2017_01_27_Tsilhqo-
tin_Canada_LOU.pdf
Land Based and Economic Stabilization 
Measures
Call to Action 28
Strengthen and expand collaborative enforcement efforts 
on Tsilhqot’in Territory to promote cultural, biocultural, 
economic and ecological values as land & wildlife recover 
from wildfire.
The implementation and enforcement of Tsilhqot’in laws over mushroom harvesting in 
the post-fire 2018 mushroom picking season was a tremendous collaborative success. The 
successful mushroom permitting scheme was the product of a supportive and collaborative 
enforcement relationship between Tsilhqot’in Rangers, provincial conservation officers, 
provincial natural resource officers and the RCMP. This model of enforcement cooperation 
can serve as a foundation for strengthening and expanding compliance and enforcement 
efforts on Tsilhqot’in territory. 
The enforcement partnership developed to implement Tsilhqot’in mushroom permitting 
law should be formalized and expanded to other areas of land, resource and environment 
regulation, including biocultural restoration. Strengthening and enhancing collaborative 
enforcement mechanisms appropriately reflect the complex jurisdictional web that 
overlays Tsilhqot’in territory.
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Call to Action 23
Engage in rehabilitation and fire mitigation planning at the territorial level with 
Tsilhqot’in communities playing an active leadership role.
Tsilhqot’in jurisdiction, extensive land-based knowledge and deep connection to the 
land through cultural and subsistence practices all require the Tsilhqot’in Nation and the 
communities to play a leading role in forest planning decisions around rehabilitation and 
mitigation in the territory. Rehabilitation after the 2017 wildfires has involved opportunities 
for some Tsilhqot’in forest companies to take on particular rehabilitation contracts. But the 
Tsilhqot’in have not been treated as a collaborative partner in landscape-level planning 
decisions taken by British Columbia in Tsilhqot’in territory.
The Nenqay Deni Accord and the Tsilhqot’in Stewardship Agreement set out guiding 
principles for an active and collaborative role for Tsilhqot’in leadership in land and 
stewardship decision in Tsilhqot’in territory. The Tsilhqot’in National Government calls for 
recognition and recommitment to these principles to ensure the Tsilhqot’in Nation has a 
key role in determining the vision, priorities and specific decisions that will be taken in its 
territory.
The jurisdictional gap with respect to the DTA is acute. As the DTA is in the process 
of transition back to full Tsilhqot’in management and control, British Columbia has 
committed to continuing to “prepare for and respond to emergencies in around the 
Title Area” in accordance with provincial laws, plans and policies under the Emergency 
Program Act.4  Moreover, British Columbia has assumed all liability and risks arising from 
emergencies within the DTA, as if it were provincial Crown land.5  These provisions in the 
agreement speak to emergency preparedness, response and compensation.
Yet, the Emergency Response Protocol is silent on mitigation and prevention. Forests 
within the DTA are a known wildfire risk in immediate need of proper forest stewardship 
planning and fuel management to mitigate this risk. However, as a result of the transfer 
of ownership of the DTA, the Tsilhqot’in National Government and Xeni Gwet’in have 
not been able to access existing provincial programs for implementing fuel mitigation 
measures. Without support, the Nation and Xeni Gwet’in lack capacity to take the 
necessary steps to mitigate known fire risks.
Fire mitigation planning in Tsilhqot’in territory, and particularly in the DTA, requires a 
regional planning process in collaboration with the Tsilhqot’in Nation and with Tsilhqot’in 
communities playing an active leadership role. 
4 Emergency Response Protocol (2015), s 2.
5 Emergency Response Protocol (2015), s 5.
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Core Challenges: 
The financial risks and inadequate disaster compensation experienced by Tsilhqot’in 
communities are the products of jurisdictional gaps in emergency management in 
First Nations communities. From an emergency financing perspective, the Tsilhqot’in 
communities were treated as equivalent to local governments – expected to cover up-
front emergency response costs and seek reimbursement. Yet Tsilhqot’in communities 
lack the financial capacity to operate on a reimbursement model, creating significant 
financial risk and uncertainty for the communities. Moreover, disaster compensation that 
simply restores Tsilhqot’in communities to their pre-fire state leaves these communities 
vulnerable to future wildfire. The 2017 wildfires present a crucial opportunity to recover 
communities in a way that attends to the major infrastructure gaps that create disaster 
vulnerability. 
Reimbursement and recovery costs for First Nations communities are ultimately sourced 
by Canada. However, BC is responsible for administering the reimbursement process for 
BC First Nations. This added level of jurisdictional coordination created a significant and 
stressful administrative burden for Tsilhqot’in communities attempting to recover from a 
disaster. Moreover, it has meant that costs have yet to be full recovered, over a year after 
the wildfires ended.
Call to Action 32
Establish clear financial arrangements and compensation measures 
developed together between Tsilhqot’in, regional, provincial, and 
federal authorities in advance of an emergency
Recognition of First Nations as lead authorities for emergency management requires 
enhancing the financial capacity of First Nations to carry out this responsibility. Funding 
arrangements that enable Tsilhqot’in leadership to effectively implement emergency 
management practices – prevention, preparedness, response and recovery – are required.  
(See Calls to Action 13-17, which are necessary to realize this commitment.)
Proportionate compensation and restitution processes that accurately 
reflect the Nation’s reliance on land-based sustenance
Disaster compensation must attend to the different ways in which disasters result in loss of 
livelihood in Indigenous communities. Tsilhqot’in citizens are coping with the immediate 
and long-term impacts of the wildfires on land-based practices, including traditional 
sustenance and use of medicinal plants. Hunting, fishing, gathering and cultural practices 
have been and will continue to be affected for decades. The Red Cross provides some 
short-term relief for “cultural livelihood” funding, but there exists no known mechanism 
for supporting and repairing communities which are experiencing long-term loss.
The Tsilhqot’in Nation can, with the support of provincial and federal partners play a 
leadership role in monitoring and assessing long-term land-based losses and formulating 
new models of disaster restitution that respond to cultural and subsistence losses. 
Financial assistance agreements should provide for adequate support to monitor long-
Dedicated Financial Resources
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term losses in game, fish, medicine, berries and other cultural losses in Tsilhqot’in 
territory. The Tsilhqot’in Nation calls on provincial and federal partners to develop disaster 
compensation agreements that incorporate Tsilhqot’in principles of restitution and which 
accurately reflect the individual and collective impacts of disaster over time.
Reserve fund for Tsilhqot’in emergency response and a commitment to 
the timely advance of federal reserve funds for emergency situations
Tsilhqot’in leadership in wildfire management requires access to funding for immediate 
emergency response. Establishing a reserve fund for emergency response will enable 
Tsilhqot’in leadership to take urgent and needed action to address wildfire threats 
without also taking the financial leap of faith that is entailed by a reimbursement 
structure. Protocol agreements for accessing the reserve fund can be drafted in advance 
to address, for example: necessary pre-conditions for reserve fund access (e.g. declaring 
a state of emergency), and a non-exclusive itemized list of automatically authorized 
expenditures (e.g. salary, sustenance and travel expenditures for fire crews). The creation 
of well-understood guidelines for acceptable and pre-authorized expenses alleviates the 
uncertainty of negotiating expenses piece-by-piece while also allowing communities to 
respond appropriately and effectively during the emergency.
Call to Action 29
Pilot project for a one-stop, coordinated reimbursement process 
for First Nations governments in BC
The Tsilhqot’in Nation recommends a reimbursement process that has a clear lead 
authority which works directly with Tsilhqot’in communities to reimburse communities for 
emergency response expenditures that are not covered by the reserve fund. Identifying and 
empowering a single lead authority responds to the cumbersome reimbursement process 
experienced by Tsilhqot’in communities in 2017-18. A single lead authority supports the 
adoption and implementation of Jordan’s Principle in this context. 
Reimburse communities in accordance with the principle of 
building back better to mitigate future disaster risk
Canada should commit to and implement the principle of building back better in a way 
that recognizes the systemic inequality experienced by First Nations communities. The 
principle of building back better is identified as a key priority in international disaster best 
practices.6  ‘Build back better’ recognizes that disaster recovery is a crucial opportunity to 
rebuild communities in a way that better prepares communities for the next emergency. 
The Tsilhqot’in Nation recognizes Canada’s commitment to 15% mitigation enhancements 
through the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements.7  The 15% rule reflects the need 
for additional funding to restore and improve damaged infrastructure after a disaster. 
This rule should be extended to First Nations communities receiving compensation for 
6 UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030), Priority 4.
7 Guidelines for the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements - Interpretation Bulletin 7 (January 1, 2017).
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disaster recovery. Tsilhqot’in Nation requests a baseline commitment from Canada to 15% 
mitigation enhancements to public and private infrastructure in Tsilhqot’in communities.
Moreover, the significant and well-known disparities between infrastructure on First 
Nations reserves and in non-First Nations communities requires Canada and the provinces 
to negotiate in good faith with First Nations communities to provide enhanced critical 
infrastructure and ensure basic infrastructure standards are met. Accordingly, and in 
addition to the financial baseline, the Nation requests an ongoing commitment by Canada 
and British Columbia to work with communities to mitigate all future concerns.
Call to Action 33
Apply Jordan’s Principle to emergency 
management on reserve
The Tsilhqot’in Nation identifies Jordan’s Principle as the appropriate basis for guiding 
funding for emergency management in First Nations communities. The Tsilhqot’in Nation 
recommends that British Columbia and Canada commit to extending Jordan’s Principle 
to ensure that jurisdictional ambiguity and complexity do not deny or delay the provision 
of essential services in First Nations communities during and after an emergency. Jordan’s 
Principle is explained below. 
Just as jurisdictional ambiguity and complexity exacerbates the vulnerability of First 
Nations children in need of social services, jurisdictional ambiguity and complexity 
operate to enhance the vulnerability of First Nations communities to threats such as 
wildfire. Jurisdictional complexity interfered with the ability of Tsilhqot’in communities 
to respond immediately to the perceived wildfire threat. Jurisdictional complexity 
caused significant delays in reimbursement of emergency management expenses further 
threatening the ability of communities to run their governments for the remainder of the 
year. As noted above, dealing with multiple departments and a complex reimbursement 
process placed a substantial administrative burden on small communities in the midst of 
wildfire recovery.
The Tsilhqot’in Nation recommends that British Columbia and Canada adopt a 
community-first approach. It recommends that the governments recognize the spirit and 
intention of Jordan’s Principle and extend the application of this principle to emergency 
management on reserve.
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BCR   Band Council Resolution
CAF   Canadian Armed Forces
CRD   Cariboo Regional District
CTA   Community Tripartite Agreement
DISC   Department of Indigenous Services Canada
DSS   Denisiqi Services Society
DTA   Declared Title Area
EI   Employment Insurance 
EFF   Emergency Fire Fighter
EMBC   Emergency Management British Columbia
EOC   Emergency Operations Centre
FNESS   First Nations’ Emergency Services Society of British Columbia
FNHA   First Nation Health Authority
FNS   First Nation Summit
GIS   Geographic Information System
GPS   Global Positioning System
INAC   Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada
I.R.   Indian Reserve
LEH   Limited Entry Hunt
LGIC   Lieutenant Governor in Council
LOU   Letter of Understanding - Tsilhqot’in Nation & Canada, Jan. 27, 2018
MCFD   Ministry of Children & Family Development
MLA   Member of Legislative Assembly
NDA   Nenqay Deni Accord - Tsilhqot’in Nation & BC, Feb. 12, 2016
PREOC  Provincial Regional Emergency Operations Centre
PTSD   Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
RCMP   Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RSBC   Revised Statutes of British Columbia (Canada)
RSC   Revised Statutes of Canada
S100   Basic Fire Suppression and Safety
S185   Fire Entrapment Avoidance & Safety
SUP   Structural Protection Unit
TDDE   Tsi Deldel Enterprises Ltd. 
TEOP   Tl’etinqox Emergency Operations Centre
TNG   Tsilhqot’in National Government
TRU   Thompson Rivers University
UBCIC  Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs
YDE   Yunesit’in Development Enterprises
 
Acronyms
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The Tsilhqot’in Wildfire project began by seeking and building partnerships with a diversity 
of experts in the field. Under the leadership of consultant Crystal Verhaeghe, a project team 
was struck in April 2018, bringing together a cross-section of expertise and perspectives. 
This included senior level TNG staff with experience in negotiations, health, forestry, lands 
and resources, as well as external partners with expertise in disaster management, fire 
ecology, and disaster law. Out of this, a strong partnership developed with two experts 
from the University of British Columbia, Dr. Jocelyn Stacey (Peter Allard School of Law) and 
Emma Feltes (PhD Candidate, Anthropology), who joined Crystal as research collaborators 
and co-authors of the report. Dr. Stacey and Feltes additionally analyzed the complexity 
of emergency management laws and the intersection of government and First Nation 
jurisdiction. Dr. Stacey and Feltes developed recommendations to improve cooperation and 
reduce conflict in First Nation wildfire management.  
 
Informed by the 2018 Collaborative Emergency Management Agreement and TNG 
leadership, the project team determined the scope of the project. It was unanimous that 
the priority should be on thoroughly documenting the unique experiences of each of the 
six Tsilhqot’in communities during the 2017 wildfires, while at the same time capturing 
the collective impacts on the Tsilhqot’in nation as a whole and identifying in particular the 
inter-jurisdictional issues that arose between Tsilhqot’in, federal, provincial, and third-party 
entities.
 
To accomplish this breadth of scope, and over five months of intensive research, our 
methodology included:
• Extensive qualitative research in each of the six Tsilhqot’in communities, amounting to 82 
semi-structured interviews. The team interviewed Chiefs, band councillors, band staff, 
forestry experts, emergency management personnel, community fire crews, Elders, and 
other community members. Additionally, government and First Nations representatives 
including the First Nations Summit, Aboriginal Affairs, Canadian Red Cross and 
Emergency Advisory representatives were interviewed.  
• Two facilitated, open nation-wide sessions with the objective of enabling a venue for 
Tsilhqot’in citizens and staff to reflect on the 2017 wildfire experience and identify best 
practices, gaps, challenges and recommendations. These sessions were supported by 
mental health advocates since debriefing is often a time to heal and reflect about the 
traumatic experiences. One session was held in the Fall of 2017 and another in the Fall of 
2018.  
• A facilitated community emergency operations Centre session held one year after the 
wildfires to assess the community health and wellbeing. The session was held to reflect on 
the state of the community one year later and to identify how the recovery process was 
progressing. From this session a breadth of needs were identified.  
• Two Nation-level meetings with Wildfire Recovery managers to review community-level 
and shared recovery needs for each community.  
Methodology
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• A scientific assessment by a fire ecologist to look at on-the-ground conditions and 
impacts. 
• Community risk vulnerability assessments with each of the six Tsilhqot’in communities 
and to determine each communities’ level of threat in the event of future emergencies.  
• An expert review and analysis of existing statutory and regulatory law regarding 
emergency management in First Nations in British Columbia. 
• An in-depth review of existing reports and emerging literature on wildfire and disaster 
management on First Nations reserves. 
 
• A Review of community wildfire recovery reports.  
This wealth of collected data and expert knowledge has all come to inform the final report. 
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